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ABSTRACT
Land rights claims remain the major focus of world indigenous movements. 
Lands relate to the formation of indigenous identity, religious practices, and the 
material base for indigenous cultural survival. From a spatial/geographical 
perspective, this dissertation explores the influences of Taiwan’s state policies on 
indigenous peoples, their cultures, identities, and human-land relationship. The Li- 
Shan area, in central Taiwan, is the focus of the research due to the fact that the most 
severe land disputes are in this area, as well as longest history of economic 
interactions among indigenous peoples, the dominant Han people, and the State, in the 
postwar Taiwan.
The rise o f indigenous movements in the mid-1980s in Taiwan indicated that the 
indigenous peoples remain the victims of colonialism. Appreciating this fact, the 
movements made demands against the State in struggling for “ethnic space.” Although 
the movements drew significant concessions from the State, the majority Han people 
systematically fought back with appeals which deny the existence of any indigenous 
peoples in current Taiwan and requested the abolishment of Aboriginal Reservation 
Lands.
Political economy, new cultural geography, and post-colonial theories provide 
the major theoretical framework for this study. The perpetual uneven ethnic power 
relationships between the dominant Han people and the dominated indigenous peoples 
are examined from the critical perspective of political economy. The new cultural 
geography offers the theoretical backgrounds for discussing cultural and identity 
politics, and multiculturalism. Post-colonial theories are especially helpful in
v
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explaining the social construction of a new indigenous/Taiwanese culture through the 
combination of the colonizing and the colonized cultures, as well as in deconstructing 
mainstream social values, and in illustrating the geography of resistance.
Finally, I wish to summarize the impacts of indigenous movements on three 
aspects of mainstream culture. First, indigenous movements shatter the mainstream 
definition of social justice and question the superficial multiculturalism. Second, the 
indigenous claim of “natural sovereignty” challenges the ideological myth enshrined 
by modem nation-states. Third, indigenous ecological wisdom injects a new and 
different ethic between society and nature. The formation of respect of the indigenous 
“situated” knowledge through an appropriate application in eco-tourism will uphold 
the improvement of ethnic relations.
vi
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have only recently been re-discovered from long- 
lost historical collective memories concealed by successive colonial regimes since 
their first contacts with Han Chinese in the sixteenth century. Although the collective 
histories of the Han majority in Taiwan have been gradually recovered from the forty 
years long martial law implemented by the ICuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s indigenous 
peoples continue to struggle both with respect to their land claims and also their 
cultural revitalization.
Around the world, land rights claims are essential to indigenous peoples and all 
other issues seem inevitably tied to land conflicts. The transnational connections are 
now the important characteristics of the world’s many indigenous movements in terms 
o f  producing mutual support in indigenous struggles against both physical violence 
and cultural hegemony, mostly from modem nation-states. Their collective memories 
of colonial sufferings brought about by foreign domination in contemporary world 
politics provide solid base for the formation of various pan-indigenous identities in 
many locations and countries.
1.1 Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan
As many other indigenous peoples around the world, Taiwan’s indigenous 
peoples suffer from hegemonic state policies, socially, politically, and culturally. 
Mandatory education imposed by the State is conducted in an alien language. 
Standardized textbooks and curricula systematically discriminate against indigenous 
cultures and customs (Chen Hsin-yi 1993). The current national official language 
policy restricts the transfer of indigenous oral histories from the elders to the youths.
with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Ancestral lands were either taken by eminent domain in the name of national security 
or economic development, or alternately fell into the hands o f Han farmers and 
business groups. The introduction of capitalism into areas where tribes now live 
destroyed the traditional subsistence economies as well as social and political 
structures (Huang Ying-kuei 1981). Authority over tribes no longer comes from 
inherited/hereditary chieftains, but rather from taking hold o f positions in public 
office. Traditional ways of hunting and gathering are prohibited by the national park 
system, which epitomizes the colonial controls over indigenous territories. The 
development of ethno-tourism as a designated showcase of the State’s cultural policy 
has become powerful forces that shape and direct the allocation of resources for a 
modern indigenous cultural “renaissance.” Although land rights claims and land- 
related issues are the focuses o f  this research, a thorough examination o f all the related 
social, cultural, and political dimensions of aboriginal problems are essential to build a 
more meaningful understanding of indigenous peoples, and their way of life, thinking, 
concerns, and values.
Many foreign regimes have established control over Taiwan in the past four 
hundred years (Table 1.1). The rugged terrain and high-rising mountains in central 
Taiwan blocked west to east expansions and deterred the territorial growth of the early 
regimes into the mountainous areas and along the eastern coast. Prior to the 
establishment o f prototypes o f any state apparatus, o f course, indigenous peoples have 
lived in Taiwan for thousand o f years. The subsequent relationships o f the indigenous 
peoples with other “foreign” groups have never been equal since these very early 
times. Many archaeological sites discovered in the past few decades clearly
2
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demonstrate that humans, most likely the ancestors of current indigenous peoples in 
Taiwan, have peopled this island since at least 4000 years ago (Liu Yi-chang 1994; for 
a more complete list, see web site:
http://com 5.iis.sinica.edu.tw:8000/~rita/pre_culture/part6.html).
Table 1.1 The “Foreign” Regimes in Taiwan and Their Control Areas
Rulers Years Control Areas
Dutch 1624-61 southern Taiwan only
The Chengs 
(Koxinga)
1661-83 southern Taiwan, control points in mid- and 
northern Taiwan
Ching Dynasty 1683-1895 almost all western plain
Japan 1895-1945 western plain and most of eastern Taiwan
KMT 1945- the whole island
Source: Shepherc 1993; Chuang Ya-chung 1993.
Early Han settlers referred to indigenous peoples living in the plains areas (i.e. 
the plains aborigines Pin Pu Tzu or Pin Pu Fan), who had frequent interactions with 
the agriculturally more advanced Han people, as “cooked f a n ” Those aborigines 
living in the broad Central Mountain Ridges, with little interactions with Han people, 
were, in contrast, called “raw f a n ” The term "fan” is an expression of Han-centrism, 
which literally means “savage people” and is often used to allude to different peoples 
surrounding the China proper other than ethnic Han. It was these terms of “cooked” 
and “raw” that allowed Han settlers to measure the various degrees of Sinicization (i.e. 
assimilated by Chinese culture) of aborigines in Taiwan. They are, ultimately, another 
expression of Han people’s sino-centrism.
During the two hundred years’ span of the Ching Dynasty’s rule (1683-1895), no 
academic or systematic classifications of aborigines were ever conducted. Japan 
undertook extensive ethnological and resource surveys immediately following their 
control of Taiwan (Chen Chao-ju 1992). The mountain aborigines were divided into
3
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either eight or nine or ten groups by Japanese anthropologists, according to different 
criteria (Pan Ying 1995). The ten groups from this classification are Atayal, Thao, 
Bunun, Tsou, Saisiat, Rukai, Amis, Dawu (formerly known as Yami in Lan-Yu 
island), Puyuma, and Paiwan. The Sinicization of the Pin Pu Tzu aborigines in the 
plains areas was already considerably complete and thus it became difficult to 
distinguish group differences even during Japanese colonial rule. However, the 
academic classifications of indigenous peoples, as Wu Mi-cha (1996) argued, were 
derived from certain assumptions and presumed criteria, and were often subject to 
opposition from the peoples in question (Figure 1.1).
The recent resurgence of Pin Pu Tzu identities, which are associated with the 
rise of Taiwan’s indigenous movements, is merely a by-product of the gradually 
popular idea that Taiwan “should be” a multi-ethnic nation-state. This Pin Pu Tzu 
identity does not constitute a separate national identity within Taiwanese nationalism. 
Rather, it is only part of phenomena pertaining to Taiwan’s resurgent nativistic 
identities, which were only allowed to emerge after the lifting of the martial law in 
1987. The impacts of Pm Pu Tzu identity on Taiwan’s society is far less significant, in 
terms of political and cultural influences, than the construction o f a pan-indigenous 
identity, which is one of the main topics in this research (see Chapter 5). The studies 
on the early histories of reclamation and frontier development in Taiwan often neglect 
even the Pin Pu Tzu peoples, who had much more frequent social and economic 
interactions with Han settlers than the mountain aborigines. Rather, most histories 
focus overwhelmingly on the intensive communal strife among Han sub- ethnic 
groups in the nineteenth century and generalize indistinguishably about the
4
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Figure 1.1 The Distribution of Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan 
Source: GIO 1997:21
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Shepherd 1993:3), without carefully 
considering the different degrees of aboriginal Sinicization over time and space.
When the Chinese Nationalist party, the KMT, took control of Taiwan in 1945, 
the traces o f Pin Pu Tzu were barely found in the island, and the mountain aborigines 
had just began their “modernization” process due to Japanese controversial colonial 
development. The KMT’s “mountain policies” promoted Han-centrist assimilation 
policies and a stigmatized ethnic identity which aborigines faced (Hsieh Shih-chung 
1987a) was institutionalized through the mass media, standardized textbooks, and 
government-controlled cultural industries, such as films, literature, and tourism. The 
implementation of prolonged martial law effectively silenced not only indigenous 
peoples, but also the majority of native Han Taiwanese. The rise of indigenous 
movements in Taiwan in the mid-1980s, then, presented tremendous challenges to 
various mainstream ideas and conceptions, such as the homogenizing tendency of 
nation-state ideology, discrimination against “the other” peoples, the superficial 
institutional arrangements of multiculturalism, and human-land relationships. These 
issues will be examined in this study.
I use indigenous peoples and aborigines interchangeably in this dissertation. In 
many literatures (such as Shepherd 1993; Wilmer 1993), the term “aborigines” is no 
longer confined to native people in Australia. I use the term “people” in a way similar 
to the word “nation.” In order to respect their internal differences, the plural form of 
people, peoples, is used when the whole indigenous population is mentioned. 
However, the term “people” implies a more or less political neutrality, while the term 
“nation” hints that a group of people has a stronger will to seek a special status, not
6
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necessarily an independent statehood, within nation-states. The best example to 
illustrate the meaning of “nation” from the perspective o f indigenous peoples is the 
term “First Nations” used widely among indigenous groups in Canada.
“Ethnic group” is used in referring to a group of people within a nation-state 
seeking a “sub-national” identity. There are at least four “ethnic groups” in current 
Taiwan by popular definition: Holo (73%), Hakka (12%), mainlander (13%), and 
aborigine (2%) (Wachman 1994:17; also estimated by the author). The first three 
categories are all sub-Han ethnic groups. In fact, the classifications o f people were a 
political taboo during the martial law era, when identities other than “Chinese” were 
viewed as threats to national security. In this dissertation, for demonstration of the 
successive immigrating waves in the history of Taiwan, the term “native Taiwanese” 
includes only Holo and Hakka groups, in contrast to the late-coming mainlanders, who 
mostly came to Taiwan in 1949. Ironically, the smallest group, the aborigines, was not 
included in my category of native Taiwanese. However, this just reflects the political 
reality in contemporary Taiwan.
I often refer to indigenous peoples as ethnic groups despite the fact that the 
development of indigenous ethno-nationalism is theoretically and practically 
unfeasible in current Taiwan. However, the use of “ethnic groups” does not imply that 
the author denies or neglects the “potential” and willingness o f Taiwan’s indigenous 
peoples to become “nations” in the future.
The KMT regime officially divided Taiwan’s indigenous peoples into two 
groups: aborigines registering in mountains and aborigines registering in plains. They 
are called mountain aborigines and plains aborigines respectively for short by the
7
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KMT. However, these terms should not be confused with their early usage during the 
Ching Dynasty. The early Han colonists called all the Pin Pu Tzu peoples (the 
“cooked” fan) as “plains aborigines” who were assimilated into the Han people and 
virtually disappeared before the KMT came to Taiwan, and all the “raw" fans living in 
the mountain areas as “mountain aborigines.” In the KMT era, Pin Pu Tzu are 
essentially indistinguishable, while the remaining indigenous peoples in the mountains 
have often been forced to migrate to the cities for better economic opportunities. 
Therefore, the KMT’s two categories o f mountain and plains aborigines are in fact, the 
same peoples o f the so-called “raw”/a/7S in previous regimes.
1.2 Colonialism and Politics of Identity
Taiwan’s current social, cultural, and political situations have been significantly 
shaped by, and re-constructed through its colonial histories and their legacies.
Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945 was succeeded by, arguably, another 
colonial regime, the KMT. Taiwan and mainland China were “united” under the KMT 
control from 1945 to 1949 as parts of Republic of China (ROC). After losing the civil 
war to the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the KMT fled to Taiwan with nearly 
two million military personnel and refugees, who are known as “mainlanders” later. 
Taiwan did not benefit from the “independence wave” after World War II, when many 
Third World countries obtained statehood following their political de-colonization. 
The international Cold War structure enabled the ROC government in Taiwan, which 
claimed that its territory includes mainland China and Mongolia, to be considered as 
the sole legitimate government of China until 1971, when the KMT-led ROC
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
government’s seat in the United Nations was displaced by the People’s Republic o f 
China.
The “imagined China” (i.e. the Republic of China) constructed by the KMT in 
postwar Taiwan served as an important basis of legitimacy for its ironfisted military 
rule. The political structures of the ROC were “transplanted” almost completely to the 
island to maintain the ROC’s Chinese orthodoxy. An imagined China was built upon 
Taiwan from the naming o f the streets, the four-layer government structure in a small 
island, and through the destruction and recreation of people’s historical collective 
memories and landscapes.
Japanese colonialism in Taiwan was based not only on economic exploitation, 
but also on cultural assimilation. The economic dimension of colonialism is a much- 
explored topic in theories o f political economy, such as Dependency Theory, World 
Systems Theory, and the early stage of Internal Colonialism. Nevertheless, the cultural 
impacts of colonialism take a much longer time to be thoroughly explored and 
theorized. The rise o f post-colonial literatures reflects the critical reflections on the 
political, social, and cultural impacts of colonialism. The influence of colonialism on 
the formation of identities is as significant on the colonized as on the colonizing 
people.
It is generally accepted, especially from left-wing theorists, pro-Taiwan 
independence scholars, that in many aspects, the early KMT’s military rule in Taiwan 
was akin to colonial rule (Chen Fan-ming 1996:128-41). The right wing pro­
independence scholars tend to describe the Chinese KMT simply as an “alien” regime
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
which neglecting Taiwan’s colonial experience (Huang Chao-tang 1994; and most 
articles in Shih Cheng-fong ed. 1994).
Both Japanese colonialism and Chinese nationalism had forced many of Taiwan’s 
intellectuals into a self-exiled status. As described by Chen Fang-ming (1996:119), 
this “only way out” for the intellectuals include two “geographical” types: internal 
exile and external exile. The former refers to the intellectuals who remain at home, 
and at the same time, refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the political establishment 
imposed by the ruling class/colonizers on the society where they reside. The cultural 
and value system associated with the rulers fails to obtain identification from the 
internal-exiled intellectuals. External exile refers to the elites who are either 
expatriated by the ruling power, or choose to leave their homeland for an alternative 
form of resistance. Internal exile is a form of spiritual exile, while external exile is 
both spiritual and physical. For Taiwanese intellectuals, internal exile was the major 
form of resistance during the Japanese colonial rule, and external exile developed 
during the KMT’s martial law era (Chen Fang-ming 1996:120).
Despite KMT’s construction o f the Chinese Nation identity in Taiwan, a 
nativistic identity movement surged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when economic 
success provided a sound material base, and international pressures offered spiritual 
support for a political democratic movement. Traditional theories of nationalism might 
emphasize/imply the “mutually exclusive” characteristic of two hostile nationalisms 
(see Blaut 1987). However, the post-colonial literatures recognize that the formation 
of identity as a much more complicated process (see Zhang Jingyuan 1995). Two 
hostile nationalisms are often “mutually constructed” concurrently. In Taiwan’s case,
10
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the development of nativistic identity cannot be separated from both the superimposed 
Chinese nationalism, and the previous experience of “Japanization” (see Chen Fang- 
ming 1996). From the indigenous perspective, the formations of a pan-indigenous 
identity and indigenous movements are also inseparable from and inspired by 
aborigines’ interactions with Han people, as well as the collective sufferings of their 
tribes and people which resulted from the State’s hegemonic policies.
The emergence of Taiwan’s pan-indigenous identity is associated with 
democratization and the recent breaking of political taboos, particularly the 
homogenous and one-dimensional identity. Hsieh Shih-chung (1987b) also points out 
that the increasing tolerance of social movements by the ruling KMT was a major 
factor to explain the eruption o f Taiwan’s indigenous movements in the mid-1980s. 
Indigenous movements offer the pan-indigenous identity as the third possible identity, 
other than Chinese and Taiwanese identities. This relatively “new” identity poses 
challenges to the current two major national identities, to the national territorial 
planning for the accommodation of indigenous autonomous zones, and to decision­
making regarding choices for political alliance among major political parties (see 
Chapter 7). However, the actual strength of these challenges will depend on the 
political clout generated from the indigenous movements.
1.3 Land Rights Issues and Environmental Problems
The protection of land rights is the basis of all indigenous movements and claims 
today (Wilmer 1993:183). For indigenous peoples, land relates to culture, society, 
religion, dignity, food production, hunting, and the formation of identity. The land 
rights issues involve not only virtually all aspects of indigenous lives, but also the
11
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basic characteristic of nation-states that claim to have “sovereignty” over a certain 
territory. Indigenous peoples claim that they are not merely native to their countries, 
but they are also the first people and are still there, and so have rights o f prior 
occupancy to their lands (Maybury-Lewis 1997:7). It was the conquerors’ “frontier 
colonialism” which often drove the “first peoples” into marginal lands and 
underprivileged status.
The first and most important organization in Taiwan’s indigenous movements, 
the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA), was founded in December 1984. The ATA 
was also the first pan-ethnic organization which systematically developed an 
indigenous movement (Hsieh Shih-chung 1986). Before the establishment of the ATA, 
an ethnic social movement organization had never systematically evolved due to its 
highly political sensitivity. Land rights have always been one of the central concerns 
of the ATA (see Chapters 5 & 6), and the “Return Our Lands” movements, initiated by 
the ATA, were by far the most successful ethnic mobilization among Taiwan’s 
indigenous movements.
The KMT inherited the Japanese Aboriginal Reservation Land system, which 
conferred a certain amount of lands from national forest land to each indigenous 
household. Despite the official claims that Aboriginal Reservation Land aimed to 
preserve indigenous peoples’ subsistence economy and improve their living 
conditions, the Reservation Land System exposed indigenous peoples to a constant 
police surveillance and limited their traditional hunting-and-gathering grounds. On the 
one hand, ironically, the invading Japanese and Chinese conferred lands and 
resources, in the name of the countries, to the island’s original masters, the indigenous
12
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peoples. On the other hand, the reservation lands, however limited or “unfair,” do 
provide the final refuges for aborigines in facing both Han cultural hegemony and the 
exploitation o f a capitalist mode of production. Radical indigenous activists argue that 
indigenous peoples have “natural sovereignty” (see Chapter 6), i.e. prior occupancy 
over the island. Therefore, the “Return Our Lands” movements should be a 
negotiation between two “nations,” between indigenous peoples and invaders, and 
between colonizers and the colonized peoples (Interview G). For indigenous 
organizations, to be simply considered as “pressure groups” within a liberal- 
democratic society, will conceal the fact that indigenous peoples do not recognize the 
legitimacy of the invading regime and its social and political institutional 
arrangements.
Land disputes often relate directly to environmental and resource management. 
Indigenous people’s close relations to nature and their ecological wisdom have been 
widely recognized. It is this changing politics of nature that provides us a critical 
reflection on the relationship between society and nature. In Taiwan, indigenous 
peoples’ involvement in resource management, environmental protection, and local 
community activism has apparent geographical variations. The variations reflect the 
different degrees of aboriginal communal consciousness and organizational strength at 
the grassroots level. In a case in southern Taiwan, under the banner of “tribalism,” 
aboriginal local knowledge, together with the cooperation from some academics, have 
created a new perspective in empowering indigenous communities in their struggles 
against deteriorating wildlife resources, illegal deforestation, and the rampant
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development of tourism without attention to environmental and cultural implications 
(Chapters 6 and 7).
1.4 Case Study: Land Conflicts in the Li-Shan Area
Li-Shan, with an average altitude of around two thousand meters above sea 
level, is the earliest and most important location for the production of temperate-zone 
agricultural products in Taiwan. The opening of the Central Cross Island Highway in 
1960 permitted the introduction o f commercial fruit and vegetable production suitable 
for cultivation in high-cold mountainous areas extending into the Li-Shan areas. In 
1957 and 1963 respectively, the government set up two public-sponsored farms to 
relocate retired servicemen and to “develop” mountain resources (Lin Fang-chi 
1984:55-59). The indigenous people in the Li-Shan area, the Atayal people, learned 
the agricultural skills necessary to grow vegetables and fruits from the veterans in the 
public farms, and gradually converted aboriginal reservation land into orchards and 
farmlands to take advantage of this new economic opportunity.
Han people in the plains areas were also lured by the potential profits which 
could be made producing temperate-zone crops in the high mountains. Armed with 
more abundant capital and advanced technology, Han farmers came to Li-Shan and 
purchased or leased lands from indigenous people. From a historical perspective, the 
arrival o f Han settlers in the mountains seems a continuation of their unfinished 
“reclamation” process. What is different from their ancestors centuries ago is that the 
object of the current Han “adventure” is the “internal frontier.”
Originally, the legal land titles o f the reservation lands did not belong to 
individual aborigines, but to the state. Despite the fact that a certain amount of land
14
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was allocated to each indigenous household, aborigines were simply the nominal title 
holders. Only indigenous peoples are allowed to lease lands from government and to 
cultivate land within the reserves. The high profits from growing fruits, especially 
apples and pears, soon attracted Han people. On the one hand, it is clear that Han 
farmers “illegally” lease or purchase reservation lands from aborigines. Inter-ethnic 
land disputes increase as all the land transactions are conducted “under the counter.”
On the other hand, the developmental state apparatus systematically relaxes the limits 
of laws related to the uses of reservation lands and so has opened a loophole for the 
operation of capital from the plains areas. All the actions, including the relaxation of 
land use laws, are justified in the name of economic development (see Chapter 4). As 
essential land surveys in the disputed areas are long overdue, the KMT government’s 
reservation land policy has drawn severe criticism from both Han and indigenous 
peoples with interests in the region.
This extensive, essentially unlimited slopeland cultivation has dramatically 
shortened the life expectancy of one of the major dams in Taiwan, the Te-Chi 
reservoir on the Da-Chia River, downstream from Li-Shan. The amount of siltation 
from natural landslides has been accelerated by human interventions. The huge 
amounts of fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides applied to fruits and vegetables are 
washed into the downstream reservoir, resulting in eutrophication and deteriorated 
water quality. The safety and capacity of the reservoir are the major concerns of the 
government. Soil erosion and its potential threat to lives and properties reveal an even 
more urgent issue for local farmers and residents. Policies that were encouraged by the 
state intent on developing and exploiting mountain resources are now issues of public
15
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condemnation. Environmentalists demand a comprehensive reflection on the current 
“development first” policy and also a restoration of forests in the mountains, 
particularly after a series of typhoons caused catastrophes which resulted in a large 
number o f casualties in recent years. Thus, land disputes in Li-Shan are not only 
correlated with ethnic relationships, but also involved locally-specific environmental 
problems.
As I write this dissertation, Han people still cannot legally own the titles of 
reservation lands, and cannot run for the position of the “head” of the mountain hsian 
(a sub-county administrative unit), where most indigenous peoples live and, where 
virtually all the aboriginal reservation lands are located (Figure 1.2). Although in 
many mountain hsiam, the number of Han residents has exceeded aborigines, the 
official position of chief for the thirty mountain hsians are all reserved for indigenous 
peoples.
A group of Han people living in mountain hsians in Nantou County founded an 
organization to promote Han people’s rights in 1993. However, the most influential 
Han people’s organization, the Plains People’s Rights Association (PPRA), was 
established in Hoping Hsian, where Li-Shan village is located. The PPRA was formed 
as a politically opposing group to counteract the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines 
(ATA). The PPRA aims to legitimize Han people’s “ownership” of reservation lands 
and to promote the candidacy of Han people for hsian chiefs. While the ATA’s 
“Return Our Lands” movements demands that the State to confer more lands to 
aborigines and will work to prevent the losses of reservation lands to Han capitalists, 
the PPRA, in contrast, demands the deregulation of all reservation lands (PPRA
16
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Figure 1.2 The Thirty Mountain Hsian in Taiwan
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1997a). That is, the PPRA wishes that laws be changed so that all lands are subject to 
the mechanism of the free market.
The PPRA also accuses that the indigenous activists do not identify themselves 
with the “Chinese Nation” and insists that, in fact, there are no indigenous people in 
Taiwan at the present time (PPRA 1997b). With plentiful capital for lobbying and well 
established political and business connections, the PPRA had become an organization 
with considerable political clouts within a few years.
The rise of the PPRA represents a counterattack of sorts by conservative forces 
by some elements in mainstream society against the indigenous movements. 
Nevertheless, it is more complex than to simply dichotomize the AT A and PPRA as a 
progressive indigenous group versus conservative Han people (see Chapter 6). It is the 
locally specific historical and geographical contexts that constitute and shape this 
particular political environment. The application of some so-called “grand theory” has 
a certain strength in explaining the formation of the overall picture, such as uneven 
ethnic power relations, the political economy of the East Asian newly industrializing 
countries, and indigenous sufferings from colonialism. However, a more delicate 
exploration of local history, economy, and politics must rely on more sophisticated 
field work. It is this personal involvement with the people and causes imbedded in this 
research that bring up the question of the representation of “the others” (Chapter 2).
The land disputes in the Li-Shan area in Taiwan is singled out as my case study, 
with other land related issues o f identity, cultural representation, and environment that 
constitute the three major issues in my dissertation. My central concerns are the 
impacts of Aboriginal Reservation Land system on the indigenous society, and the
18
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influences o f the indigenous movement, which to a large degree is a response to the 
reservation land policy, on the entire Taiwan’s mainstream society. The reason for me 
to choose Li-Shan as my study area is because it is the earliest locations to introduce 
commercial agricultural activities into the high-cold mountain area. Li-Shan also 
presents the most intensive land conflicts between indigenous and Han people. The 
research will investigate the extensive impacts of reservation land system on the 
indigenous societies: What is the historical and political context under which the 
policy was formed? What does this policy mean to Taiwan’s aborigines, especially on 
their identity formation, cultural and landscape representation, as well as on the 
“modern” concerns on environmental problems? Under what circumstances and 
through what media does the current ethnic relationships in Taiwan are constructed? 
How do indigenous people’s calls for a “national” status challenge the mainstream 
ideology of modem nation-states? In terms of the identity issue, what is the 
relationship between the indigenous movement and the mainstream socio-political 
movements, especially the Taiwan independence movement? What can we leam from 
the severe environmental degradation in Li-Shan, and from indigenous “situated” 
ecological wisdom?
In this dissertation, Chapter 2 will present a review of literature. I give a brief 
outline on the histories o f indigenous peoples prior to the arrival o f the KMT regime in 
Chapter 3. The focuses are on the pre-modem Ching Dynasty, and the first modem 
regime, the Japanese era of colonial rule. The KMT’s “mountain policies” are 
introduced in Chapter 4, including the evolution of laws which most directly effect the 
Aboriginal Reservation Land. The greater picture for both the current conditions of
19
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indigenous peoples in Taiwan and on the physical characteristics of the reservation 
lands are also provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines (and deconstructs) KMT- 
promoted dominant ideology and its impacts on Taiwan’s identity politics, including 
both Han and indigenous peoples. The wax and wane of Taiwan’s indigenous 
movements are also incorporated in this chapter. Chapter 6 focuses on both the land 
conflicts and the emergence o f the PPRA in the Li-Shan areas. As one of the major 
factors that has brought Li-Shan to the national spotlight, the environmental problems 
resulting from extensive cultivation on steep slopes are also examined critically in 
Chapter 6 .1 review the impacts of indigenous movements on three dimensions in 
Chapter 7: the cultural hegemony and the fundamental assumptions of interest-group 
pluralism, the relations between indigenous ethno-nationalism and native Taiwanese 
nationalism, and the establishment of new human-land relationships. Finally, Chapter 
8 provides a summation of issues in which I will give my own conclusions and point 
out possible further research topics and ways to improve the understanding of other 
cultures.
20
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW: PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
AND APPROPRIATE THEORIES
In this chapter, different interpretations on the causes and effects of the current 
conditions facing indigenous people throughout the world will be presented. Some 
consider indigenous populations as the not-yet-“de-colonized” people in the world 
political arena due to situations which are best called “internal colonialism.” Different 
kinds and intensities of colonialism prevail and are practiced in different places and I 
shall make a more general review of these conditions later. The appropriateness of 
applying postcolonial theories under the contexts of both indigenous peoples and East 
Asian societies has also raised concerns for some local scholars (Liao Bing-huil995).
Indigenous movements also give rise to critical reflections on the ideology of 
national sovereignty around the globe. In spite of the rise of various trans-national 
indigenous groups, the political clout of indigenous peoples is still vulnerable to State 
violence, resource developers, and cultural hegemony. Fourth World theory is still 
under construction and has not yet exercised significant impacts on international 
politics.
To conduct fieldwork under “other” social and cultural contexts raises the 
ultimate question of representation: Is the researcher capable o f legitimately speaking 
for his/her objects being studied? On the other hand, how can we, as academic 
researchers, minimize the existing uneven power relations embedded within the 
interactions between the researchers and the research objects, who in this case are 
politically and culturally underprivileged groups? What social and political stances, do 
we, the researchers choose to stand? As we might know, the researcher’s location on
21
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the ideological spectrum not only reflects in his/her theoretical frameworks, but also 
the “academic” interpretation of “field data.”
Some works on indigenous peoples in Taiwan will be reviewed in areas related 
to my concerns: reservation land, cultural and identity politics, ethnic relations, and 
environmental ethics. It is worth noting that the majority o f documents on indigenous 
peoples in Taiwan prior to the rise of indigenous movements in the mid-1980s were 
produced mostly by anthropologists, which provided a “thin description” of 
indigenous customs and traditions. Less attention was paid to political, economic, and 
social conflicts (Huang Ying-kuei 1983).
2.1 Colonialism in Various Forms
The burgeoning focus on colonial studies has recently led to more extensive re­
examinations of colonial impacts on various dimensions than classical Marxism. 
Corbridge (1993) identifies four key points or activities o f colonial rule:
First, ‘colonialism established territories and territorial boundaries 
where [sometimes] none had existed before’... Second, 
colonialism established within each territory a political order and 
the administrative hierarchy to run it. The ultimate basis of this 
political order was, invariably, force... Third, colonialism 
brought with it a series of ties which bound a colony into the 
wider networks of trade and production which defined the 
colonial world-economy... Finally, colonialism brought with it a 
culture o f rule bound up with the imposition o f an alien language 
(Corbridge 1993:176).
Internal colonialism separates space within a nation-state into two familiar units: 
the core and the periphery. Uneven spatial “modernization” processes create a 
relatively advanced core with superordinate group, while also resulting in a less 
advanced periphery with subordinate group (Lee Tsu-min 1991:56). There are 
crystallized separations based on the unequal allocation of social resources between
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these two groups. High prestige roles are reserved for members of superordinate 
group, while less privileged roles are inevitably left to the dominated group (Hsieh 
Shih-chung 1994a). Some high prestige spots do go to members of the subordinate 
group in a symbolic action to reinforce the legitimacy of the hierarchical system 
(Hsieh Shih-chung 1994a) and the associated cultural/ethnic division of labor. This 
social stratification system contributes to the formation of distinctive ethnic identities 
within these two groups.
Spatially, the core is characterized by a diversified industrial structure whereas 
industrialization in the periphery, if it takes place, is highly specialized and usually 
complementary to the core economy. Therefore, the peripheral economy is most 
vulnerable to price fluctuations in the world market (Hechter 1975:9-10).
Modernization theory and economic determinism seem to be the underlying 
presumptions of internal colonialism, given its emphasis on economic perspectives 
and industrialization, and its ignorance of colonial cultural and psychological imprints. 
However, in its later application, the idea of internal colonialism has been employed to 
explain other factors, such as cultural differences and social status (NPQ 1989; Walis 
YuGan 1994a).
The uneven spatial development of the core and the periphery in internal 
colonialism, is often associated with the spatial distribution of ethnic groups. The 
ethnic groups in peripheral areas suffer economic exploitation and political 
marginalization, while the dominant groups in core areas enjoy greater prosperity and 
privileges. Ethnic inequality develops along both class and spatial lines (Lee Tsu-min
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1991:57). Thus, internal colonialism successfully integrates both ethnic groups and 
class issues within a geographical dimension.
In the 1990s, postcolonialism receives simultaneously the insights and 
controversies both political and cultural which emerged from the postmodern polemic 
of the 1980s. However, the term “postcolonialism” suggests a misleading concept in 
that it implies that postcolonialism only deals with a society whose colonial period has 
been terminated. Postcolonialism not only deals with the current various forms of 
colonialism (political, cultural, and economic), but also analyzes the colonial impacts 
on contemporary societies, including effects on both the colonized and colonizers. In 
fact, the influences of centuries-old colonial expansions are so profound that even 
political de-colonization has only been partially achieved. Thus, “postcolonial” refers 
to only the termination of “formal,” “political” colonial rules in many Third World 
countries. In brief, as an intellectual project rather than a chronological moment, 
postcolonialism shifts the wisdom and loads of critical culture studies to the 
relationship between the colonizers, the colonized, and the colonies (Duara 1997).
Although the opponents of postcolonialism heavily criticize it as nothing more 
than the product o f intellectuals from the Third World in search of academic posts in 
the West, there are insights from postcolonial ideas that are espoused and applied by 
many Third World intellectuals. In a sense, postcolonialism inherits the celebration of 
differences from postmodernism and provides a sharp analysis on the politics of 
cultural representation derived from cultural studies. But it takes a step further to 
disclose the mutual construction of self-identity between the colonizers and the 
colonized. Identities in the “mother countries” are as much constituted by the
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colonizers’ experience in the colonies as the identities of the colonized by the foreign 
hegemony. While the Orient’s self-imaginations -  geographical, cultural and social -  
and identity are powerfully shaped by the Western construction of “Orientalism” (Said 
1979), the Western self-identity and its imagination of both self and others are also 
inextricably influenced by this very Orientalism.
It is important to identify the social, historical, and geographical backgrounds 
behind the seemingly “popularity” of postcolonialism in the 1990s. Its popularity, 
ironically, is partially the result o f colonialism that leads to global migrations in an 
effort to settle “frontiers” and civilize “savages.” Because of past colonial relations, 
many intellectuals from the colonized world come to their colonial “mother countries” 
for further studies. Many o f the important scholars in postcolonialism, such as Said, 
Bhabha, and Spivak, possess this Third World background (Liao Bing-huil995; Zhang 
Jingyuan 1995). The characteristics of postcolonial studies, which rise in Western 
academic contexts and are, then, colored with some “foreign” attributes, makes the 
direct application on East Asian societies problematic (Liao Bing-huil995). Liao 
argues that discussions about postmodernism or postcolonialism in Taiwan has, in 
fact, the appearance of neocolonialism in promoting or embracing the newest Western 
theories (Liao Bing-huil995). It is this time and space that challenges scholars, with 
different training backgrounds (studying in North America, Europe or Japan) and 
different “locations” (ages, social status) to develop their own views on local political, 
social, and cultural issues within the framework of multi-national economic and 
academic institutes (Liao Bing-huil995).
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Colonialism left different imprints and operated in different “intensities” across 
different space and time. Japanese colonialism left behind different cultural impacts, 
created different sentiments towards ethnic identities, and drew different evaluations 
in Taiwan and Korea. “If there is indeed no singular time and space of 
colonialism/postcolonialism... it is also impossible to speak of a singular colonial 
discourse” (Willems-Braun 1997). There can be no global theory of colonial culture 
and discourse, only “localized theories and historically specific accounts that provide 
insight into varied articulations o f colonialist and countercolonial representations and 
practices” (Willems-Braun 1997).
It is also important to point out that neither internal colonialism, nor 
postcolonialism and neo-colonialism is aimed directly at interpretations o f the 
relationship between indigenous people and their opposite, the settlers which came 
later. Internal colonialism, in particular, in its most significant analysis by Hechter, 
addresses the uneven economic power and modernizing process between England and 
its Celtic fringe. Nevertheless, this is as much a limitation as it is a point of departure 
to introduce new dimensions and case studies into these theories by putting them into 
“alien” societal contexts. A more comprehensive research on aborigines will involve 
virtually all aspects of societies in the modern nation-states and in all tangent 
disciplines. The development o f indigenous movements in Taiwan also introduces new 
perspectives in re-examining some policies that used to be viewed as beneficial to the 
aborigines, whose oppressions were brought to light only recently. For example, 
universal mandatory, but Han-centrist, education and textbooks are criticized as 
educational colonialism (Interview C). The inappropriate social welfare system that
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helps to trap the aborigines into the social construction o f poverty (Chen Hsin-yi 1993) 
which has also been referred to as welfare colonialism by indigenous activists is also a 
case in point (Interview C).
2.2 Indigenous Peoples and W orld Politics
To limit the concerns related to indigenous peoples within a nation-state context 
so as to ignore international dimensions and their impacts on world colonial history 
will mislead our reflections to a narrowly isolated path. Before examining the roles of 
indigenous peoples in world politics, it seems inevitable that a definition must be 
given to the central term, “indigenous peoples.” To provide a universal definition for 
any term is never easy work, especially when the term itself involves diversified 
peoples in different comers o f the world suffering various cultural, political, economic 
and social oppressions imposed by different conquerors. I have no intention of 
attempting a universal definition to this term. However, it is essential to distinguish 
several aspects that differentiate indigenous peoples from other groups, such as 
minorities.
Indigenous populations are not necessarily minorities in a nation-state. In certain 
Latin American countries, such as Guatemala and Bolivia, indigenous people are in 
fact the largest ethnic group (Wilmer 1993:217). Although the conditions facing 
indigenous peoples and minorities are sometimes similar: oppression, low social 
status, poverty, degradation of ethnic cultures, and discrimination, there are exceptions 
in the case of minorities if we define minorities exclusively and mistakenly only on 
“head counts.” Minorities can be the ruling class who establish authoritarian regimes 
and hold the majorities from contesting politically powerful posts, such as the country
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of South Africa during the apartheid era. According to Daes (1996), “a group must not 
only lack political power, but lack the numerical strength ever to gain power through 
democratic means, before it qualifies as a “minority.” An oppressive group that 
constitutes a numerical minority o f the national population would, accordingly, not 
qualify automatically as a “minority” (Daes 1996). Minorities can also be 
economically successful, such as Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia. Under this 
condition, whether they can be qualified as minorities is open to different ideology 
with different presumptions.
But there are at least two concepts that have never been associated with the 
conditions of minority that serve to distinguish indigenous peoples from minorities: 
priority in time and attachment to a particular territory (Daes 1996). Indigenous 
peoples are widely regarded as maintaining a special relation with their “ancestral 
territories.” They inhabit some particular land since time immemorial, long before any 
modern political regime was established. However, “peoples from other parts o f the 
world overcame them, and by conquest, settlement or other means, reduced them to a 
non-dominant or colonial situation” (U.N. Working Definition, see Wilmer 1993:216). 
From the above discussion, we can add a third aspect to indigenous peoples: they are 
the peoples who have not yet experienced de-colonization, and so, by definition, do 
not benefit from independent statehood.
In 1970, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities called for a study on 
indigenous peoples. In 1981, the Commission on Human Rights created the Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations and since then a yearly meeting has been held to
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develop a drafted declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. The U.N. announced 
1993 as the “International Year for the World’s Indigenous Peoples.” In 1995, a draft 
of the “Universal Declaration on the Rights o f  Indigenous Peopled was submitted to 
the Commission on Human Rights (TIVB 1994). The year of 1995 also marked the 
start of the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (Mercer 1997). In 
this decade, significant progress is anticipated to be made on the official U.N. 
document o f the Declaration.
The “Convention no. 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of 
Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries” 
ratified by International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1957 was another influential 
international document pertaining to the rights of indigenous peoples. Its 
comprehensive coverage on various aspects, including respect for aboriginal land 
rights, protection for job opportunities, improvement of social security and health care, 
equal access to language and education, and enhancement of economic and social 
conditions, however, was flawed by its basic assumptions of assimilation and 
integration. Therefore, indigenous peoples’ autonomy for culture and social 
institutions was ignored. In 1989, a revised version of the ELO Convention no. 107, 
known as Convention no. 169 “Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries,” was adopted by the general conference in response to 
aborigines’ request for a higher degree of autonomy on culture, natural resources, and 
self-identity (Wilmer 1993: 179-80).
The International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) was founded in 
Copenhagen in 1968 by a group of scholars. Such academics have played significant
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roles in recent developments, such as the Survival International (SI) found in 1969 in 
Britain, and Cultural Survival (CS) in 1976 in Massachusetts. IWGIA and CS reach its 
audience mainly by publications, reports, and related activities. Representatives from 
these two groups regularly attend the U.N. Working Group’s meetings. IWGIA 
recently turned its attention to indigenous human rights and assisted delegations from 
different countries to go to the U.N. meetings (Wilmer 1993: 141; TIVB 1994).
In 1975, George Manuel, joining indigenous leaders from Australia, New 
Zealand, and Scandinavia, founded the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP). 
WCEP, advocating human rights and cultural rights, self-determination in the direction 
of development, indigenous ownership of natural resources and lands, and education 
in nativistic languages, represents another significant achievement of international 
indigenous movement (Hong Chun-hu 1992: 68).
All around the world there are far too many examples of human rights abuse 
against indigenous peoples, who are often seen as standing in the way of economic 
development, and who are paying the price for opposing the destruction of their 
traditional cultures, way of life, and local environments (Mercer 1997). Indigenous 
movements around the world must contend with various forces and trends, such as 
multinational corporations, inappropriate policies and violence from the States in 
which they reside, cultural hegemony, the invasion of the capitalist mode of 
production, and the deterioration of the environments that are crucial for their survival. 
Despite the fact that some significant progress on indigenous rights has been made in 
Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., and Canada (see Mercer 1997; Salee 1995), 
indigenous peoples are still vulnerable to all the forces mentioned above.
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Another international ethnic political movement initiated by indigenous peoples 
is the Fourth World movement. The proposal and usage of the term, Fourth World, 
indicates the strong appeals of indigenous peoples to distinguish themselves from the 
First, Second, and the Third Worlds (Hsieh Shih-chung 1990). The term “Fourth 
World” also possesses a symbolic function to raise the international status of 
indigenous peoples, one of the most underrepresented groups in international politics, 
to a hoped-for equality with other international political entities that constitute all 
other “worlds.” Although the “Fourth World movement” is still an ongoing process on 
its theoretical construction, it has almost become an exclusive term for the worldwide 
indigenous population, and has attracted some attention within the academic 
community (Hsieh Shih-chung 1990).
2.3 Field Work in “Other” Cultures: the Issue of Representation
For geographers’ and anthropologists’ fieldwork, or other social scientists as 
well, the description of the “real” world and the issue of representation has been a 
major issue in the past decade. In the work following his Orientalism in 1978, Said 
pointed out that representation of other cultures, societies, histories, as well as the 
relationship between power and knowledge constitute his central concerns (Said 
1986).
Duncan and Ley (1993) have pointed out four major types of representation 
theories. The first two modes are roughly based on the same “mimetic” theory of 
representation, which believe that researchers should exert themselves to reflect and 
describe the external world as authentically as possible. First, there was a period where 
“descriptive” fieldwork based on the observation of “trained” professionals dominated
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the methodology o f fieldwork. This continued until the 1950s. The second form of 
mimesis is based on positivist science. The major difference of these two modes is that 
the former whose central concerns are description and classification (or pattern), 
values the concrete and emphasized particularity. On the other hand, the latter is more 
concerned with abstraction and generalization, and strives to construct spatial theories 
through a set of presumptions and reductions (Duncan and Ley 1993). One of the well- 
known examples o f  spatial theories developed by geographers is Central Place Theory.
Postmodernism represents the third type and was a radical departure from 
mimetic representations. Its “destroying forces” come from two strategic 
displacements. The first is to remove the “privilege sites from which representations 
emanate, notably Western, male intellectuals” (Duncan and Ley 1993:7). Second, 
postmodernism interrogates and distrusts the totalizing ambition of meta-narratives 
known as Enlightenment projects. It is the second strategy that shifts the 
representational control from Western male academics to the “polyphony of voices” of 
multiple sites and decentralizes a single authority.
The hermeneutic method is the fourth mode of representation identified by 
Duncan and Ley. It recognizes the author’s position in an interpretative text where 
interpretation is a “dialogue” between the researchers and their data -  which are 
collected for representing other places and other people (Duncan and Ley 1993:3). A 
neutral, value-free observer (which never existed) is displaced by an intellectual who 
is embedded deeply in his/her intellectual and institutional context and whose 
interpretation of external world is subsequently influenced by his/her social and 
political positions. The hermeneutic way o f research in a broad sense can
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accommodate a number of theoretical positions in geography and I will adopt this 
mode of representation in this interpretation of my own fieldwork in Li-Shan.
Geographers may borrow from anthropologists, particularly ethnographers, for 
their critical reflection on cross-cultural fieldwork. The new cultural geography, in 
fact, borrowed heavily from works of cultural/social anthropologists, especially 
Clifford Geertz’s differentiation between “thin” and “thick” description. Thin 
description emphasizes human behavior in the sense o f physical motions; in contrast, 
thick description reveals its significance in the social and cultural context.
Ethnography, and by the same token, cross-cultural fieldwork in geography, “is a 
matter of interpreting the meaning of behavior with reference to the cultural context 
within which it is ‘produced, perceived, and interpreted’” (Jacobson 1991:4).
Despite all the new developments in the field of cultural geography, the 
“traditional” concerns of cultural geographers, dated back to Carl Sauer, such as 
cultural diversity, distributions, and diffusions, have been by and large maintained 
(Mathewson 1996). Nevertheless, with the new development in theories and 
methodologies, geographers are equipped with new weapons to examine the same 
themes with different perspectives and interpretations (Gregory 1989).
Unbalanced power relations are seemingly inevitably embedded in the 
relationship between the researchers and the subject of the research. The researchers 
seize the power of controlling and interpreting the data or information collected from 
the fields. These data function as “raw materials” that can be utilized. The rewards of 
using/consuming these data almost exclusively flow towards the researchers; rarely do 
they benefit the research objects (Bostock n.d.). Moreover, the usage of research
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information is often channeled towards the re-confirmation of these uneven power 
relations, or the institutionalization o f these relations (Bostock n.d.).
I made two field trips to Taiwan from April 1997 to August 1997, and from
November 1997 to February 1998. During my field work in Li-Shan, I resided at the
Li-Shan Presbyterian Church, with the family o f one of my most important
informants, Minister YuRaw PaSang. I went to their orchard and church, visited
church members and other local indigenous activists, as well as engaged in local
election campaigns. The head of Hoping Hsian is the Minister’s brother-in-law and
thus I was able to obtain specific data and took a closer look at the local election.
Because I cannot speak any indigenous language, the most used language between my
informants and me is the Mandarin. In addition to field work in Li-Shan, I also
interviewed several indigenous activists and academics in Taipei and Pingtung, as well
as participated in one conference, one public hearing and some reading group
meetings on the aborigine-related issues. Of course, I also developed some
connections with the core members of the Plains People’s Rights Association (PPRA)
and Alliance of Taiwan’s Aborigines (AT A).
2.4 The Politics of Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan: Land, Culture,
Identity, and Environment
Hong Chun-hu’s study (1992) on Taiwan’s aboriginal reservation lands was the 
first dissertation devoted exclusively to this topic. As a conservative, pro-ruling party 
scholar, he fail to critically examine the KMT’s mountain policies and ignored, almost 
completely, the meaning of land to aboriginal cultures and social structures. This pro­
establishment study, in my view, only contributed to the re-enforcement of current 
ethnic power relations, and made no attempts to change this power structure. Other
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studies on the reservation lands, such as Lin Fang-chi (1984) and Chang Fen-chien 
(1962), gave insufficient considerations to social, political, and cultural dimensions. It 
is not until the rise of the indigenous movement that the studies on the impacts of both 
the capitalist mode of production and modem technology upon indigenous societies 
appear (Yang Kuo-chu 1996). Sociologists also studied the process of ethnic 
mobilization associated with two indigenous “Return Our Lands” movements in the 
late 1980s (Lee Tsu-min 1991). Chen Hsin-yi (1993) explores the social construction 
of indigenous peoples’ poverty in Taiwan’s society. The economic dependence of 
aborigines upon the State is not an internalized characteristic of aborigines, but rather 
a result o f the State’s minority policies (Chen Tzung-han 1994:9). Geographers’ 
research on reservation lands tends to focus on land use patterns and their changes 
over time to reflect the economic re-structuring in the mountain areas (Chen Hsien- 
ming 1984 & 1986; Chang Chang-yi 1989 & 1992). However, few recognize that 
aboriginal land rights movements are, in fact, struggles against the State or business 
interests over space -  the maintenance of ethnic space, and the rights to interpret and 
utilize this space.
Most ethnic studies in Taiwan focus on the relationship between native 
Taiwanese and the mainlanders (such as papers in Chang Mao-kuei et al 1993 and 
Shih Cheng-fong ed. 1994). Hsieh Shih-chung’s series studies (1987a, 1987b, 1992, 
1994b, 1994c, and 1994d) on ethnic relationships between Han and indigenous 
peoples laid the foundation for further exploration into this relatively new dimension 
of ethnic studies. His pioneer study on the “stigmatized identity” among indigenous 
peoples was among the first researches on the social construction of identity politics.
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Hsieh (1987b and 1994a &d) also introduced Western theories applied to local case 
studies, such as internal colonialism, theories of ethno-tourism, and the American 
Indian Movement, into the field of Taiwan’s indigenous studies. He argued that the 
ethno-tourism and the social “re-discovery” of Taiwan’s indigenous culture were the 
results of the state policies. Huang Ying-kuei (1981) opened a new broad field on 
economic transformation and its impacts upon indigenous societies, particularly the 
commercialization of agricultural products. Chen Tzung-han (1994) provides a very 
comprehensive and critical analysis on the post-war KMT policies towards aborigines. 
There are also works that are heavily supportive of KMT policies, and filled with an 
uncritical acceptance o f the KMT’s political propaganda, including the work done by 
the indigenous peoples (Kao Te-yi 1984; Chen Jui-yun 1990). This kind of 
“academic” works only serves to legitimatize unequal ethnic power relationships and 
re-enforce the already rigid nation-state ideology, which accelerating the assimilation 
trend imposed upon the minorities by the hegemonic state policies.
Aborigines’ call for self-autonomy in Taiwan’s mountain areas and efforts 
directed at the formation of a pan-indigenous identity stimulate more delicate 
discussion and critical reflection on the existing nationalism discourses. Western 
theories of nationalism cannot be applied uncritically to different social and cultural 
backgrounds. Anderson’s “Imagined Community” (1991) is often interpreted as 
emphasizing the importance of “print capitalism” and its widely diffusion in a country 
where the “imagined” political unit is built. In Taiwan, I will argue, it is this 
“imagined geography” that is essential to legitimatize ruling power. Chao Kang (1996) 
borrowed heavily from Hobsbawn, Greenfield, Habermas, and Geertz to construct a
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radical theory of a democratic nation. He claimed that various forms of nationalism, 
given primordial nationalism that stresses blood relationships, liberal nationalism, or 
reactionary nationalism (what he called hyper-ethnonationalism, or “voodoo” 
nationalism), are the crisis o f modernity, rather than the hope of human beings (Chao 
Kang 1996). Nationalism, with its xenophobia and “organic” connections with modem 
nation-states, is too often associated with wars and genocide. In this regard, both Chao 
Kang (1996) and Hsieh Shih-chung (1990) coincidentally argue that the pursuit of 
independent statehood is not the ultimate truth in the process of human history.
Political economy approaches to environmental problems often associate with 
development issues and the empowerment of underprivileged people (see Blaikie 
1985; Peet and Watts 1996). Indigenous peoples’ close connection to the mother earth 
is the result of their cultures and economic modes of production, rather than simply a 
romantic imagination. Therefore, the “return” of rights to natural resource 
management to indigenous peoples means not only the utilization of indigenous 
wisdom about local environment, but also requires a full respect and support for each 
indigenous cultural renaissance. The recent combination o f academic, “scientific” 
knowledge with the aboriginal, local, and grassroots knowledge in managing mountain 
and forest resources in southern Taiwan, seems to provide a promising future for local 
aborigines, and the restoration of their cultures, and ethnic pride (Chang Chin-ju 
1997).
Tien Ke (1994) argues that Chinese scholars studying Taiwan’s aborigines 
reflect a similar propensity to the pro-KMT scholars in Taiwan: they both are blinded 
by rigid nationalist ideology and, moreover, some of the researches seem simply to
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serve for the purpose of state policies. According to Tien, the errors that Chinese 
scholars make about Taiwan’s indigenous peoples include an ignorance of plains 
aborigines, the homogenization of indigenous peoples, and the imagined “single 
origin” theory which advocates that Taiwan’s aborigines were in fact, originated from 
South China (so they are also “Chinese” in origin!) (Tien Ke 1994).
The indigenous peoples themselves are now also speaking up after a long silence 
during the martial law era. Indigenous scholars, activists, artists, and novelists, such as 
Sun Da-chuan, TaiBong SaSaLe, and Walis YuGan, provide an “insiders’ view” for 
students of indigenous studies. However, Sun Da-chuan (1995b) cautions readers with 
two critical reviews. First, the common feature of these indigenous elites is that they 
all master the mainstream communication tool, the Chinese language and are able to 
manipulate the writing codes. This skill allows the more-educated indigenous elites to, 
at least partially, replace the elders in tribes as the source of authority. Nevertheless, 
these young indigenous elites are deeply Sinicized and many of them were absent 
from childhood memory of their tribes (Interview E). Second, in the process of 
constructing a pan-indigenous identity or “tribalism” (see Sections 6.3 and 7.3), any 
essential fundamentalism of indigenous ego- or tribal-centrism, which promotes 
superiority or excludes other ethnic groups’ perspectives on indigenous affairs on the 
basis of their being “inauthentic,” should be avoided.
Few studies in the Li-Shan area have considered the complex relationships 
among current land use patterns, the history of the local political economy, aboriginal 
culture and land rights claims, and the dominant developmental ideology. To blame 
local indigenous and Han fruit or vegetable growers without critically reflecting on the
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appropriateness and “legitimacy” of reservoir construction, and State-led development 
policies, only reveals how deeply the developmental ideology and cultural bias has 
penetrated into Taiwan’s civil consciousness.
In brief, political economy, new cultural geography, and post-colonial theories 
provide the major theoretical framework and methodology for this study. The 
perpetual uneven ethnic power relationships in Taiwan are examined from the critical 
perspective of political economy. Environmental degradations are also investigated 
with the theory generated from both political economy and cultural ecology, the 
political ecological analysis. The new cultural geography offers the theoretical 
backgrounds for discussing cultural and identity politics, cultural and landscape 
representation (especially in ethno-tourism), as well as multiculturalism. Post-colonial 
theories are especially helpful in explaining the social construction of a new 
indigenous/Taiwanese culture through the combination of the colonizing and the 
colonized cultures, as well as in deconstructing mainstream social values, and in 
illustrating the geography of resistance. The collection and analysis of “field data,” 
and even the theories that are chosen by a particular researcher are not only limited by 
also inevitably influenced by his/her training backgrounds and ideological stances. 
Messages of “subjectivity” are not what a hermeneutic research tries to convey. 
Rather, I will argue, a clear stance on the study topic will clarify the researcher’s 
social responsibility towards the objects being studied and influenced by the research 
project, as well as clarify the blindspots and limitations embedded in every research.
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CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FORCES INFLUENCING 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES IN TAIWAN
The writing o f histories is also a writing of politics. Histories are never simply 
repetitions or description o f realities. Rather, histories always involve the politics of 
representation and reflect contemporary power relationships. The interpretation and 
writing o f histories are contested “fields” for those with different agenda and 
ideologies.
The “official” history of Taiwan traces the course of Chinese “common 
ancestors” back approximately five thousand years ago. The mythical figure of Huang 
Di (the Yellow Emperor) is said to be the common ancestor of all Chinese. Peripheral 
Taiwan, from Chinese point o f view, is hardly a stage of historical events. Moreover, 
due to the highly oppressive socio-political controls and the ideological indoctrination 
superimposed by the KMT regime, the idea of a common ancestor, Huang Di, became 
a symbol of subordination o f certain ethnic or national identities in Taiwan. Although 
both the ROC and PRC claim that Taiwan is an “integral and inseparable” territory of 
China, Taiwan was not officially incorporated into the Chinese Empire until as late as 
1683 during the Ching Dynasty and has never been ruled by the PRC.
The early Taiwanese national discourse, however, was also Han ethno-centric, 
which blinds the capability o f viewing history with the co-presence of the indigenous 
peoples. Therefore, Taiwan’s history was often referred as a “four hundred years’ 
history” (Su Bing. 1986). Only until the mid-1980s when the indigenous movement 
righteously challenged both Taiwanese and Chinese Han chauvinism, did the historical 
writings alter their routine assumptions of Sino-centrism.
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The new historical writing on Taiwan’s histories includes not only the Chinese 
cultural and lineal backgrounds, but also includes the colonial Japanese culture, 
American global pop culture, and the Austronesian culture of the indigenous peoples. 
The new imagined geographical location of Taiwan is no longer in the peripheral area 
of the culturally “greater China,” but in a new location where various cultures and 
political powers meet, contest, and co-exist. Taiwan, as the arguable original place of 
the Austronesian peoples (Bellwood 1991), is capable of looking not only westwards 
to its old connection with China, but also southwards and eastwards to the histories of 
Austronesian migration.
The insertion or “discovery” of indigenous histories regarding the writing of 
Taiwan’s histories is itself an ontological breakthrough. Critical reflections on both 
colonial representations and cultural politics of the indigenous peoples will provide an 
epistemological re-examination on traditional historical writings and must challenge 
the old, “orthodox” interpretation.
3.1 The Policies towards Taiwan’s Aborigines under the Dutch, 
during the Koxinga Era, and the Pre-Modern Ching Empire
The Dutch East India Company was awarded a monopoly of Dutch trade in the 
East in 1602 (Shepherd 1993:47). In a effort to break up Portuguese and Spanish 
monopolies of the China trade, and given the Company’s already strong trading 
presence in Southeast Asia, the Dutch managed to occupy southern Taiwan in 1624 
(Shepherd 1993:47-48; Chuang Ya-chung 1993). Of course, the main objective of the 
Dutch East India Company was to conduct profitable trade in its colonies. Deerskins 
hunted by the aborigines were exported to Japan while other deer products such as the 
antlers and hooves went to China (Shepherd 1993:62; Lin Tao-sheng 1995). The
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Dutch drew “foreign” guest workers from nearby southeastern China to Taiwan’s then 
indigenous society and thereby completely changed Taiwan’s social structures forever 
(Wu Mi-cha 1996). The Dutch also used aborigines to subjugate several Han people’s 
rebellions (Lin Tao-sheng 1995) in an effort to “pacify” the “raw /an.”
The subjects of Dutch colonial rule were mainly indigenous peoples in the plains 
areas in the southern portions of the island. The Dutch colonialism, as any other 
colonial rules, was more than merely economic exploitation and political domination. 
Western colonialism and its associates, such as geographical expeditions, journals, 
missionaries, and technologies, involve the politics o f representation and the 
displacements of indigenous cultures and value systems (Chuang Ya-chung 1993).
The regional surveys conducted by the colonizers signaled both the incorporation of 
Taiwan into the Dutch mercantile trade network, and the new epoch of cultural 
reconstruction undertaken mainly by Dutch Christian missionaries (Chuang Ya-chung 
1993).
The construction of the colonial “otherness” is the prerequisite to justify the 
righteousness o f religious conversion. The “mission” to convert Formosa natives to 
Christianity, to some extent, on the prevalent idea of the times that the native religions 
and customs were inferior, immoral, and uncivilized from the perspective o f Western 
Christians (Chuang Ya-chung 1993). Therefore, the process of conversion always 
involved the displacement and interruption of indigenous cultures and the alienation of 
aborigines from their traditional spatial concepts. Both romanization of, and the 
translation of the Bible into, the indigenous languages produced controversial 
consequences. The introduction of a writing system into the indigenous societies by
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the Dutch missionaries represented both empowerment and at the same time, 
accelerating dissolution o f indigenous customs and resistance against the colonizers. 
The influence of the romanized Bible was so profound that it was still in use even 
when Taiwan was under the rule of both the Koxinga (Cheng Cheng-kung) and 
subsequently the Ching Dynasty (Lin Tao-sheng 1995).
Koxinga’s fleets landed in southern Taiwan, defeated the weak coastal defenses 
o f the Dutch, and quickly seized control over southern Taiwan. As a loyalist family of 
the Ming Dynasty, the Chengs vowed to expel the Manchus from China proper and 
reestablish the Ming Dynasty and its royal family. Taiwan was Chengs’ solid base for 
re-taking the mainland. (Ironically, history seemed to repeat itself about two and half 
centuries later when the KMT promised its followers that it would return to mainland 
to overturn the “tyranny o f Communism.”) However, Koxinga and his successors 
controlled Taiwan for only 22 years, from 1661 to 1683.
Because of the military purposes of the Koxinga, the people of Taiwan, mostly 
peasants, were treated as a reserve army, and the land of Taiwan was reclaimed 
extensively for the production of food to feed the large standing military that Koxinga 
was developing. During the Cheng’s reign, most of the southwestern plains areas in 
Taiwan had been reclaimed by the Han immigrants (Lin Tao-sheng 1996). The 
Chengs’ eagerness to build up military strength resulted both in unprecedented efforts 
to reclaim arable lands within the aboriginal territories, but also harsh policies towards 
the indigenous peoples in the plains areas (Lin Tao-sheng 1996).
Even though under the Chengs’ aggressive cultivation policies, the middle and 
northern Taiwan saw only limited Han reclamation and the lands remained mostly
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held by the plains aborigines, the Pin Pu Tzu. At this time then, the majority of the 
indigenous peoples still possessed their social and political organizations, and 
maintained their own cultural autonomy in interpretations of the outside world (Hsia 
Chun-hsiang 1992:74). However, the Han people, with more advanced land 
management skills and more effective agricultural production systems gradually 
instituted an efficient state apparatus for further development of this “frontier” island.
The Ching Dynasty ruled Taiwan from 1683 to 1895. The first documented 
effort to erect stone-marked boundaries to delimit"fan  territory,” which literally 
means savage’s lands, from the Han-colonized land occurred in 1722. This miniature 
“Great Wall” was the earliest prototype of the recognition of aboriginal reservation 
lands. The line o f demarcation was subsequently shifted and re-constructed to become 
an island-wide set of boundary trenches which changed from time to time according to 
the dynasty’s changing pro-colonization or protectionist policy toward indigenous 
lands. In the early Ching period, only men were allowed to come to Taiwan for 
reclamation, while their family members had to stay in the mainland. The overall goal 
of the Ching policy was to prevent Taiwan from becoming an overseas rebel base. It 
was believed by many Ching officials that the government’s interest was best served 
by preserving the livelihood of indigenous peoples, both mountains and plains 
aborigines, including their access to lands (Shepherd 1993:3). Han immigrants and 
their reclamation activities were held to lands within the official boundary.
It was important to be “economical” in terms of the overseas frontier 
management for a land-based empire. Clarifying land titles and preventing title 
disputes were activities which were necessary to reduce control costs. One efficient
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way devised by the Ching administration to strike a balance between the control costs 
and the extraction of local revenues was to enlist young mail plains aborigine in 
pacification campaigns against rebellious Han immigrants and other plains or 
mountain aborigines (Shepherd 1993:3). Therefore, the Ching’s frontier policy was the 
product of careful consideration weighing factors including the frontier’s strategic 
importance, control costs, and potential revenues (Shepherd 1993:3-5). The balance 
between control costs and revenues generated by taxes on agricultural lands decided 
whether the State backed the land claims of plains aborigines, or at other times 
permitted the Han people’s expansion of reclamation into the “/a «  territory” (Shepherd 
1993:5).
During the reign of the Yung-Cheng emperor (1723-35), who was renowned for 
his aggression in expanding frontiers and his eagerness to increase revenues for the 
military, a pro-colonization policy was adopted to enable Han settlers to rent deer 
fields from plains aborigines (Shepherd 1993:17). To respect the aboriginal prior 
claims, Han people’s reclamation corporates (the farmers’ organizations) had to pay 
“large-rents” before reclaiming tribal lands. From 1738 to 1766, extensive land 
surveys were ordered to scrutinize land contracts between Han and plains aborigines 
for official inspections (Shepherd 1993:18-19). The frequency of surveys reflected the 
fast changing boundaries of “fan  territory” due to the Han encroachment. In 1788, the 
Ching government came to realize that the protection of plains aborigines land rights 
was no longer feasible and formally legalized land transactions between Han migrants 
and plains aborigines. While reclamation activities pushed toward the ancestral lands
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of mountain aborigines, plains aborigines were Sinicized and eventually assimilated 
into the Han agrarian society.
The history of the Han people’s reclamation in Taiwan can be described as the 
gradual encroachments upon the indigenous ancestral lands. The Ching government’s 
policies were forced to frequent changes over certain period of time to reflect the 
social reality that aborigines, plains and mountains alike, were losing lands to the Han 
immigrants. In 1724, Han settlers were first allowed to lease lands within the fan  
territories from plains aborigines. Then, in 1788, the Ching government acceded to the 
demands of Han people and allowed them to officially purchase lands from plains 
aborigines. Finally, in 1875, even the lands within the traditional territories of the 
mountain aborigines were open to Han settlers (Huang Fu-san 1981). It is obvious that 
Han people used more than legal measures to obtain arable lands within fan  territory 
and forced the government incapable at the time of putting down revolts, to legalize 
the land transactions.
A complicated land tenure system evolved in conjunction with ethnic 
interactions between indigenous and Han peoples. This system arose from locally 
specific socio-political relations in the frontier colonization. In order to conform to the 
official order that ruled against illegally acquiring aboriginal lands, many Han farmers 
acknowledged that tribal lords owned the titles to their lands. These Han settlers also 
agreed to pay annual rents to the aboriginal landlords, as well as investing capital and 
labor to improve the productivity (Chen Chiu-kun 1994; see also Figure 3.1). Some 
Han peasants asked the land titleholders to permit their cultivation in perpetuity so 
long as the required rents were appropriately paid. Thus, the Han peasants were able to
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(aboriginal landlord / 
or land title holder)
Figure 3.1. One Plot, One Owner Pattern 
Source: Chen Chiu-kun 1994.
The second type o f land tenure system involves even more parties, usually more 
than one ethnic group, into the land in question (see Figure 3.2). The three-layered 
relationship in which the original tenant cultivator became a usufruct right holder. The 
usufruct right holder paid primary rent to the landlord (either the titleholder or 
aboriginal landlord) from the rental crops collected from the subtenant, the actual 
cultivator (Chen Chiu-kun 1994). In this three-layer system, the ownership of a plot of 
land was separated into title (or subsoil, large-rent) right that owned mostly by tribal 
authority, and cultivation (or topsoil, small-rent) right that mostly own by Han settlers 
(Shepherd 1993:8; Chen Chiu-kun 1994). By paying “large-rent” to the tribal 
landlords, Han settlers were able to “legally” reclaim the lands within the fan  
territories.
The “headhunting” mountain aborigines and their territorial claims continued to 
be the counterforce to Han-sponsored reclamation. Efforts made to conquer and pacify
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the “raw” aborigines extended throughout the Ching and continued even during the 
Japanese occupation. This land tenure system was partially modified and finally 
abandoned by the Japanese colonial government. The large-rent system was abolished 
in 1904 within the surveyed territories. The abolition of the large-rent system reduced 
the condition o f split ownership and simplified the majority o f arable land areas into 
“one lord to a field” and therefore, raised the efficiency of the statecraft of the 
Japanese empire in controlling land resources (Lin Chia-ling 1996:45-47). The tribal 
authority in collecting large-rent had been gradually in decline from the late Ching 
period. However, the abolishment of the large-rent system by the Japanese 
government accelerated the process of deterioration of tribal economic sources, and 
inevitably elevated the pressures upon minorities and politically underprivileged 
groups to assimilate into the mainstream (Lin Chia-ling 1996:46).
subtenant 
(actual cultivator)
usufruct right holder 
(secondary-rent)
primary-rent holder 
(aboriginal landlord / 
or land title holder)
Figure 3.2. One Plot, Two or More Owners Pattern 
Source: Chen Chiu-kun 1994.
topsoil right
subsoil right
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3.2 Indigenous Peoples of Taiwan under Japanese Control
The Japanese Empire was the first political entity with the characteristics o f the 
prototype of the modem nation-state to rule Taiwan. Various modem surveys, 
including land, ethnology, and natural resources, were undertaken extensively and 
aggressively by the Japanese regime to better manipulated export potential during 
colonial rule. During the period from 1910 to 1914, the Japanese conducted a “Forests 
and Wild Fields Survey” with the goal of confiscating lands without official patents 
and ownership certificates. From 1915 to 1925, the plan of “Survey of Official Forests 
and Wild Fields” was implemented and aimed at the clarification between state-owed 
forest lands, including fa n  territory, and those lands that were subject to later 
development. Even as late as 1925, not all the territory of mountain aborigines was 
surveyed completely by modern methods (Chen Tzung-han 1994:34; Lin Chia-ling 
1996:57-60). These ambitious “forests and wilderness” surveys arguably laid the 
foundation for the future exploitation of Taiwan as a colony and promoted the process 
of capitalization of state controlled fan  territory.
The earliest Japanese survey demarcated around 450,000 hectares as the “lands 
for the fa n  peoples.” These lands were discrete and disseminated from the locations of 
tribes (Chang Fen-chien 1962; Interview A). Successive surveys on mountains, 
forests, and fan  territory classified land uses into three categories according to the 
different degrees of potential for future development. One category of land, 
accounting for around 240,000-250,000 hectares, was reserved for the use of 
aborigines (Lin Chia-ling 1996:61; Chang Fen-chien 1962). The powerful modern 
state apparatus thus shrunk the areas allocated for aborigines by about 200,000
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hectares. The fact revealed that the Japanese Empire, with the assistance of advanced 
technology and an effective bureaucratic system, had a more thorough control and 
understanding of both the peoples and the land of Taiwan than any previous regime. 
The reserved lands, based on the previous “lands for the fan  peoples,” were in discrete 
units and were mostly scattered around, or emanated from, the location where 
aboriginal tribes were still living. A limitation to indigenous hunting grounds and 
slash-and-burn fields was disguised through the creation o f aboriginal reservations, 
which, in fact, circumscribed aborigines, and their way of life within a space 
designated by the colonial state.
A series of coercive collective movements directed at the indigenous tribes was 
imposed throughout the whole period of Japanese colonization. At its outset, the 
policy of collective movement was a tentative experimental method in “managing” 
mountain aborigines by local governments. It later became a formal policy of the 
Japanese empire. The purpose of collective movements was at first, for the 
convenience of exploiting natural resources, most notably, hardwood logs and 
camphor, within mountainous fan  territories. It also served as an instrument for the 
ensuing authoritarian control over aborigines and lowered the costs of management of 
fan  peoples by moving aboriginal tribes to more accessible sites. The new sites were 
often located within the jurisdiction of regularly administrated areas to reduce the area 
offan  territory. This encirclement assuredly placed the aborigines under a much 
greater degree of police surveillance. By disconnecting people from their homeland, 
the assimilation and acculturation o f uncivilized fan  would be accelerated, and thus
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prevented the indigenous peoples, who often took the advantage of local rugged 
topography, from revolting against the Japanese Empire (Hwu Sheau-Shya 1996:28).
Taiwan, as a colony of Japan, was driven into the Second World War. Taiwan 
provided not only natural resources for colonial exploitation, but also its people were 
coerced to serve the war machine of the Japanese Empire. Throughout world history, 
governments have conscripted minority groups in multi-ethnic states for military 
service. Peled (1994) has categorized three types o f ethnic conscription: by force, by 
ideology, and by contract. In responses to such drafts, he argues that there are three 
reasons which caused ethnic youths to be enlisted: fear, ideological conviction, and the 
expectation of future civic benefits. Colonial mother countries differ from each other 
in terms of the power of the colonial regimes vis-a-vis ethnic minorities, so that the 
priorities o f methods to enlist their minority groups and the reasons for ethnic 
minorities to be conscripted by the colonial regimes might vary. The Japanese way of 
conscription, to a large extent, was the combination of force and ideology, with more 
emphasis on the promotion of ideological conviction. For any place, this was, perhaps, 
the most thorough control of minority groups. With the ideological loyalty to the 
Japanese Emperor, the possibility o f domestic insurrections against Japan was 
reduced.
An ethnic division of labor was emerged under the supervision o f the Japanese 
imperial war machine. On the one hand, Japanese-introduced the agricultural 
technology in conjunction with the labor force of the Han youths generated massive 
food exports to Japan. On the other hand, the hunting skills and great endurance, 
which characterized the tribal societies (in perhaps a somehow stereotypical way), of
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the indigenous youths were transformed into the skills of war (Chen Tzung-han 
1994:35).
The Japanese also conducted comprehensive ethnological, flora, and fauna 
surveys in the mountain areas. Japanese anthropologists’ classification of Taiwan’s 
(mountain) indigenous peoples into either nine or ten distinctive groups has had 
profound influence even long after the end of World War II (Chen Chao-ru 1992).
The consequence of Japanese colonialism is a controversial and ideology-driven 
topic. Progressive academics condemn colonial impacts on the formation of a 
confused identity, resource exploitation, political oppression, and cultural distortion. 
While at the same time, ironically, these scholars were later proud of the cultural 
“hybridity” (see Chapter 7) that distinguishes Taiwanese culture from others. 
Advocates o f Taiwan independence tend to positively credit the Japanese 
“achievements” in modernizing Taiwan and efficient law enforcement. Those who 
believe in unification with China denounce the Japanese because of either Chinese 
nationalism or the hatred which developed during war. The different collective war 
memories experienced by different ethnic groups helped breed later ethnic tensions in 
Taiwan. In this way, the current ethnic tensions in Taiwan are, in part, a legacy of 
Japanese colonial rule.
For a brief review of the relationships among indigenous peoples, alien regimes, 
and Han settlers, then, some generalizations can be drawn from the above discussion. 
The Dutch desired mostly economic profit, coupled with some limited efforts to 
convert nearby aborigines to Christianity. The overall relations between indigenous
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peoples in Taiwan and the Dutch were benign, if in some specific cases also 
oppressive (Hsia Chun-hsiang 1992:112-113).
The Ming loyalist Koxinga and his successors brought the first large-scale Han 
immigrants to Taiwan. Because of Koxinga’s purpose of re-taking the mainland from 
the Manchus, he undertook the military buildup by aggressively acquiring lands from 
aborigines to promote higher food production to feed his large military force. The 
relations with indigenous peoples were, therefore, in tension (Hsia Chun-hsiang 
1992:112-113).
In the early Ching period, only (single) men were allowed to come to Taiwan. 
The intermarriages between Han men and indigenous women became common and 
were also helpful for friendly ethnic interactions (Hsia Chun-hsiang 1992:112-113).
As more and more Han settlers came to Taiwan and the demands on lands escalated, 
ethnic tensions gradually built up.
Japanese colonialism and its natural resource extraction policy generated very 
tense relations with the indigenous peoples, particularly those lived in the mountain 
areas. A relatively stable condition was finally reached in the mountains only after 
series of pacifying policies, oppressive measures, and the introduction of rice-growing 
agriculture into these areas, which resulted in improvements in material life. Of 
course, ideological indoctrination was also carried out by the authoritarian colonial 
government as it was throughout the Empire (Hsia Chun-hsiang 1992:112-113). 
Nevertheless, the era of Japanese colonial rule, in fact, still enjoys a highly positive 
position in the thoughts of many indigenous elders (Sun Da-chuan 1991:20).
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CHAPTER 4. MOUNTAIN POLICY AND RESERVATION 
LAND POLICY UNDER THE KMT
This chapter will illustrate the current social and economic circumstances facing 
Taiwan’s aborigines after nearly 100 years colonial rule by both the Japanese and the 
KMT, and then, follow by detailed and critical reviews on the evolution of reservation 
land-related provisions and laws. The last section of this chapter is devoted to the land 
conflicts in Taiwan’s mountain hsians (the sub-county administrative units).
It is interesting that the KMT continued the Japanese indigenous policies, 
despite its denouncement o f the Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan. Whether the KMT’s 
rule of Taiwan is also a form of colonial rule is subject to debate (see the debate 
articles in Chung Wei Literature Monthly during 1995). However, a simplified 
dichotomy o f either pro-Taiwan independence or pro-unification with China is useful 
to distinguish two ideologies towards both the evaluation of the Japanese colonial rule, 
and the nature of the KMT regime. Still, we must recognize that there is a wide 
political spectrum reflected in different strategies and opinions about these issues. The 
locations of the arguments on the spectrum are decided not only by 
independence/unification positions, but also by left or right ideological stances in the 
political arena. The overall popular perspective is that advocates of Taiwan’s 
independence tend to value the Japanese colonial rule for its achievement of 
modernizing Taiwan, and in turn tend to consider the KMT’s takeover Taiwan simply 
as the actions of yet another colonial regime.
In contrast, those who are pro-unification, including the KMT itself, are inclined 
to discount Japanese development efforts and to emphasize the exploitative side of 
colonial rule, while at the same time playing down the KMT’s “alien” characteristics
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vis-a-vis the native Taiwanese. Despite all those stances, the recognition that the 
indigenous people have been under some form of colonial regime, while under the 
KMT or the Japanese, constitutes one of the few agreements reached by the debates in 
various issues of the Chung Wei Literature Monthly during 1995 and on other 
occasions (Chao Kang 1993; Walis YuGan 1994a).
Recently, the full complexity of the colonial experience has received more 
attention, mostly from post-colonial scholars. Colonial rule involves the colonizers’ 
manifest superiority toward the colonized, and the promotion of labels o f 
modernization versus primitiveness (Wilmer 1993:60). All regimes that have 
established control over Taiwan have considered the mountainous area to be a special 
administration district. The relationship between the indigenous people and the 
successive alien rulers was dependent on the capacity for governmental control in the 
mountainous area.
The reservation land policy has been one of the most profound mountain policies 
that influence indigenous peoples’ livelihoods while re-defining indigenous peoples’ 
conceptions of both land and spatial organization.
Similar to the treatment of many other aborigines around the world, the 
indigenous peoples of Taiwan were thought to be unable to cope with the dramatic 
social changes induced from the “outside.” This belief led to the creation of both, what 
Kariya’s (1993) calls, “paternalistic administrative structures,” under both Japanese 
and KMT rule, and the reservation land system.
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4.1 The Current Situation Facing the Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan
The current conditions facing indigenous peoples in Taiwan cannot be 
understood without looking at both the broader historical and political contexts of 
Taiwan over the past few centuries, as well as considering world colonial history 
which subordinated indigenous peoples in many different places to marginalized 
positions. This marginalizing process of Taiwan’s indigenes is summarized by Hsieh 
Shih-chung (1986) according to a set of different eras o f alien domination in Table
4.1.1 briefly discussed the eras of the Ching dynasty and a detailed description o f the 
policies carried out by the Japanese empires toward the indigenous Taiwanese in 
Chapter 3. This section will focus on the KMT’s policies on Taiwan’s indigenes.
Table 4.1 provides not only the numerous alien dominations, but also 
summarizes the changing power relations among different social/ethnic groups. The 
Ching and those regimes (the Dutch, Spanish, and that of the Ming loyalist Koxinga) 
that preceded it had only loose controls over raw fan, the aborigines living in the 
mountains, and thus had only limited access to mountain territories and resources.
With the assistance o f modem technology and the introduction of more intensive 
bureaucratic control, both the Japanese colonial rulers and the KMT strengthened their 
authority and policy influences to an unprecedented extent while subjugating virtually 
all the indigenous territories under the surveillance of the state apparatus. By the late 
Japanese era, the indigenous peoples in Taiwan had completely lost their status as 
“masters” of this island, and total domination of these people and their lands by 
external groups had become firmly rooted.
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Table 4.1 The Process of Marginalization of Indigenous Peoples in
Taiwan
Positions of Aborigines Eras Alien Powers





Mostly being masters 1624-1661 Holland & Spain
Half master 1661-1875 Koxinga & Ching Empire
Being masters in 
Fewer areas
1875-1930 Ching Empire & Japan
Losing position of master 
completely
1930 -  up- 
to-date
Japan & KMT (China)
Source: Hsieh Shih-chung (1986)
Hsieh Shih-chung (1994) later defines the term “master” as
[t]he group identifies itself positively, and that its sociocultural 
institutions are still effective. It does not refer to relationships 
between the majority and minority groups in the sense of 
population. ... although objectively the Han Chinese had already 
become the superior group [in 1875], some aboriginal groups, 
having almost no contacts with the outerworld, still interpreted 
the whole in their own terms. Their ethnic position was not 
different from the time when alien powers had not yet arrived.
They were still masters, so to speak.
The “master’s” status refers not merely to effective control over certain territory, 
but also to social and cultural viability. I will discuss the changing social status of 
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples and their social and cultural revitalization movement in 
Chapter 5.
4.1.1 Economic Conditions in the Mountain Areas of Taiwan
The KMT’s early “protection policy” toward the mountain compatriots was in 
fact aimed at accelerating the modernization process affecting the indigenous cultures, 
with the purpose of controlling resources and preempting resistance from mountain 
area residents (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:10). Poverty is quite prevalent among the 
indigenous population (Table 4.2), but it is unfair to say that living conditions in the 
mountain areas have not improved given the remarkable economic growth during the 
past five decades or so. However, the average income of an indigenous person is
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slightly greater than sixty percent of the average income level of a Taiwan Province 
resident. This estimate excludes Taipei and Kaohsiung, the island’s two largest cities. 
If these two cities are included to estimate, the average income per capita in Taiwan as 
a whole, the percentage is even less, dropping to 36.95% and 37.60% for aborigines in 
the mountain area in 1978 and 1985 respectively (RDEC 1991:64). A simple 
quantitative comparison of the differences in wage levels or the uneven distribution of 
wealth, or even a qualitative approach on the “relativity o f exploitation” and other 
social psychological indicators will not satisfactorily demonstrate the social 
mechanisms that produce poverty. Poverty, is constructed by the socio-economic 
relationship that cannot be reduced to the economic dimension alone.
Table 4.2 The Income Comparison Between Indigenous and Average Family in
Average Income in 
Taiwan Province
Average Farmer’s 




1985 74626 100% 54558 73.1% 48644 65.2%
1991 155731 100% 116636 74.9% 96608 62.0%
Average Income of 
Indigenes in Mountains
Average Income of 
Indigene in Plains
Average Income of 
Indigene in Cities
1985 42989 57.6% 45012 60.3% 50311 67.4%
1991 92117 59.1% 96524 62.0% 112586 72.3%
Source: Calculated from both 1996 Tahvan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book. Ministry 
of the Interior. Taipei, Taiwan & The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in 
Remote Areas in 1991, Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government, 
1993.
*Not include Taipei and Kaohsiung Cities
The island’s economic transformation is conspicuously reflected in the changing 
income components. Taiwan has undergone a thorough and rapid industrialization in 
the past fifty years. Over time, industrial production substituted for agricultural 
products as the major source of income for people in Taiwan. Considering the spatial 
distribution o f wealth, a parallel example of core and periphery relations originating
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from Dependency Theory can be drawn between plains and mountain economies, and 
indeed even on a larger scale, between First World countries and Taiwan as a whole 
(Koo 1987). Along this path toward modernization, peripheral areas have limited 
autonomy in the direction and pace of their development. Within the framework of 
Dependency Theory, the indigenous mountain economy situated so clearly in the 
periphery of a peripheral capitalist country has but little control over the core-initiated 
modernizing /industrializing process.
Two major economic trends can be identified in indigenous societies. Table 4.3 
shows the first trend of economic transformation in a rapidly capitalizing mountainous 
area. Within a six-year period, wage income accounted for an increasing proportion in 
the income component structure. In turn, the proportion of incomes generated by 
agricultural activities steadily declined in all three categories of indigenous population. 
The portion of income remitted by family members working outside the area provides 
a broad possibility of interpretation. The family members working outside could mean 
either wage laborers or seasonal agricultural workers. Whatever the interpretation, it 
reveals that income from working outside was a significant source of revenue, at least 
to the plains aborigines.
The long declining trend o f the contribution o f agricultural income to total 
income is illustrated in Table 4.4. Before capitalism was introduced into mountain 
subsistence economy, the indigenous living relied exclusively on agriculture-related 
activities, such as the production of subsistence crops and hunting. During the process 
of the capitalist development in Taiwan, the original subsistence economy collapsed as 
the agricultural income decreased in significance. This overall tendency, however,
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fails to reflect the minor, local differences resulting from different spatial locations 
and specific environmental conditions. Agricultural income in Li-Shan, for example, 
since the mid-1960s, has always accounted for a significant portion of family incomes 
when temperate-zone fruits and vegetables displaced original slash-and-burn 
agriculture.









1985 1991 1985 1991 1985 1991 1985 1991
Aborigines 
in Mountain
56.52 68.96 21.63 15.52 13.44 10.36 8.41 5.1
Aborigines 
in Plains
61.17 74.38 11.57 8.41 20.83 12.12 6.43 5.09
Aborigines 
in Cities
92.17 90.59 1.81 1.10 2.43 3.18 3.59 5.13
Source: Calculated from The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in
Remote Areas in 1991, Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government,
1993.
Table 4.4 Percentage o f Agricultural Income as Total Income for




1953 1967 1972 1985 1991
I.M. I.P.* I.M. I.P. I.M. I.P.
Non­
agriculture
0 19.43 26.47 40.61 n.a. 78.37 88.43 84.48 91.59
Agricultural 100 80.57 73.53 59.39 n.a. 21.63 11.57 15.52 8.41
Source: Calculated from Chen Hsin-yi (1993 : 15-16) & The Survey on Economic and 
Living Qualities in Remote Areas in 1991, Department o f Civil Affairs, Taiwan 
Provincial Government, 1993.
* Indigenous Peoples in Mountain # Indigenous Peoples in Plains
The second characteristic o f the economic transformation of mountain areas in 
Taiwan is the commercialization of agricultural activities. Capitalist agriculture is 
claiming a growing proportion o f the production resources, including land, labor and
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capital, for both indigenous peoples and Han people. The other transformations 
associated with commercialized agriculture have been gradually perceptible, including 
the commercialization of agricultural land and changing attitudes toward land, the 
increasingly importance of the cash economy and the demands for cash, the alteration 
of employment pattern, changing land use patterns, rising land values, and dramatic 
changes to the land tenure system. These changes will be discussed in the last section 
of this chapter (Huang Ying-kuei 1981; Hsia Chun-hsiang 1992: 92-3).
For more comprehensive studies of poverty among the indigenous peoples, 
several factors need to be taken into account: the land and property rights under the 
KMT regime, the roles played by capital and labor in the local market economy, and 
education and power relations under Han cultural hegemony (Chen Hsin-yi 1993 :i).
On this small crowded island, land ownership and the wealth resulting from land 
speculation, rather than the actual wage incomes, accounts for Taiwan’s enlarging gap 
between the haves and the have-nots. The labor market has highly selective controls 
over worker characteristics such as ethnicity, race, gender, and age. Changes in the 
education level alone have limited capability to change this labor market. In short, the 
same level o f education does not guarantee the same job opportunity for different 
racial/ ethnic groups. Therefore, education can only be one of the predictors of income 
levels. Taiwan’s reputation as one of the few developing countries with a very evenly 
distributed incomes has faded away since the various waves of land and real estate 
speculations beginning in the mid-1980s have increased the “resource gap” between 
rich and poor.
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Within the indigenous population, educational levels are, in a very general sense, 
related to wage levels and the degree of socialization into the mainstream social 
values. Table 4.5 indicates the differences of education levels between the aborigines 
and the Taiwan population as a whole. The percentage of indigenous peoples receiving 
at least a senior high school education is significantly lower than for the average 
person living in Taiwan. The differences in educational attainment between the 
indigenous peoples of the plains, cities and mountains, are minor, although the 
indigenes dwelling in plains seem to receive less education than the other two groups. 
Table 4.6 shows that the gap between the average population and the aborigines in the 
mountains for attending higher education has increased over the past few decades. 
Despite government subsidies, extra scholarships, and selectively lowering the 
threshold for college/university entrance, policies aimed at elevating education levels 
for the indigenous population have failed to achieve the hoped-for results.
The study of poverty also demonstrates imbalances in the knowledge/ power 
relationship between the dominating and the dominated groups. Traditional 
conservative approaches, on the one hand, emphasize the direct association of 
“capability” with “race” and “gender” (Chen Hsin-yi 1993: 22). The poverty often 
associated with minority ethnic groups is attributed to the distinctive “nature” of these 
groups, such as laziness, lack of “work ethics,” alcoholism, and dullness (Lee Yi-yun 
1992). The lack of control over the pace of social change, maladjustment to changes, 
and stereotyped images imposed by the dominating group and media, however, are 
interpreted as the cultural characteristics of the minorities. These interpretations 
resemble moral criticisms and reveal the underlying character of Han chauvinism in
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2.34 2.4 1.98 3.04
Senior High 
School 22.5
14.30 14.23 13.96 15.44
Source: Calculated from the 1996 Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book. Ministry 
of the Interior. Taipei, Taiwan and The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in 
Remote Areas in 1991, Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government, 
1993.
Table 4.6 The Differences of Educational Levels between Mountain 
Indigenes and Taiwan Average _______ ________________
1969 1978 1985 1991
Senior High School 5.29% 8.74% 9.71% 14.51%
College/ University 2.05% 4.26% 5.64% 8.5%
Source: Chen Hsin-yi (1993: 43) & The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in 
Remote Areas in 1991, Department o f Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government, 
1993.
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Taiwan’s case (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:25). On the other hand, the more liberal 
perspective stresses that “capability” is varied with learning opportunities. Education 
is thought to be the way to nurture “cultural capital” for vocational requirement. In this 
regard, education has only an instrumental purpose as exclusively for the purpose of 
future economic benefits. Ethnic/racial differences are absent from, or neutralized, in 
both approaches. Ethnic cultural backgrounds rarely draw attentions in evaluating the 
performance of minority students in Taiwan’s standardized educational system, where 
cultural differences are completely ignored.
4.1.2 Mountain Policy
Like the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in Canada, 
Taiwan’s mountain policy and its agency is a “total,” “comprehensive” structure in the 
sense that it controls virtually every aspect of life for the peoples under its charge 
(Kariya 1993). However, the purpose and evolution of the KMT’s mountain policy 
must be understood within Taiwan’s historical and geographical context. Taiwan was 
restored to Chinese control in 1945 but one result of the Potsdam Agreement which 
served as the “blueprint” for a new postwar world order among the Allies (Pannell and 
Ma 1980:264). The international Cold War structure, centered around two 
superpowers, enabled the KMT to justify its claim as the legitimate government of the 
whole of China until 1971 when Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations. This 
forced the power base of the KMT’s legitimacy to shift from claiming to be the sole 
legitimate Chinese government to, most vividly, promoting economic development in 
Taiwan (Amsden 1985).
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Geographically, tv/o-thirds o f Taiwan is composed of rugged, steep mountains in 
the central and eastern parts. Mountains are now home to the majority of the 
remaining indigenous peoples whose different cultures and languages are still 
distinctive today. Taiwan’s location in the east flank of the Eurasian landmass made it 
party to the containment policy promoted by the West, especially the U.S. The 
historical conjunction also gave Taiwan a special place to receive and interact with 
three major cultures -  Japanese, Chinese, and American. All three have their 
respective positions in Taiwan in the postwar era.
Administratively, the thirty mountain hsians -  sub-county units - were all 
established by 1946. The “Mountain Development Association in Taiwan” was 
founded in 1948 by the ruling regime to co-opt indigenous intellectuals and the elite 
for stabilizing the mountain administrative system and to strengthen the KMT’s 
control over the indigenous societies (Chen Tzung-han 1994:116). Civil and military 
controls were further consolidated by the enactment of several executive orders 
validated by martial law which was in effect from 1949 to 1987. These orders were 
aimed at isolating mountain society from the plains society, and at limiting the 
accessibility of the mountain areas and their residents to Han people.
The alternative educational system employed in the mountain area was 
incorporated into regular administration and became one part of the standardized 
policy o f the Department of Education, of the Taiwan Provincial Government in 1949. 
The adopted national language, Mandarin, was made mandatory in schools and, in 
turn, once popular Japanese was prohibited. The purpose of this language policy, as 
outlined in the act, was to “promote the concept about our country and elevate national
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consciousness” (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:7). Textbooks were standardized in 1958 when all 
indigenous children had the same curricula as Han pupils. Even the indigenous 
peoples’ names were changed into the names of Han people, and indigenous peoples 
were even compelled to adopt the Chinese way o f naming, i.e. the use of first names 
and family names, which was completely strange to the aborigines. This forced 
adoption of Chinese names only ended in 1993 when the new law allowed the 
aborigines to restore their traditional names.
It is obvious that the goals o f the national education system and its associated 
preconditions were to pave the way for “plainization” and to justify the assimilation 
policy. Moreover, even in the late 1980s, some texts in the standardized books 
contained apparent discrimination against the aborigines and implicitly promoted the 
idea of the superiority of the Han people. Indigenous peoples were depicted as 
headhunting, backward, people whereas the Han were portrayed as civilized. It is 
under this kind o f social construction that indigenous peoples suffer what Hsieh Shih- 
chung calls the “stigmatized identity (1986). His definition of ethnic stigma is as 
follows:
“An ethnic group, especially a minority, has a real, Active, or 
imaged “feature” which not only makes people who contact with 
this group keep them at arm’s length, but is disgusting by the 
group itself. ... In addition, this “feature” also always had intimate 
relations with poverty, dependence, rejection, and forever 
inferiority. In the expressed attitude or behavior, members o f this 
group may self-defend themselves a lot, because o f the 
uncertainty or insecurity. Furthermore, “cringe” and “making a 
deceptive show of power”, or “strong self-slight” and 
“exaggerated self-esteem” usually interlock to appear in their 
social lives.”
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In the Taiwan Provincial Government’s outline on the governance o f the 
mountain area, the mountain administrative system should be in a transitional status to 
prepare for the future incorporation into the regular administration. Three major 
“movements” were promoted in the mountain hsiam in 1951 — agricultural 
cultivation, reforestation, and the “correction” of living style of the mountain people. 
Six programs were carried out simultaneously, including the forced adoption o f the 
national language, improving and correcting clothes, diet, housing, daily life, and 
customs. The influence o f the state policy penetrated thoroughly into the indigenous 
private domain and everyday life for the first time. In 1973, the new act for improving 
the standard of living for the mountain people echoed similar themes which stressed 
economic development and the necessity to foster “progress” in the mountain regions 
for the purpose of modernization. Changes to cultural and religious practices, through 
the disguise o f economic improvement, had profound impacts on indigenous society 
and ethnic identity. In 1953, a Taiwan Provincial Government’s program specified 
“plainization” as the ultimate goal of the mountain administration (Chen Tzung-han 
1994:53). As I will discuss later, “plainization” in fact means modernization (in its 
narrow sense) and eventual assimilation.
As a signatory of, and influenced by, the “Convention Concerning the Protection 
and Integration o f Indigenous and Other tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in 
Independent Countries” approved by the International Labor Organization, the KMT 
enacted the new mountain policy in 1963. Integration replaced “plainization” as the 
ultimate goal of the new policy (Chih Man-ling 1991:33). Under the prerequisite of 
military security, and in coordination with the “progress of mountain societies,” the
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development of tourism, and the requirement of exploiting mountain resources, the 
new policy allowed the relaxation on earlier laws which previously maintained the 
isolation o f mountain areas. This revision signaled the first policy transformation from 
protection to a development orientation. In 1966, a revised provision concerning all 
aboriginal reservation lands opened the door of the mountain areas to the capital and 
markets of the plains society. The KMT’s Central Standing Committee also passed a 
resolution in the same year aimed to assist aborigines to develop the economy as the 
major goal of the KMT’s mountain policy (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:7).
Extensive construction of an improved transportation network in mountain areas 
followed the opening of the Central Cross Island Highway in 1960. This primary 
network was completed in 1968. This network system permits accessibility by road for 
each of the thirty mountain hsians’ governments. The presence of a highway system in 
peripheral areas is always a double-edged sword to the people it is supposed to serve. 
One the one hand, it connects different economic systems and subordinates the 
subsistence economy to the imperatives of modem industrializing economy. Thus, the 
standard of living is significantly improved. On the other hand, the dominant cultural 
and value systems are superimposed to the peripheral area through the better 
“connections.” Highways also served as the path for the outflows of indigenous youths 
and labor forces to the job market in the core area.
The first governmental effort to preserve traditional mountain culture was not 
promulgated until 1976 (Chen Tzung-han 1994:127). As the prototype of the KMT’s 
cultural policy towards minority groups, the contents of the policy, such as the training 
of traditional songs and dance for tourist consumption, “museumized” aboriginal
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cultures for display, reveal implicitly the Han chauvinist domination. The “top-down” 
paternalistic institution decides what is suitable for aboriginal cultural revitalization 
and what should be subsidized for the purpose of tourism development. The state 
intervention often becomes the origin of stereotypes about the indigenous groups.
Thus, the displayed cultural activities, such as the yearly harvest ceremony, or folk 
dances and music, guided by state’s policy and ideology are manifestations of the 
uneven knowledge/power relations between the dominating and the dominated, or 
between the commercialized cultural industry and the culture it aimed to preserve.
The largest public project pertaining to Taiwan’s indigenous culture, the 
Aboriginal Cultural Park in Pingtung, was open in 1987 under the protest of several 
indigenous groups. This theme park signaled, perhaps, the biggest and latest attempt to 
interpret and reproduce the “official edition” o f Taiwan’s indigenous culture by 
paternalistic government agencies. The rise of the indigenous movement in the mid- 
1980s has effectively challenged the authority and the monopolistic interpretations of 
indigenous cultural meaning by official agencies.
The indigenous peoples’ movements and other “nativistic” movements in
Taiwan, as the opposition to the Sinicization process imposed by the early KMT
policy, have gained positive responses from some reform-minded politicians. In an
oral instruction given to the Taiwan Provincial Government in 1992, Taiwan’s
President was quoted as saying:
“We should not deal with aboriginal education, living, 
employment and other affairs as we deal with general affairs. In 
short, aboriginal affairs should be taken care o f with special 
attention. Our attention to them should be clearly demonstrated 
through our administration in order to make them actually enjoy 
our care for them” (AAB, unknown year).
69
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Two issues stand out in the remarks above. First, the highest level of 
administration seems to abandon the early recognition that the mountain policy was 
only to serve for a “transitional period” and in time would be replaced by “regular” 
administrative measures. A policy orientation that is more sensitive to cultural 
differences was adopted as the result of the “nativistic trend” which emerged around 
the time when martial law was lifted in 1987 (see Chapter 5). A strong request from 
the civil society to pay more attention to the nativistic culture, language, histoiy and 
geography has gained substantial political support and forced the ruling KMT elite to 
respond to the demand. Geographically, the State confirms the politics of difference in 
the ethnic space in the mountainous area. Policies sensitive to culture and geography 
have displaced demands of homogenous solidarity of the previous military regime 
which characterized the old KMT before the eruption of democratic movements in the 
mid-1980s.
Second, the paternalistic character in the KMT administration remains clearly 
prevalent. Indigenous peoples are peoples who required being “taken care o f’ and 
from this perspective they are not even to be significant participants in their own 
affairs. Paternalism, in addition to its dominant power over the minorities, implies a 
potential integration o f value systems. The norms of mainstream culture displace 
indigenous cultures and social principles as the “standard” system. The loss o f cultural 
subjectivity to the Han value system constrains the capability o f the original internal 
mechanism in indigenous societies to respond to outside stimuli (Hsia Chun-hsiang 
1992: 106-111). Facing the “attacks” rather than “interactions” from outside, the tribal 
culture and people are a “dying,” “sunset” nation. To the indigenous nations, culture
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and history at their outset are not simply academic issues, but are critical for the 
struggle for cultural and national continuance (Sun Da-chuan 1991:128).
4.1.3 Cultural Representation: Indigenous Peoples in Tourism
The representation of indigenous cultures in Taiwan has been under the one- 
party control for more than four decades. Stereotypes have been constructed and 
maintained through standardized textbooks, mass media controlled by the State, and 
pop culture such as movies, magazines, novels and commercials. In many cases, 
indigenous peoples and cultures are presented as objects for tourist consumption. The 
wholehearted support o f the “ethnic tourism” by the local government (for example, 
the Hualien County) and promotion by the mass media has justified the marketing of 
cultural exoticism (Mellinger 1994; van den Berghe and Keyes 1984).
During Taiwan’s martial law era, political dictatorship led to a monolithic, silent 
society wherein the homogeneity of the population was stressed for the sake of 
“national security” (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c: note 3). Diversity in any aspect was 
considered as a threat to national solidarity. Therefore, information on racial/ ethnic 
diversity was virtually absent from the educational system. Ethnic and racial 
characteristics were repressed from discussion and display. The insensibility toward 
different “others” has led to the distortion of the social and cultural representations of 
these minority groups in Taiwan. Tourism serves as one of the most obvious fields for 
the study of the representation of the “indigenous others.”
MacCannell (1989) suggests that tourists as the new leisure class look for an 
“authentic” experience of different lives. However, the development of tourism, itself 
a phenomenon of modernity, has generated a “staged authenticity” for the
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consumption of tourists. Tourism needs to take place in particular space and for a 
period o f time. Seeking a diversion from routine life, tourism often occurs in places 
where other people live. Ethnic tourism, which often involves minority groups, is the 
case in point.
The most significant ethnic tourism in Taiwan takes place in around ten theme 
parks, mostly very small and located in eastern Taiwan, which display indigenous 
culture (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994b: 68). The largest among them, the publicly-owned 
Aboriginal Cultural Park in Pingtung is organized around the “real” life o f the pre­
modern indigenous peoples in this tourist space. Unlike other parks which almost 
exclusively highlight folkdance and music of the local aborigines, this theme park also 
features ancient housing and information on the spatial allocation of families and 
tribes. Presumably, this park restores or preserves some aspects of indigenous lives 
and heritages. However, similar to Laxson’s study of Native Americans (1991), the 
questionnaire survey and observation of tourists’ behaviors conducted by Hsieh Shih- 
chung (1994b) concluded that the perceptions of indigenous culture reveal more about 
tourists’ own cultural stereotypes than the information that they are supposedly to 
learn from their visit. Laxson even rejects the idea that traveling can encourage 
cultural understanding and suggests that brief touring encounters can only reinforce 
ethno-centrism and convince tourists of the correctness of their own worldviews 
(1991).
“Commoditization” is another concern about the development of ethnic tourism. 
Local customs, rituals, festival, and ethnic arts are produced and performed for the 
tourists’ consumption and thus undermined and changed the meanings of cultural
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products and human relations in local communities (Greenwood 1977). Moreover,
capitalists can commercialize local cultures without the consent of the participants,
while the capital/ labor relations allow the local people to be exploited. At the same
time, ethnic artifacts are increasing “staged” so as to look “authentic.” The force of
capital thus creates an “illusion” of indigenous cultural revitalization. Hsieh Shih-
chung (1994b: 124-25) has made similar observation for Hualien county located in the
eastern side of Taiwan:
Most aboriginal performers concentrate in a few commercial 
institutes owned by the Han entrepreneurs to perform set dances 
and songs, which are defined by those enterprises as mountain 
culture.... One dance instructor... said that young ladies as well as 
kids do not have national (ethnic) consciousness and the mountain 
culture is relegated to a money-making instrument.
“Lacking passion toward culture” does not happen to the dancers and performers 
alone. Other staff members and even the audience display a similar jaded attitude in 
the commercial performing institutes. For the staff, their jobs are viewed only as 
profit-making activities. For the audience, the performance is just another kind of 
entertainment. Few will make connections between the dance and music, and the 
indigenous culture from which it sprung. Together, the staff, the performers, and the 
tourists have forged the existence of a cultural formalism for commercial aims (Hsieh 
Shih-chung 1994b: 124-25).
Even though the purpose of the cultural formalism is profit, it is still a process of 
cultural display which dynamically defines ethnic identity through the limited 
interactions of the indigenous performers and, the mostly, Han audience. The 
audience, in this case, does not necessarily seek authentic experience. Rather, a 
disruption from regular life may well be their goal so that they can return to “real life”
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with happiness and health, as they believe to be a main function of tourism. Cultural 
connections are thus difficult to form, not to mention any effort to induce the desire 
for an “authentic experience” which is described by MacCannell (1973) as the modem 
embodiment of religious pilgrim. MacCannell’s concept of “authenticity” remains 
problematic both in the tourists’ attitudes and in how to “define” such an experience.
Cohen (1988) argues that authenticity cannot be a “objective” quality “out there” 
waiting to be discovered. Instead, authenticity is a “socially constructed concept and 
its social (as against philosophical) connotation is, therefore, not given, but 
‘negotiable’” (original emphasis). Any viable culture must be dynamic and itself a 
changing process. Culture in this regard, cannot be only as the pre-modern life prior to 
the penetration of modernization, as sought by the early nostalgic ethnographers 
(Cohen 1988). Culture in its dynamic process o f development might “absorb and 
digest” new elements for its own reproduction. “Fake” culture can one day become 
authentic as regarded by both the “experts” and the people themselves.
Greenwood’s concerns about the commoditization (1977) of local cultures also 
need a more delicate analysis. Intrinsic meaning and significance o f cultural products 
or religious rituals may be lost in the process o f this commoditization. Cultural brokers 
and tourist entrepreneurs from outside may exploit local peoples. However, viewed 
from a different angle, new cultural meanings are emerging from the cultural re­
presenting process. Religious rituals for the internal public can be transformed to an 
expression of self-identity to the external public. The yearly harvest ceremony held by 
the urban Amis people in Taiwan may lose some traditional meanings compared to the 
one held originally by the tribe, but the urban form of ceremony functions as the
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display of Amis identity and ethnic consciousness as it exist for better or worse at the 
present time (Chen Tzung-han 1994:145).
The development o f tourism in indigenous societies has other implications. First, 
it leads to the creation of a certain number of low-paid, low-skilled service jobs in 
indigenous communities. The number o f job created varies geographically. Those 
jobs, with a finite number, preserve certain labor forces from leaving the tribes. The 
second side effect, however, is to increase the dependency on cash and the wider 
market economy for aborigines. Third, the increasing state intervention in ethnic 
tourism inevitably leads to questions on the contradictory and complex role that a state 
can play (Wood 1984). In the politics of representations, one needs to recognize the 
linkages between tourism discourse and the power of the State to uncover both the 
practices and ideologies that structure touristic relations and the representation of the 
minorities, and whose interests the touristic industry serve (compared to Mellinger 
1994: 776). The resulting changes in power relations are the fourth major influence of 
tourism. It is demonstrated most vividly in the naming of places. As the “only 
masters” before the arrival of the Han people, the aborigines once had the sole power 
to name the landscapes within their ethnic space. Those names are often related to 
tribal myths and ancestral stories. The influx of tourists has altered the indigenous 
naming of the landscapes into the “Sinicized” names to accommodate the cultural 
background of the Han tourists at the expense of local history and geography (Hsia 
Chu-joe and Chen Chi-wu 1988).
For the indigenous peoples living in these areas, tourism can be destructive in 
some cases, but empowering in others. The consequences obviously influence the
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whole social and political structures o f a region, as well as the historical and
geographical contexts of the local community. That is, the social and cultural impacts
of tourism should be submitted to a detailed empirical examination, if possible within
an emic, processual, and comparative framework (Cohen 1988). A geographically
sensitive study is necessary to distinguish the conditions under which cultural
meanings are preserved and newly emerged, from those under which meanings and
societies are destroyed and alienated. The goal of this kind of study is, as pointed out
by Mellinger, to
condemn and disrupt the imperialist structures and colonialist 
fantasies that constitute much of tourism culture, and to take up a 
discourse o f possibility that provides for the empowerment of 
misrepresented groups and the transformation of tourist 
representations (1994: 776).
A living indigenous people’s culture has ties to the land, not performance stages 
or museums. Land rights, therefore, have been repeatedly singled out by worldwide 
indigenous leaders as the most important issue (Wilmer 1993 :131). Despite various 
definitions about “indigenous peoples,” the close cultural affinity with a particular 
area of land or territory is always central to the concept of this term (see Kingsbury 
1995; Gray 1995). In next section, I will turn my attention to the official government 
provisions relevant to the indigenous lands in Taiwan. These documents are important 
in that they reflect both attitudes and efforts by the national government to come to 
“grip” with these issues.
4.2 The Evolution of the “Provision”
“The Management Provision o f Mountain Reservation Land in Counties o f 
Taiwan” was originally promulgated as administrative decree o f the provincial
76
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
government in 1948. Successive revisions came in 1960, 1966,1974, and 1990 and the 
name of this Provision was later modified to the “Provision of Development and 
Management of Mountain People's Reservation Land” (the “Provision,” hereafter). In 
1995, the term “mountain people” was replaced by the term “indigenous people” in 
the Constitution and was henceforth changed in all laws and administrative decrees 
generated in response to the calls and pressures from the indigenous movements. 
Despite the fact that this is the only “Provision” pertaining to the indigenous 
reservation land, its legal status is still as an administrative decree rather than a formal 
law or act approved by the legislature. As such the importance of the decree in courts 
of law remains insufficient compared to the formal laws. This creates problems in 
dealing with the subsequent land disputes between the Han and indigenous peoples as 
will be discussed later.
In power/knowledge relations, naming is one of the most direct ways of 
expressing domination and authority. The evolution of these names and indeed the 
naming processes of this single Provision reflects the changing social and political 
context, and the changing of policy trends as they may effect indigenous people and 
the land tenure system. Two alterations constitute the major theme in the subsequent 
name changing process o f the “Provision” in question. First, a mere management- 
oriented Provision was substituted by one which included both “development and 
management” in 1990 which seemed to exemplified the ideological changes in some 
government agencies. Hsiao Hsin-huang (1983) illustrated that at the provincial level, 
protection was the preferred direction. On the contrary, the central government 
promoted a development-oriented agenda and the modification of the terminology
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reflects these contrasting goals. Nevertheless, the struggles and competitions between 
different state apparatus leading to different policy orientations did not necessarily 
involve re-evaluations about the preferred condition of either development or 
protection for aborigines as a goal of these minority policies. Rather, the development 
and cultivation of marginal slopelands demanded by rapidly expanding capitalist 
development in Taiwan’s “economic miracle” were at stake (Chen Tzung-han 1994: 9- 
10). The modification of the Provision towards a more capital-friendly direction 
demonstrates that continual economic development remains still at the top priority of 
the government policy.
Second, the name-changing process from “Mountain Reservation,” to “Mountain 
People’s Reservation,” and to the latest “Indigenous People’s Reservation” in 1995, 
not only recognizes ontologically the other “persons” in mountains, but finally confers 
upon them the name they have long sought. This “name-correcting” movement has 
been one of the three major goals o f Taiwan’s indigenous movements since the mid- 
1980s. The other two goals are the establishment of clear land rights and clarifications 
about autonomous rights (YiChiang BaLuer 1995). Mountains are no longer simply 
physical landscapes and meaningless space. Instead, mountains are the living place for 
“other” peoples, an “ethnic space” for indigenous peoples.
Protection was the major characteristic o f the early edition of the Provision 
which proclaimed its goals as to “stabilized people’s livelihood in the mountains” and 
to “develop the mountain economy” in 1948. The goals were changed into 
“safeguarding land used by people in the mountains, to promote reasonable use o f 
mountain reservation land, to stabilize people’s living in mountains, and to develop
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the mountain economy” in thel966 version. This was modified again to “safeguard 
mountain people’s livelihood, and implement mountain people’s administration” in 
1990 (Hong Chun-hu 1992:44). Seeking economic development and a more effective, 
“soft” surveillance (compared to the Japanese policing system) seem to be the two 
major intents throughout the era as a whole. Despite its significant impacts on the 
indigenous livelihood, this Provision remained an administrative decree of provincial 
government until 1990 when it became an executive order of the central government. 
However, it was still an administrative decree, not a law.
In his dissertation, Hong Chun-hu (1992:198-257) made an extensive effort to 
collect and organize all official documents to record the detailed process of revising 
the Provision from 1980-1989. However, as a conservative pro-KMT scholar, he did 
not offer critical reviews and evaluations on the Provision itself. Though some 
contextual information on the entire matter was offered at the very beginning of his 
volume, such as the rise o f civil society after lifting of the martial law in 1987, and the 
establishment of opposition parties, critical comments are basically absent from his 
work. To evaluate the process of policy formation, one cannot abstract the Provision 
from these concrete sociopolitical contexts or pay attention exclusively to just the 
governmental documents.
During the fifty years of Japanese control, despite the fact that they were 
conscripted by the colonizers to fight all over Southeastern Asia, the aborigines were 
basically protected and isolated from the plains Han society. The KMT inherited the 
Japanese policy of reservations that separated indigenous peoples of the mountains 
from the Han people of the plains, both demographically and administratively. A
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developmental perspective was, however, added with the inception of the KMT’s 
mountain policy. The goals of the mountain policies embodied by phrases such as 
“transitional status” and “regulated capitalist development” characterize the KMT’s 
economic, social, and political policies toward the mountain area (Hsiao Hsin-huang 
1983). The reservation policy, then, served as both a buffer between a more 
“advanced” capitalist mode of production in the plains and the premodem economy in 
the mountains, and also as a political instrument for social control and surveillance. 
“Plainization of mountainous area,” as outlined in a provincial government’s project in 
1953 (Outline o f Promoting Administrative Development in the Mountains), was the 
ultimate goal o f the KMT’s mountain policy. From the KMT’s perspective, the term 
“plainization” not only means changing the economic system, but also re-shaping the 
political organizations, social norms, and cultural values. In a word, it reflects the 
KMT desires to promote modernization and assimilation. The profound influence of 
Taiwan’s “plainization” policy can still be seen even after more than three decades of 
implementation of the mountain administration. The “plainization of mountain 
economy” was suggested by a provincial official in charge of reservation land as the 
long-term goal o f the mountain policy (see Chang Chen-che 1988). This proposal 
reveals not only the oversimplified separation of economy from other social factors, 
but also clearly indicates a developmental ideology, and a critical lack o f perception 
toward the current political, social, and cultural crises facing these indigenous peoples.
The establishment of aboriginal reservation lands, as the most decisive policy in 
the government’s efforts to effect the transition of indigenous society, has altered 
traditional concepts of land based upon a spiritual, religious, and kinship-oriented
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interpretation, to the establishment of law-binding private property and personal space, 
which was seen as a necessary for the State-defined development.
In the 1966 revision of the Provision, capitalism was officially introduced into 
the mountains following the opening of Central Cross Island Highway in 1960, by 
permitting “legal” public or private companies to rent and use reservation land. This 
opened the area to a variety of new problems and new agents of change. The revision 
is commonly considered to be the result of the concession o f government policy to the 
pressure of imperative economic development (Lin Fang-chi 1984:92; Lee Tsu-min 
1991:32). Economic development served as the most important legitimate foundation 
for the KMT’s rule over Taiwan in the face of the international crisis (Amsden 1985).
After the Cross Island Highway was opened, the changing concept of land 
ownership and control became more apparent. Capital and technology from “plains- 
based” investors were able to permeate into the mountain subsistence economy and 
fundamentally altered not only the mode of production, but also traditional social 
values. To take advantage o f the higher altitude and the lower temperatures in Li- 
Shan, plains-based Han people invested significant capital to make Li-Shan a rare 
region for growing temperate-zone crops in tropical/subtropical Taiwan. As a 
consequence, extensive areas o f steep slopelands were turned into fruit orchards and 
vegetable fields. Agricultural activities on these slopelands, legally or illegally, 
brought huge profits to both Han and aboriginal cultivators and at the same time 
accelerated the ensuing environmental degradation. The intensive land use in 
ecologically sensitive areas causes national concerns on the slopelands conservation 
(Chang Chang-yi 1981&1992).
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Despite the Provision’s efforts to prohibit the sale o f reservation land to Han 
people, the very significant number of land transactions between aborigines and Han 
investors is an “open secret” among the people of the mountain hsian. From 1958 to 
1968, an islandwide land ownership and land use survey in the reservations was 
conducted to clarify the cadastral records and the utilization of natural resources.
Other, less comprehensive, cadastral surveys were computed in the Li-Shan area in 
1958, 1966, 1970, 1974, 1976, and 1985, as land conflicts in the region continued to 
be among the most severe in the island (PPRA 1997a: 183-84). The Provision limits 
land ownership in the reservation land to only those aborigines who have continuously 
used or tilled a plot of land for ten years. This criterion was officially revised to five 
years o f tenure in 1990 because of many complaints. Land titles otherwise remain with 
the State, in which case, aborigines possess only usufruct rights, tilling or topsoil 
rights. After the revision o f 1966, Han people could lease land from the aborigines 
who still own the usufruct rights to any given parcel. Under no conditions can land 
title or usufruct rights be transferred to any non-indigenes. Although land transactions 
are illegal and so theoretically impossible (since the State is the legal owner) in the 
reservation area, complete land sales including the title and the usufruct right passing 
from the aborigines to Han people are prevalent in several mountain hsians. Potential 
land conflicts were hence embedded in this particular geographical and historical 
context since the implementation of the Provision as the land tenure policy. Although 
the Provision was the major government document which addressed these issues, its 
lack of both strict enforcement and of a broad picture of the minority policy brings 
about the current complex problems of the land disputes.
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Some individual aborigines, who benefited from their early investment in high- 
value-added cash crops, were among the first group to realize that land could in fact, 
be the target of investment. To take advantage of being aborigines, they started to 
purchase plots from other indigenous people who needed urgent cash (Yang Kuo-chu 
1996). A small new “land aristocracy” class emerged among indigenous groups from 
what was originally a much more egalitarian tribal societies. The gap between rich and 
poor indigenous people enlarged as one of the most conspicuous consequences of 
capitalist development and land speculation. Plains-based Han people, with ample 
capital, advanced technology, and superior management skills, entered the 
mountainous area mostly after 1966 when the revised Provision allowed this to occur.
4.3 Land Conflicts in M ountain Hsian
Again, the revision o f the “Provision o f  Development and Management o f  
Mountain People’s Reservation Land'' in 1966 opened the legal door for the first time 
for public and private enterprises and individuals to invest in reservation land. 
However, it would be misleading and naive to assume that land conflicts in the 
reservation land emerged only after the revision in 1966. Structurally, it is the “profit- 
seeking” nature of the capital from plains investors and the developmental ideology 
supported by the KMT which enabled the relaxation of usufruct rights in the 
reservation land, and the more intensive use of these resources.
Fifty years earlier, the Japanese were also active in the region. With the goal of 
exploiting camphor resources in Taiwan’s foothills and for other types of logging, the 
Japanese tried to incorporate the indigenous peoples into the imperial production 
system. At the same time, the Japanese brought Han people into the mountainous areas
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as labor for resource exploitation. During the “power vacuum” when the Japanese 
were forced to leave Taiwan, but before the KMT had totally gained control of 
Taiwan, the Han people who either resided in, or had recently penetrated into, the 
indigenous territory had started some commercial activities. These Han residents of 
mountain areas clearly functioned as cultural brokers before any provision about the 
indigenous peoples was enacted (Hsia Chun-hsiang 1991:100). Some long term Han 
residents of these areas will argue accordingly that they are also “indigenous” since 
they have lived in the mountains since before the KMT took control over Taiwan. 
These Han people argue that this long term occupation justified their claims to land 
titles within the reservation areas.
Historically, then, land conflicts are not a new event in the mountain area. With 
the increasingly flow of Han migrants from southeast China since the seventeenth 
century to Taiwan, and considering the space and resources o f Taiwan remained 
constant, lands, especially arable lands became a precious resource to both indigenous 
peoples and the Han immigrants. Thus, in the history of Taiwan, land conflicts have 
developed culturally along the ethnic/ racial cleavage and geographically, in the 
marginal areas of the island. The following section will focus on the land conflicts 
which occurred after the KMT established its control over Taiwan, particularly after 
capitalism intruded into the mountain subsistence economy.
4.3.1 The Physical Characteristics of the Reservation Land
Uneven distribution in both the thirty mountain hsians and in some plains hsictns 
in Taiwan’s eastern coastal plains is the first spatial feature of the aboriginal 
reservation lands. They are spatially discrete and mostly located along both sides of
84
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
upper-middle streams, and often contiguous to national forest lands (Chang Hui-tuan 
et a! 1996:212; AAB 1996; see Figure 4.1 for distribution). The second spatial feature 
of the reservation lands is that they are found, with few exceptions, in slopelands 
across the island. Table 4.7 shows the distribution of the reservation lands in terms of 
altitude. Most of the reserves are under the altitude of 1,000 meters and in accordance 
with traditional tribal locations. The reservation lands located in altitudes higher than 
two thousand meters account only for a small proportion o f the entire reserves. The 
lands above twenty-five hundred meters have limited economic benefits given their 
slopes, their extreme climate conditions and the poor thin soils. Because of 
topographical limitations, coupled with the traditional indigenous conception of lands 
where vague boundaries among individuals’ lands were common social practices for 
many tribes, some of the reservation lands did not have clear demarcations in early 
days. (In fact, as I will argue in Chapter 7 that the precise boundaries o f private lands 
and, by the same token, the territories o f national states, are possible only after the 
modern development o f “geography,” i.e. the inventions o f sophisticated instruments 
to determine the boundaries.)
The total area o f the reservation lands has changed on a yearly basis, especially 
in recent years, as a result of efforts by the indigenous movements and the plains 
peoples’ rights movements. Both will be discussed in the later chapters. In most cases, 
new reservation lands are added to the old ones but these “new” lands are 
overwhelmingly located in marginal areas.
The laws and relevant government agencies, including the departments of 
Environmental Protection, Agriculture and Forestry, and Civil Affairs in Taiwan
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Figure 4.1 The Distribution o f the Aboriginal Reservation 
Land in Taiwan 
Source: AAB 1996: 41
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Provincial Government, classify the aboriginal reservation lands into three basic 
categories of agricultural, pastoral, and forestry lands, according to the physical 
characteristics and topography. The slope gradient, or the steepness of the slope, is the 
single most important factor in deciding the legal allocation of land. Other criteria 
include the depth of soil, the degree of soil erosion, and the characteristics of the 
parent rock materials (Chang Chang-yi 1992). My fieldwork and interviews suggest, 
however, that many of the attributes are, in fact, arbitrary and inconsistent, and reflect 
subjective measures conducted in a careless way by government officials in the early 
days. Years later, the precedents established by these first surveys remain in place 
regardless of veracity.
Table 4.7 The Distribution of Aboriginal Reservation Land in Altitudes











Source: Chang, Hui-tuan et al 1996:212.
According to the intensity of land use patterns, agricultural lands can be used for 
forestry and animal husbandry as well as crop production, and the pastoral lands are 
also compatible for forestry use. Nevertheless, the forestry land, given steep slopes, 
can not accommodate any other land use, such as the growing of cash crops 
(agricultural use), or the raising o f animals (pastoral use). “Illegal” land uses, as 
referring to the agricultural or pastoral uses of forestry lands, or the agricultural use of
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pastoral lands, are termed “exceed the limited use” (chao-hsien-lee-yung) in official 
documents.
Table 4.8 provides the areas and percentages of the land use categories in the 
reservation land. The universal standards set in the “Statute o f the Use and 
Conservation of Slopelands” proscribes that any land with its slope over twenty-eight 
degrees has to be categorized as “forestry only” land, regardless of soil and vegetation 
conditions (Chang Chang-yi 1992). Since the pastoral lands account for but a small 
proportion o f the reservation land, most illegal land use occurs in the forestry lands 
that are used, despite the regulation, for the cultivation o f crops.










Area 57759.590 173368.65 1905.920 11697.278 244731.438
Percent 23.60 70.84 0.78 4.8 100
Source: Aboriginal Administration Bureau (AAB), Taiwan Provincial Government. 
1996
4.3.2 The Current Conditions in Mountain Hsicms
The early edition of the “Provision of Development and Management of 
Mountain People’s Reservation Land” indicates that reserved slopelands were 
designated for the indigenous peoples exclusively so that only indigenous people 
could lease lands from the State and later obtain clear and free land titles. The 
situation only changed after the revision in 1966 which permitted private or public 
enterprises to invest in reservation lands and thus introduced more intensive economic 
activities such as lumbering, mining, and quarrying into these reserves. While the 
KMT’s policy vacillated between “protection” and “development” of the mountain 
area, capitalism and the Han people did not waste their time following the “letter of
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the law” and began quickly to develop the mountain areas in their own way with little 
regulation.
The Provision, from one perspective, seems to be a causal factor in the origin of 
land conflicts in the mountain hsian. On the one hand, only aborigines can legally own 
the land title in the reserves. Han people can only lease lands from the aborigines who 
either own the lands, or have usufruct rights over the lots in question. On the other 
hand, under-the-counter land transactions have been pervasive between Han investors 
and the indigenous peoples who often needed immediate sources of cash. Officially all 
of these “mutual agreements” where land is at stake are unlawful according to the 
strict limits of the Provision. In such cases, the hsian government is supposed to 
“confiscate” any land which “exceeds the limited use” (illegal use), restore original 
forestry, and terminate the legal lease of the land parcel in question. The problem 
seems to lie either in the ineffective governmental implementation of the Provision, or 
possibly even with imperfections of the Provision itself.
Table 4.9 shows the official statistical results of the most current land uses 
survey for the reservation lands in 1996. The areas used by aborigines account for 
sixty percent of the total reservation lands. Natural forestlands, that is lands without 
any human interventions or activities, occupies slightly more than thirty one percent of 
the total. Within the lands used by the aborigines, 53,955.9472 hectares, or about forty 
percent out o f the total o f 148,872 hectares are devoted to reforestation by indigenous 
peoples over the period from 1976 to 1992, in a different source of data (Aboriginal 
Affairs Bureau, AAB 1992:57). The data itself in Table 4.9 does not specify what 
institutes are present in the reservation areas. In alternate sources, lands used by the
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government and taken by eminent domain also constitute a significant proportion of 
the “lost” reservation land. For example, the Yu-Shan National Park alone has taken 
around fifteen hundred hectares o f reservation land (Lee Tsu-min 1991:33).













Area 148872 76672.3541 10168 9019.0839 244731.438
Percentage 60.83 31.33 4.15 3.68 100
Source: Aboriginal Administration Bureau (AAB), Taiwan Provincial Government. 
1996
The reservation lands used by Han people have become the most direct source of 
ethnic/racial land conflicts since the mid-1960s. Herein lies the crux of the matter. 
Official documents record less than four percent of the reservation lands as being used 
by Han people (Table 4.9). Although the situations vary from place to place, it is 
widely believed that the actual proportion of land used by Han investors or residents is 
much higher, given the fact that many transactions are simply kept from official 
inspections. Taichung and Nantou Counties are often singled out as the two most 
significant cases for Han people using the reservation lands (see PPRA 1997a; Lee 
Tsu-min 1991; Lin Fang-chi 1984; Chang Chen-che 1988).
The area of the reservation lands, some argue, is in fact diminishing even under 
the KMT’s control. Lands are not only lost to aggressive Han capitalists, but also to 
the state apparatus, including the Taiwan Provincial Government, as well as to 
counties, hsians, state-owned enterprises (TaiPower Company, Taiwan Sugar 
Company, which is the largest land owner among public institutes), national parks, 
experimental forestlands for public universities, veteran farms, and also to the 
Ministry of National Defense (YiChiang BaLuer 1994).
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Table 4.10 gives a detailed insight into the current circumstances o f the 
indigenous peoples’ use of the reservation lands. The indigenous peoples are at best, 
the nominal owners of the reservation lands. Only about thirty percent of the 
reservation lands are actually assigned to indigenous ownership. In order to acquire 
ownership of reservation land, the aborigines have to first register the transaction with 
the local government and then prove their claim to uninterrupted use over the lot in 
question for five or ten years, depending on the time of their registrations of the lands. 
The ten years’ requirement was revised to five years in the “Statute of the Use and 
Conservation of Slopelands” in 1986, which is the source of the Provision (Lin Chia- 
ling 1996:103). The new Provision, however, was not enacted by the Executive Yuan 
until 1990. Also 1990 marked the first time that the status of the Provision was 
elevated from an administrative decree of the Taiwan Provincial Government, to one 
of the central government. Despite the revision, the percentage o f land officially 
assigned the status of indigenous ownership is much lower than the original 
expectation. The problem lies, perhaps, either in the lack of access to government 
information, or that the concept of registering land for exclusive use remains foreign 
to the aborigines. It is no wonder that some elder indigenous peoples have great 
difficulties navigating the complex legal process and failed to obtain the official 
ownership for many years (Interview C).
The titles o f those lands, which have been set up for either usufruct or tilling 
rights, can be transferred from the State to individual aborigines provided they have 
continuously been used for five years or for five years into the future. Therefore, by 
the year 2000, about ninety percent (29.67+40.48+23.06 in Table 4.10) of the lands
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currently used by the aborigines should be under the title to indigenous peoples. 
Compared to the current, low ownership rate, if ninety percent of the land could be 
under indigenous ownership (of the total 148,872 hectares lands), this would reflect 
great progress.
Table 4.10 Various Rights Acquired by Aborigines in Reservation Land
Out of A Total of 148,872 Hectares in 1994




Setting Up Tilling 
Right
Area (hectare) 44171 60257 34330
Percentage 29.67 40.48 23.06




Area (hectare) 71 779 9264
Percentage 0.05 0.52 6.22
Source: DPP (1995).
While land rights constitute a matter of paramount importance to indigenous 
peoples in Taiwan, the issue has not gotten much attention in the mainstream press. 
The land rights issue only drew public attention in the late 1980s when indigenous 
groups held two marches in the name of the “Return Our Lands Movement.” This 
movement is by far the most successful indigenous movement in terms of the number 
of the people mobilized to participate in the demonstrations. Each of the two marches 
drew around two thousand indigenous peoples from different tribes across Taiwan. 
Given that the total indigenous population is estimated to be around thirty-three 
thousand, about one out of every one hundred sixty six participated in the two 
demonstrations (Lee Tsu-min 1991:1). This successful mobilization not only reflected 
the acuteness of the land loss in the mountain hsians, but also drew significant 
attention to many related issues. The marches seem to have gotten the attention of the 
authorities as well. From 1991 to 1995, mainly in response to the demands and
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pressures of the “Return Our Lands Movement,” the Taiwan Provincial Government 
added a total o f 17178.2993 hectares to the original reservation lands (AAB 1996:9- 
11, calculated by author).
According to the Aboriginal Administration Bureau (AAB 1996:13-15) of the 
provincial government, the additional reservation lands come mainly from public 
forestry lands. However, the task did not go smoothly and fell behind the original 
schedule. Some new sanctioned reservation lands are contiguous to Han people’s 
lands and the boundaries are in disputes. Other new reserves contain lands used by 
non-aborigines. These lands have to be excluded from the category of reservation 
lands (AAB 1996:15) as a compromise to reality. In fact, the government’s concession 
to the reality that many Han people illegally use reservation lands, and that many more 
have “exceed the limited use” problem, is the force behind every revision o f the 
Provision.
In a proclaimed democratic society, the rights of both minority groups and 
indigenous peoples are inevitably appropriated and incorporated by various political 
forces. For the ruling elite, the formal care for the minorities functions to consolidate 
the legitimacy of its ruling. For the opposition party, the minorities/aborigines and 
their problems serve as a subject which can be co-opted by opposition forces and as 
such serve as sources of political gain.
In April 1995, the Executive Yuan held a conference on national territorial 
planning, partly in response to the indigenous and environmental groups’ calls for a 
comprehensive planning for future development and resource allocation. The 
“Planning and Management of Aboriginal Reservation Lands” was among eight topics
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being discussed in the conference. The Democratic Progressive Party, the biggest 
opposition party in Taiwan, together with several relevant indigenous groups such as 
the Aboriginal Division of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church and the Alliance of 
Taiwan Aborigines, cosponsored the first aboriginal land conference in May 1995, 
before the opening of the official planning conference. Delegates from the aboriginal 
communities, scholars, and government officials attended the DPP’s conference (The 
First Land Conference for Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan, 1995).
Still, most of the reservation lands currently under indigenous control are located on 
marginal slopelands with only limited economic potentials. Land conflicts between the 
indigenous peoples and the Han people occur in specific locations where economic 
prospects, either in agriculture or tourism, are notable. As indicated in Table 4.11, 
Taichung and Nantou are the two counties with the highest percentage of Han people’s 
use of the reservation lands. Considering both legal and illegal uses, Han people use 
up to 31% of total reservation lands in Taichung and 11% in Nantou, while the 
national average is around 4.6%. However, these figures are all from official 
documents. The actual area of the reservation lands used by Han people can be even 
greater than the data suggest. The only mountain hsian in Taichung County is Hoping 
Hsian, where I conducted my field research. The area of the reservation lands in 
Taichung County is second to the last. However, the total area used by Han people in 
Taichung County is only second to the Nantou County.
In Table 4.9 and 4.11, the total reservation area used by Han people has a 
difference of nearly two thousand hectares (9019.0839 in 1996 vs. 10970.8755 in 
1994). It is highly unlikely that within a two-year period, the area used by people of
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Table 4.11 The Use of Aboriginal Reservation Land by Han Peoples in
Taiwan in 1994 unit: hectare









(2)+ (3) % of Land 
Used by the 
Han
Taipei 2095.2629 6.1440 3.0147 9.15 0.44
Ilan 14802.6190 264.4209 171.1513 435.5000 2.94
Taoyuan 11675.0704 291.5938 0.0000 291.5938 2.49
Hsinchu 18960.8590 16.1845 0.3620 16.5465 0.87
Miaoli 8002.3467 565.3392 0.0000 565.3392 7.06
Taichung 6303.6456 1524.9831 428.7464 1953.7295 30.99
Nantou 30372.1831 1976.9857 1373.1090 3350.0947 11.03
Chiayi 6992.9969 71.8802 41.0123 112.8925 1.61
Kaohsiung 12709.5304 189.4520 0.0000 189.4520 1.49
Pingtung 63925.5842 938.1873 647.8807 1586.0680 2.48
Taitung 39413.4697 1436.8282 283.2927 1720.1209 4.36
Hualien 24141.3139 415.3622 324.9453 740.3075 3.07
Total 239395.2629 7697.3611 3273.5144 10970.8755 4.58
Source: DP (1995).
95
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Han extraction has dropped nearly eighteen percent from the official figure calculated 
in 1994. A possible interpretation is that the situation is so blurred and/or that illegal 
land transactions are so pervasive that each subsequent survey obtains tremendously 
different results. Some aborigines and local officials may well be inclined to conceal 
the real amount of land being co-opted to avoid ensuing punishments. This situation 
reveals the “dynamic” dimension in the reservation lands: not only has the area o f the 
reservation lands in question changed in the past few years, but also the real areas of 
different land use patterns have fluctuated. The local contexts, social, political, 
historical, and geographical are the key to deciphering this complex, long-standing 
problem.
Socially, the mountain hsians have been the mixed space represented by both 
aboriginal and Han cultures since the late Japanese period beginning in the 1930s.
This “hybridity” makes the mountain hsians a special place for the majority Han 
people. Politically, only aborigines are eligible candidates for the official political 
position of “chief ’ o f the mountain hsians. Han people, even though they outnumber 
the aborigines in several mountain hsians, cannot be elected as the chief o f the hsian. 
Historically, the educational system in Taiwan emphasized a homogenous civic public 
which was intended to transcend all differences in peoples. Only recently has the 
educational system started to acknowledge cultural differences in Taiwan. This 
reluctance among Taiwan’s people and the educational bureaucratic system has done a 
great harm especially to the minorities and their cultures. In this historical context, 
being “different” in practical terms means exclusion and discrimination. 
Geographically, the economically and politically peripheral locations enable the
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disputes in the mountain hsians to exacerbate to a significant degree before the issue 
drew any national attention. The relatively sparse populated marginal areas o f the 
mountain hsians also permit abundant space for development of tourism and high- 
altitude agriculture. Land conflicts, therefore, often occur in which viable tourism or 
high value-added agricultural products are at stake.
Complaints from Han people living in mountain hsians are centered around two 
land-related issues: the rights to the continuous use of, and rights to the ownership of, 
the reservation lands. Han people possess only lease rights in reservation areas. Since 
the government does not acknowledge the land transactions between Han and 
indigenous peoples, one parcel of land can thus be sold or leased several times which 
often results in civil disputes involving more than two parties. Some Han people allege 
that aborigines try to deny those transactions conducted between their parental 
generation and Han people and now want the land back ignoring earlier contracts. 
Often, new Han investors who were previously unfamiliar with the Provision and its 
related clauses, “bought” lands from indigenous landlords and then found that, de jure, 
they did not own the land they have already bought and paid for (PPRA 1997a:48). 
Certainly most indigenous peoples do not intend to be fraudulent as the Han people 
alleged, but similar civil disputes inevitably do damages to the already bleak ethnic 
relations and go far in reinforcing existing racial stereotypes in the mountain hsians.
On the other side o f the story, aborigines’ complain about the “cunning” and 
“relentless” plain-based capitalists, who buy large areas of the reservation lands by 
any means available for the purpose of land speculation or other exploitation. Such 
stories are prevalent in my field research and in the reports from the First Land
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Conference for Indigenous Peoples in Taiwan (DPP 1995). The socially structured 
disadvantages in aborigines’ economic status, which I discussed earlier in this chapter, 
often propels indigenous peoples into land sales, even though they know the 
transactions are unlawful.
As a consequence o f economic hardship, many indigenous peoples are forced 
into the black market to sell their lands, sometimes at an unfair price, because they 
need cash. According to the sixteenth clause of the Provision, those aborigines who 
transfer their usufruct or tilling rights to non-aborigines should be denied their 
previous rights over the lands and their reservation lands should be confiscated by the 
local government.
YuGan NaFu (1995) lists several possible reasons to interpret the causes of the 
illegal land transactions in the mountain hsians. Indigenous peoples tend to sell their 
lands to Han people under the following conditions. First, in locations where the 
reservation lands have clear potential value for the tourism industry, the aborigines are 
lured by monetary benefit. In other cases, the lands have no potential for tourism but 
may have a high economic value (usually in agriculture), however, the aborigines have 
no capital to effectively manage them because o f no feasible financial assistance from 
the government or the local Farmers’ Association. Land sales can also occur in places 
where the lands have neither tourism nor agricultural values, but the aborigines have 
no motivation to work on the lands because they simply cannot rely on their efforts to 
raise their families. Second, the lack of effective implementation of the indigenous 
land policy by the government results in a prevalence of illegal transactions. The 
inefficiency of enacting land policy in the mountain hsians is arguably due to the lack
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of professionalism within the bureaucracy of the local hsians. Third, the low status of 
the “Provision of Development and Management of Mountain People’s Reservation 
Land” as an administrative decree constrains its capability for effective criminal 
charges against illegal uses. Fourth, the numerous “satellite” laws, which refer to any 
law related to the Provision and the use and development of slopelands, reduce the 
motivations for crop production. Fifth, by cheating and other fraudulent means, and 
capitalizing on the unfamiliarity of laws by aborigines, plains people can purchase 
lands. Sixth, for large-scale resource exploitation, vested interest groups in the 
mountain hsians, including politicians, merchants, and some civil servants, have used 
their privilege to collaborate with big business groups to purchase lands collectively 
from the aborigines who are ignorant of these future plans for development which 
would raise the value of their lands in the very immediate future (see DPP 1995).
Based on my own intensive research, I am inclined to agree with the overall 
observations made above. The lack of direct proof in the last but definitely not the 
least important aspect of the problem, that is, the implicit connections between the 
Han people that demand the deregulation of reservation lands and one business 
conglomerate renown for land speculation, need further exploration and research. 
However, my field research suggests that these allegation are often true and I shall 
discuss the relationship between some active Han capitalists in the mountain hsians 
and the big business groups in Chapter 6.
In summary, as the “foreign regimes” increase their control of indigenous 
peoples over a span of 400 years, the social and economic conditions facing aborigines 
are generally deteriorated. In both incomes and education levels, the gap between
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aborigines and Han people is enlarged increasingly. In most cases, the aborigines are 
stereotyped and their images are distorted in the consuming process of the 
development of ethno-tourism. The goals of KMT’s mountain policy, thus, can be 
described as assimilation and modernization.
The establishment of reservation land system generated profound influences on 
indigenous perspectives towards lands, spatial organizations, and social behaviors. 
However, the changes of related provisions, i.e. the Provision, were unable to prevent 
the loss o f the reservation lands to Han people. Moreover, the revisions of the 
Provision reflect the State’s increasing concessions to the demands of capital and the 
interests of business groups. Following their deprivation of interpreting rights towards 
their own histories and cultures, the indigenous peoples in Taiwan also lose their lands 
to the majority Han people rapidly.
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CHAPTER 5. CULTURAL POLITICS AND IDENTITY 
POLITICS UNDER THE KMT
Chapter 5 reviews the social constructing process of the KMT’s Chinese 
orthodox ideology in Taiwan, and the resulting ethnic tensions among Han people’s 
sub-ethnic groups, as well as between Han and indigenous peoples. The development 
of the indigenous movement in Taiwan and its impacts on the new cultural and 
identity politics are also critically reviewed.
Taiwan’s transformation from the stringent order o f a military regime predicated 
upon authoritarianism to a relatively democratic and pluralistic society is an 
impressive success given the remarkably limited violence involved in the transition 
(Wachman 1994:xii).
There are numerous debates about the “nature” of the KMT’s rule in Taiwan: 
whether the KMT should be considered to be a “foreign colonial” regime, or just an 
authoritarian regime with the same culture and national identity as its Taiwanese 
“compatriots” (Chen Chao-ying 1995a &b; Chen Fang-ming 1995; Liao Chao-yang 
1995; Su Bing 1986, Chap 8). Even the presence of this debate remarks on the new 
political era in Taiwan at the present time. The underlying force differentiating these 
varied views on the KMT’s aile is reflected in different stances on unification with, or 
independence from, China and the possible political paths facing Taiwan in the near 
future. This unification/independence conflict was socially and politically constructed 
as the single most fundamental force, through a set of conflicts over the past few 
decades, and as such determines virtually every aspect of Taiwan’s society and future. 
This state-centered nationalist argument, the Chinese nationalism versus Taiwanese
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nationalism, inherits the blind spots of nation-state ideology, and fails to acknowledge 
cultural and identity differences.
In Taiwan, ethnic tensions developed over time as the mainlanders monopolized 
both the political and economic arenas since the arrival of the KMT in 1945. In an 
early rough vision of Taiwanese nationalism, “exclusion” of the “Chinese” 
mainlanders from privileged positions was the main appeal to the majority Holo 
population. As a pluralistic system gradually emerged and replaced the original 
monotonous value system imposed by the authoritarian regime, nationalist discourse 
blossomed and exhibited more sophisticated considerations on issues related to the 
meaning of nations, ethnicity, and culture. Discourse of Taiwanese nationalism is no 
longer merely confined to the old bisection of Taiwanese vs. Chinese, but also now 
includes the domain o f cultural and political construction of identities. Indigenous 
movements and their claims for nationhood exert significant influences on the 
construction of Taiwan’s new identity. However, indigenous voices were not heard in 
these greater debates prior to the epiphany of the indigenous movement in the mid- 
1980s. In the early formation of Taiwanese nationalism, a dichotomy of Taiwanese 
(pen-sheng-ren) vs. mainlanders (wai-sheng-ren) dominated the entire discourse. Any 
appreciation of the distinctive characteristics of Taiwan’s indigenous people was 
totally absent from the discourse construction in the two major national identities.
Cultural politics concerns the representation of “otherness” by a dominant group 
as a way of control and as a formulation of stereotypes of all other groups. 
Representation in this sense is a manifestation of power relationships among different 
social groups, in the same way that race, gender, or class is represented. Identity seems
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to be one of the underlying causes, if not the decisive one, of contemporary cultural 
politics. Different identities induce struggles for access to resources and the right of 
representing the others. These rights function as reflections of knowledge/power 
relations exemplified in naming, classifying, and defining systems in terms of a 
modern, pluralistic society’s views towards minority groups.
Regarding the formation of national/ethnic identities, which are the central 
concerns of this chapter, two opposite perspectives arose from earlier theory: 
primordialism and instrumentalism (Smith 1991: 23-25). Primordialism, or 
essentialism, stresses the “natural,” “essential,” “animal instinctual” causes of 
national/ethnic identities, nationalism, and patriotism, and therefore the separation of 
self and otherness (Ardrey 1966, cited in Jordan et al 1994:139). A common “belief’ 
in common ancestry, then, is insufficient for the formation of ethnic/national identity. 
Blood relations, the continuity of lineage, and other biological connections (that is, the 
same “race” from the point of view of physical anthropology) must also be 
emphasized among the members of primordial ethnic groups (Chao Kang 1996).
This perspective came under severe attack by many more contemporary theories 
o f national/ethnic identity (such as Chao Kang 1996; Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 
1990; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). However, the primordial perspective still 
remains prevalent with the claims and rhetoric of what Chao Kang (1996) called 
ethno-nationalism. Ethno-nationalism is often associated with the building of the 
nation-state and often needs an idealized person as the symbol of collective worship in 
the process of consolidating and directing political power to the state apparatus rather 
than distributing power among people. In this regard, a primordial interpretation of
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national/ethnic identity is better described as political propaganda rather than the result 
of thorough research. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of this primordial 
national/ethnic formation precisely mirrors the conspiratorial knowledge/power 
relations between the State and the academics. This national/ethnic discourse is 
constructed around some biologically-derived conception o f “who does not belong to 
us,” rather than some politically-based conception of “who is one of us.” On the other 
hand, the construction of national/ethnic identities is also considered instrumental as 
an intentional manipulation of domestic opinion against “foreign” invasion or for 
political gains. Here, “instrumental” is not necessarily used in a derogatory fashion, 
rather, I use the term to stress its “artificial” nature. Therefore, language, religion, 
customs, collective historical memories, and citizenship are among the most important 
aspects o f culture which are used to construct identities. However, the demarcation 
between these two categories o f primordialism and instrumentalism can easily blur. 
For example, language is often associated with blood relations; and religion with 
collective memories.
The constructed nature of national/ethnic identities suggests the possibility of
shifting boundaries and to some degree, the malleability o f cultural identities, and of
national/ethnic membership, just as the subjective significance of the different cultural
attributes mentioned above waxes and wanes (Smith 1991:23-24). Smith (1991:25)
also suggests that:
Any realistic account of ethnic identity and ethno-genesis must, 
therefore, eschew the polar extremes o f the primordialist- 
instructmentalist debate and its concerns with, on the one hand, 
fixity of cultural patterns in nature and, on the other, ‘strategic’ 
manipulability of ethnic sentiments and continuous cultural 
malleability. Instead, we need to reconstitute the notion of
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collective cultural identity itself in historical, subjective and 
symbolic terms.
Three layers o f identities appear in my above discussion: national, ethnic, and
cultural. Because o f the richness of the various meanings for these terms, a consensus
on universally acceptable definitions is difficult to achieve. For very general, but by no
means comprehensive distinctions among these levels, a national identity tends to lead
to a request for independent statehood, while an ethnic identity places less emphasis
on political demands and more on a cultural dimension. However, it is not unusual to
see the term used interchangeably (Chang Mao-kuei 1993, quoted in Chao Kang
1996). The geographical scale of cultural identity can be international, national, or
sub-national. Cultural identity constitutes an important part of a sense of community,
and yet remains important as well in the process of nation-state building. Changes in
cultural identities, in Smith’s word (1991:25):
refer to the degree to which traumatic developments disturb the 
basic patterning of the cultural elements that make up the sense of 
continuity, shared memories and notions of collective destiny of 
given cultural units of population. The question is how far such 
developments disrupt or alter the fundamental patterns of myth, 
symbol, memory and value that bind successive generations of 
members together while demarcating them from ‘outsiders’ and 
around which congeal the lines of cultural differentiation that 
serve as ‘cultural markers’ o f boundary regulation.
With the incorporation of myths, memories, and values in any definition of 
cultural identity, it is unavoidable that emotional elements haunt any discussion of 
cultural identity. Knowledge is more often used to reinforce our ideology through 
selective absorption of information, than to adjust and prepare us for a changing 
world.
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An absolutely objective observer of such complex issues is difficult to imagine. 
My approach might be viewed as a “hermeneutic” one embedded within my specific 
intellectual, historical, and geographical contexts, while situated in a certain ethnic 
context as well. The following discussion on the “Sinicized” history and geography of 
Taiwan reflects not only my “selective absorption” of certain theories about identity 
politics, but also my own stance on the issues at hand.
5.1 “Sinicized” Taiwan: Geography and History
The role o f collective historical memories in the formation of any given 
“national consciousness” is well explored in the broadly defined instructmentalist 
approach of nationalism. The development of discourse of geographical knowledge 
and its inseparable relationship with strategies of power acquisition and hegemony 
played a significant role during the expansion of European colonialism and in the 
“Age o f Empire” (circa 1870-1914) (Driver 1992). In contrast with the association of 
geography with specific spatial/territorial claims by modern nation-states, the use of 
“imaginative geographical knowledge” in the construction of nationalism seems to 
receive less attention from political geographers. I will use the process of Taiwan’s 
“Sinicization” implemented by the KMT since its arrival in 1945 to illustrate the role 
of “imaginative geographies” in the construction of totalitarian “Chineseness” in 
Taiwan.
During the important transitional period of the formation of a new ethnic 
identification, Taiwanese were entrapped between their loyalty to their, then, colonial 
“mother country” of Japan, and their supposedly ancient cultural and blood ties to 
China. At the end of the Second World War, the perceptions of Taiwan’s people
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regarding the final outcome of the war oscillated dramatically between being a 
“winner” and “looser,” alternately as “invader” and “victim” as a result o f almost fifty 
years of Japanese colonial rule. The dilemma ended soon, with the “help” from the 
KMT, and was replaced by the more favorable choice of superiority as the “winners” 
(Chen Tzung-han 1994: 40-41). Taiwanese feelings o f superiority were manifested by 
their wholehearted welcome to the “liberating” army from the “father country” of 
China. This welcome message sent by many Taiwanese in 1945, along with the 
previous Chinese ties existing in some intellectual and political reform circles, were 
often interpreted by pro-unification advocates, as proofs of the predominance of a 
“Chinese consciousness” in post-war Taiwan (Chen Chao-ying 1995a &b). In their 
semi-primordialist discourse construction, this “China consciousness” was embedded 
with rhetoric related to the supposed strong, if ancient blood relations between the 
people o f Taiwan and the Chinese o f the mainland. Common culture, language, and 
historical memories of oppression by Western imperialists and the Japanese 
strengthened this consciousness. In the same vein, the “Sinicization” of Taiwan did 
not happen precisely because Taiwan has always been, culturally, part o f China (Chen 
Chao-ying 1995a ), but rather because the post-war KMT regime chose to focus on 
this selective aspect of history.
The story is quite different from the view of contemporary Taiwanese 
nationalists. The KMT promoted a form of orthodox Chinese culture in Taiwan 
through restrictive social and political controls on mass media (television, radio 
stations, and newspapers), textbooks, school curricula, budget allocation, public 
funding, censorship, as well as by limiting access to foreign information from 1945 to
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the late 1980s. From the perspective of Taiwanese nationalists, the tacit intention was 
to “re-sinicize” the Taiwanese, who were thought to be “Japanized” after fifty years of 
colonial indoctrination. As such, from the KMT perspective, the loyalty o f the people 
of Taiwan was suspicious.
The most apparent example of (re)sinicizing people in Taiwan is manifested in 
the mandatory universal education system. Although there is considerably more 
information about Taiwan’s history and geography publicly available than ever before, 
school curricula remain pervasively focused on China as a whole, even at the expense 
of Taiwan and the island’s own history. Over the course of three years of junior high 
school, five volumes of geography textbooks and six on history are issued to each 
student. Among them, only two chapters out of each discipline incorporated any 
material about Taiwan. A second example is found in the social studies textbooks used 
in elementary school where only 30 of approximately 1200 pages of required material 
mention Taiwan’s history or geography (Wachman 1994:82-83). As a result, the more 
an individual is educated, the more likely he/she tend to identify with China, rather 
than Taiwan, as the basis for his/her perceptions regarding nationality. This trend is 
more significant particularly within the personnel o f educational system and staff in 
public sector (Wang Fu-chang 1993).
In short, an “imaginary geography” of China was, and still is, being taught to 
Taiwan’s students before they enter colleges. The old names of the mainland’s cities, 
provinces, and even names of the main trunk railroad lines used during the KMT’s 
Republican Era (1912-1949) are still taught in the islandwide standard textbooks. At 
the macroscale, the shape of the Republican Era national boundaries of KMT China
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are still portrayed as an imaginary “begonia leaf’ that includes China proper and 
indeed all o f Mongolia! This leaf encompasses a vast territory of fourteen million 
square kilometer to make it the second largest country in the world.
At the microscale level, hundreds of streets in Taiwan were re-named after the 
cities and provinces of China roughly according to their corresponding geographical 
locations. The island province of Taiwan, as the epitome of China, serves then to 
provide an “imaginary geography” for the ruling KMT elite. In essence, the projection 
of a comforting nostalgia possessed by early KMT leaders has become national policy 
in the depiction and delineation of space in Taiwan. Geographical knowledge, then, 
becomes instrumental for the political purpose in constructing an “imagined China” on 
Taiwan island.
This “epitomized China” in Taiwan illustrates itself best in the structure of 
Legislature and National Assembly. Both legislative bodies possessed “permanent” 
representatives from every province of ROC who were not subject to re-elections. A 
very limited number of these two congressional bodies was open to the contest of 
native Taiwanese so that a “provincial balance” could be maintained. In this way, the 
majority o f KMT seats were perpetuated. The first comprehensive popular elections 
for seats on the National Assembly and the Legislature were only held in 1991 and 
1992 respectively (nearly five decades after the KMT’s arrival), when all the senior, 
permanent delegates were forced to “retire” from office (GIO 1997:679).
The orthodox Chinese history constructed by the KMT was embedded with a 
conformist Confucianism mentality with the well-known intention to stand in sharp 
contrast to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution which emerged in the mainland from
109
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
1966 to 1974. Portraying itself as the authentic representation of Chinese culture 
through various diplomatic efforts, the KMT was able to legitimatize its international 
status as the sole government of China until 1971 when the People’s Republic of 
China replaced Taiwan as the recognized government o f China in the United Nations. 
Externally, the Cold War structure enabled the KMT to construct its imaged China as 
part of the East Asian containment policy towards global communism. Internally, the 
pseudo-presentation of Chinese history and geography in Taiwan and the promise to 
eventually “counterattack” and regain the mainland serves not only to legitimatize the 
KMT’s international status, but also to console and consolidate the loyalty of nearly 
two million political refugees and their offspring who first came to Taiwan with the 
KMT in 1949.
One of the central axes surrounding intensive debates presented in the Chung 
Wei Literature Monthly in 1995 was whether or not the native Taiwanese could be 
said to have a “China consciousness” or “Chineseness” under Japanese rule. A follow 
up question would be: “Did the KMT sinicize Taiwanese to eliminate their Japanese 
characters?” or “Did the KMT “re”-Sinicized Taiwanese to reassert their nature as 
Chinese (Liao Hsien-hao 1995; Liao Chao-yang 1995; Chen Chao-ying 1995a&b; 
Chen Fang-ming 1995)?” However, if we recognize that shifting cultural and national 
identities are not unusual in the process of nation-state building, the early 
characteristics of being “Taiwanese,” given that its origins were either Chinese or 
Japanese, has little to do with the new constructing process adopted either by the KMT 
or by the new social/political movements after the mid-1980s. The undeniable history 
is that the process of Sinicization did take place in Taiwan, and that the KMT
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construction of an imaged geography and distorted history most certainly did play a 
significant role in this process. One thing worth noting is that resistance to the 
Sinicization policy was not apparent until the rise of discourse regarding Taiwanese 
nationalism in the mid-1980s. Early resistance against the KMT was more focused on 
demands for democratic reforms and related demands for a greater sharing of power 
for ethnic Taiwanese rather than a cry for independent statehood. I will introduce a 
detailed discussion on the history o f ethnic relations under the KMT in the next 
section.
The debates mentioned above also raise another controversial question: “Who 
are the real victims o f the colonial rule in Taiwan?” Both camps agree that the 
indigenous peoples of Taiwan have been the most subordinated subjects under these 
successive alien, colonial rules. The rise of indigenous movements and the discourse 
the movement represents has posed strong demands to require that the two sides revise 
their nationalist discourses. In Chapter 7 ,1 will discuss the influence of recent 
indigenous movements on the overall discourse of nationalism not only in Taiwan, but 
also in other places.
5.2 Ethnic Relations under the KMT
In contemporary Taiwan, the underlying cause of ethnic tension can reasonably 
be credited in part to these different national identities, that is, a so-called “Taiwan 
consciousness” versus “China consciousness.” For advocates of Taiwan’s 
independence, the “China consciousness” has been deliberately superimposed by the 
KMT regime as a means of power consolidation, while Taiwanese consciousness is 
viewed as an evolutionary historical product (Chen Fang-ming 1995). The presence of
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Taiwanese consciousness was first veiled by communal strife between the Holo and 
Hakka populations in the early stages of their migration history. In the Dynastic era, 
Taiwanese consciousness then was marginalized by Taiwan’s peripheral location in 
the entire Chinese empire. Only in the early 19th century, the construction o f roads 
and railroads, and the related intensive colonial development by the Japanese 
transformed Taiwan into a politically and culturally cohesive entity. At this time, the 
island-wide Taiwanese consciousness transcended the individual ethnicity for the first 
time in the migration history of the island (Reitsma and Kleinpenning 1989:369; Sun 
Da-chuan 1995b). However, the formation of Taiwanese consciousness during the 
colonial era did not necessarily lead to the request for independent statehood. The call 
for Taiwan’s independence is a historical and geographical product, as I will argue in 
the next section. Ethnic tension is, at the least, one of the most important factors in the 
formation of “Han” Taiwanese nationalism.
Ethnic conflicts have been the very important political issues in post-war 
Taiwan. The tension between the KMT and Taiwan’s society resulted from the “alien” 
characteristics o f the KMT regime, and from the historically-overlooked “228 event” 
which happened in February 28, 1947. In 1947, small scale civil unrest first erupted in 
Taipei City as a result of a conflict between mainlander detectives charged with 
stopping the sale of untaxed contraband and a native street vendor selling cigarettes. 
The chaos, and street fighting and military resistance which followed, inspired by 
deteriorating economic and social conditions quickly spread to every comer of the 
island. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek finally had to send in troops from the mainland 
to crush the civil revolts and restore order. The foil picture of the 228 event, which
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cost 8,000 to 20,000 lives (Wang Jenn-hwan 1989), has gradually come to light only 
after five decades o f official silence on the matter. The massacre created an almost 
invincible barrier between the KMT regime and native Taiwanese, at least for the Han 
Taiwanese. It might be unfair to say that the ethnic meaning of the “228 event” was 
superimposed only in the 1970s when the tension between the mainland rulers and 
native Taiwanese escalated (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). However, there is no doubt that a 
full appreciation of the ethnic implications o f the “228 event” increased significantly 
during the political struggles between the two largest ethnic groups in more recent 
times.
Basically, three factors can explain the “228 event.” First, in the mid-1940s, the 
newly established KMT government confiscated all Japanese properties and 
enterprises. Because of the fact that during the late period of colonial occupation, the 
Japanese took over most Taiwanese enterprises, the action of the KMT regime actually 
resulted in the mass confiscation of a large proportion of property actually owned by 
Taiwanese. Moreover, the military government in Taiwan lacked the capability o f 
dealing immediately and decisively with economic affairs on the island and led to 
serious inflation. Second, the native Taiwanese were discriminated against by the new 
military government in virtually all arenas. Staffs of the central government were 
filled almost exclusively with mainlanders. Third, fifty years of colonial control had 
rendered Taiwan a culturally and linguistically distinct region from China. To the 
mainlanders, the Taiwanese were more like Japanese, who were their unrelenting 
enemies during the war (Wang Jenn-hwan 1989).
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The “alien” characteristic of the KMT, in the context of Taiwan, is evidenced in 
several domains. First, in the breakdown of the KMT’s membership structure, which 
consisted of a majority o f mainlanders rather than native Taiwanese until around 1972, 
though the former only constituted 15% of total population (Wang Jenn-hwan 1989). 
Second, with respect to persons filling virtually all high positions in the power 
structure of the KMT, most notably, its Central Standing Committee members and 
Cabinet ministers, native Taiwanese constituted only 32% of positions even in 1978 
(Wang Jenn-hwan 1989; Wachman 1994:18). Even in earlier years, this proportion 
was markedly lower. Third, only after the ROC was expelled from the United Nations 
in 1971, was the KMT regime forced to seek support through alliances with the native 
Taiwanese, who had long been excluded from the KMT’s most powerful echelons.
The process o f the KMT’s co-optation of native Taiwanese through both local 
political factions and economic interests, is dubbed the “Taiwanization” or 
“indigenization” (pen-tu-hua) policy (Arrigo 1994). The KMT realized that it had to 
turn “inside” to seek legitimacy among the ruled Taiwanese, rather than relying 
exclusively on the fading international Cold War structure and American promises of 
support as it had in the past. The process of the KMT’s Taiwanization policy 
accelerated after 1988 when the first native Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, was sworn in as 
President following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of the Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek. Pragmatically, perhaps, Lee as the handpicked successor of Chiang 
Ching-kuo, pushed the Taiwanization policy within the KMT, and as a result, induced 
discontent among party hard-liners. Thus, the KMT was split into the Lee Teng-hui- 
led “mainstream,” the “Taiwanese KMT” and the hard-liners’ “non-mainstream,”
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“Chinese KMT.” It is worth noting that the KMT’s internal split was roughly along 
ethnic lines. Mainlanders and their second generation constitute the majority o f the 
non-mainstream members. The (Chinese) New Party was established in 1993 with 
core members who were original KMT legislators. Virtually all o f them came from the 
second generation of mainlanders.
5.2.1 Ethnic Tensions among Han People
In the early period of Han Chinese immigration to Taiwan, ethnic conflicts 
erupted between principally the Holo (Minan people), who mostly came from Fukien 
province, and the Hakka people, mainly from Kuangtung province. The conflicts 
usually took the form of communal strife between these two major groups. Sometimes 
the conflicts occurred within the largest migrant group, the Holo people. Competition 
for lands and water resources intensified frictions, which plagued almost all o f the 
Han-populated areas settled during the Ching dynasty (Hsu Wen-hsiung 1980). This 
communal strife, couple with competition for scarce resources, and a general lack of 
interactions between these groups prohibited the formation of an entire Taiwan-based 
consciousness. Not until the collective resistance against colonial rule, and the 
completion of the island-wide transportation system that connected various locations 
and conveyed island-related information during the Japanese occupation, did Taiwan 
consciousness actually begin to take shape (Chen Fang-ming. 1995; Sun Da-chuan 
1995b).
Still, in contemporary Taiwan, ethnic tensions have mostly arisen between the 
two largest groups, native Taiwanese (primarily Holo and Hakka) and the mainlanders 
who came to Taiwan after 1949 (Chang Mao-kuei et al 1993; Chao Kang 1996; Shih
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Cheng-fong ed. 1994). In mainstream discourse, ethnic backgrounds are usually 
referred to based on a person’s province of origin, as dictated by paternal lineage (lao 
jia, or “old home”). Mainlanders on Taiwan are known as wai-sheng-ren, which 
literally means people from outside the province. Native Taiwanese, including both 
Holo and Hakka, with no distinction, are calledpen-sheng-ren, which means people 
from this (Taiwan) province (Wachman 1994:17). These two ethnic categories were 
codified during the KMT’s early war-time policy when representing whole China was 
an important means of legitimizing authority. People, and more importantly Congress 
members from every province of China, had to remain visible at the central 
government level, while the number of Taiwanese in public sector was curbed (Wang 
Jenn-hwan 1989). Thus, native Taiwanese were forced to give up political careers 
which had evolved under the Japanese, and transfer their energy to economic 
activities, at a time when the KMT sought to deepen connections to both domestic and 
international capital which was needed for economic development which further 
served to legitimatize KMT rule (Amsden 1985; Liao Ping-hui 1994). The overall 
trend, then, is that the native Taiwanese have tended to concentrate their efforts in 
primary and manufacturing sectors, and the mainlanders in the service sector; and 
native Taiwanese in the private sector and mainlanders in public sector. This inequity 
is especially true for education where fluent Mandarin was a necessary requirement 
for academic success or even to be a teacher in the highly standardized education 
system (Lin Chung-cheng and Lin He-ling 1993).
Still, in a general sense, political party affiliations and voting behaviors also 
reflects, in an important way, ethnic differences. The KMT has greater amounts of
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support among the people originating from the mainland while the opposition party, 
the DPP, gamers most of its votes from native Taiwanese (Wang Fu-Chang 1993). As 
the KMT has been forced to “Taiwanized” to maintain a majority of seats in Congress, 
its hard-liners removed themselves from the party and established the Chinese New 
Party (CNP) in 1993. The CNP is now considered by most observers to be the party 
most closely associated with the “mainlanders.” It effectively partitions the KMT’s 
traditional mainland supporters as the KMT becomes more and more “Taiwanized.”
Ethnic differences are also reflected in the issue of national identity. Under the 
current sociopolitical context, Taiwan and China are two polar opposites with no 
“gray” in between. More than half (54%) of the mainlander population reports they 
view themselves as having a “Chinese” identity, while only 19.8% of the native 
population has this same perspective. Only 7.3% of mainlanders identify themselves 
with Taiwan, while 29.1% of native Taiwanese claim a “Taiwanese identity.” The rest 
of population who responded to this question answered that it “doesn’t matter” (Wang 
Fu-chang 1993). Clearly, Taiwan’s different ethnic markers are rooted in differences 
of provincial origins, which lead to different perspectives on national identity. This 
situation is popularly known as the “provincial complex” (sheng-chi-ching-chieh).
Many factors contribute to the current ethnic tensions and identity crisis in 
current Taiwan. The longstanding concept of the Chinese “central kingdom,” which 
reflects the longstanding assumption of supremacy over peripheral peoples and nations 
renders the concept o f multi-ethnic state foreign to the ideology of the KMT (Hsieh 
Shih-chung 1994c).Early on, the KMT’s claim to be the sole government of all of 
China prevented it from achieving full integration with local Taiwanese elites.
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Moreover, the KMT had to limit the role and visibility of native Taiwanese in the state 
bureaucracy, especially in the higher positions, to justify its claim as the sole 
legitimate government of all o f China. On the other hand, the Japanese characteristics 
and cultural prints which are a part of Taiwan’s people and landscapes reminded the 
mainlanders of their wars against Japan. From the perspective of some early KMT 
leaders, the Taiwanese were “contaminated” by Japanese culture and so required a 
period of reindoctrination to become authentic Chinese. To the Taiwanese, the 
colonial legacy represents the loss of their own “subjectivity,” which is constructed 
within, and through, discourses (Pratt 1994). The two opposite discourses forcibly 
imposed upon Taiwan by two different regimes within a span of fifty years have had a 
dramatic influence on the formation of the post-colonial Taiwanese identity.
In any analysis o f ethnicity discourse, two points embedded in the discursive 
construction are self-evident, though they are often intentionally ignored. First, ethnic 
boundaries are not generated under isolated conditions. Rather, ethnic awareness is a 
product of interactions among peoples, time and space. The existence of the “other” is 
crucial to the formation of the ethnic self. Therefore, ethnicity and national identity as 
well, are dynamic processes, contingent instead of absolute, and partially inventive 
instead of totally traditional. Second, ethnic groups are by no means internally 
homogenous, although all ethnic discourses work to maximize inter-ethnic difference 
and to minimize the intra-ethnic variance. There are, of course, gender, class, power, 
knowledge, religious, and ideological differences within the people of every ethnic 
group.
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5.2.2 Ethnic Relations between Han and Indigenous Peoples
In Taiwan, indigenous peoples are virtually absent from the current construction 
of the mainstream ethnic discourse because even in total they are too small in number; 
and taken one by one, the groups are too heterogeneous with respect to culture. Even 
within the “progressive” camp, in its construction of the discourse of Taiwanese 
nationalism, most intellectuals devote one or two paragraphs to describe the 
“uniqueness” (if they mention the issue at all) of what they consider as a 
“homogeneous” group of indigenous peoples. The many different aboriginal groups of 
Taiwan are treated for convenience as “one” of the ethnic groups that constitutes 
modern multi-ethnic Taiwanese society (Young Pi-chuan 1994; Huang Chao-tang
1994). Indigenous calls for a “national” status is basically overlooked.
While the Japanese discriminated against the indigenous peoples living in the 
mountains, and refused to confer Japanese nationality upon them (Lin Chia-ling 
1996:49-51), the KMT regime recognized their full citizenship and called them 
“mountain compatriots.” However, the term continues to imply a Sino-central 
chauvinism that regards aborigines not as different peoples, but as only one o f the 
constituents of the KMT’s nationalist imagination “Chung-Hwa-M in-Tzuthe 
Chinese nation. The authoritarian military regime sought through its policies to absorb 
the indigenous peoples into Han social, economic and political systems and to 
transcend and eliminate group differences (Chen Tzung-han 1994:52). As the direct 
heir of the totalitarianism of its colonial predecessor (AT A, I Chiang, and Lava Kau
1995), the KMT opted to fashion a civil society of solidity, sameness and universality 
which subjugated the politics of difference during the entire martial law era.
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Taiwan’s aborigines currently consider every regime from 1624 to the present, 
which established itself in either part of or all of Taiwan, as colonial regimes (ATA, I 
Chiang, and Lava Kau 1995). Different regimes exerted different degrees of control 
over indigenous territory depending on the level o f statecraft and the extent of 
dominion over Taiwan’s mountain areas. Indigenous peoples’ struggles for ethnic 
survival are caught between an environment where competitors differ in political 
ideology but share the same Han ethnicity (ATA, I Chiang, and Lava Kau 1995).
There was, and perhaps still is, a fear among the mainland population that once 
Taiwan becomes independent, all mainlanders will be “ousted” by native Taiwanese in 
the ensuing era. A parallel, if oversimplified, political rhetoric can also be found 
among some Han people who oppose indigenous calls for ethnic autonomy precisely 
because they fear being expelled from the island (see PPRA 1997a and 1997b). 
Nevertheless, considering the very limited political clout of the indigenous movements 
within the current Han-dominated power structure, this rhetoric is so exaggerated that 
few Han people can even take it seriously. This kind of outrageous political 
rhetoric is easier to understand as simply a ruse to counteract fears regarding the 
potential growth of the indigenous movement.
At the present time, the KMT continues to assign “protective quotas” to 
aborigines in terms of political participation to ensure their minimum representation.
A few symbolic seats in Taiwan’s legislative bodies, at all levels from local positions 
to those within the central government, are reserved for indigenous peoples. However, 
the KMT’s interventions in areas with predominantly indigenous populations are 
thorough and highly organized, and the results of elections at all levels always
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conform to the party’s will (Walis YuGan 1994a; AT A, I Chiang, and Lava Kau
1995). Successful indigenous candidates tend to be either the KMT’s official nominee 
or else they are funded by wealthy Han people and so their stance on indigenous 
struggles must be questioned. Indigenous politicians may be receptive to voting and 
implementing policies in a particular way in return for Han capitalists’ assistance in 
political campaigns, most notably on local issues such as the deregulation of 
reservation lands and support for the local patronage system. This system either 
elevates Han people to the important posts in the hsian government after the 
aborigines are elected, or provides Han contractors with extra businesses, or steers 
government contracts towards the relevant political machine.
Pro-resistance elites, who are mostly members of the Alliance of Taiwan’s 
Aborigines, have suffered severe setbacks in almost every election. The frustrations 
associated with supposedly “democratic” elections not only led to recent re­
adjustments of political strategies and campaign rhetoric, but also resulted in the 
decline of the ATA’s influence and popularity (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). These 
resistant elites have been forced to accept the reality that the seemingly significant 
concessions they received after negotiation from the government turned out to result 
in, at best, only superficial reforms (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c).
As noted earlier, according to a provincial executive order titled, “Identification 
Standards for the Aborigines of the Taiwan Province,” the KMT classified indigenous 
peoples only by their current geographical residence. In a strict legal sense, there are 
only distinctions of “aborigines of the mountainous areas” and “aborigines o f the 
plains” in the Constitution (Chen Hsin-yi 1993:9). The former refers to those who
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were registered in the mountain areas during the Japanese rule, while the latter were 
registered in the plains in the Japanese era. The KMT informally inherited the 
Japanese anthropologists’ way o f categorizing Taiwan’s aborigines which is now 
almost 100 years old and no longer is appropriate. The large influx of the indigenous 
peoples onto cities over the past few decades makes the category “urban aborigines,” a 
purely location based classification rather than ethnicity-based category, reasonable 
and appropriate.
Upon marriage with a Han man, an indigenous woman loses her legal ethnic 
status automatically. On the other hand, a Han woman who marries to an aborigine 
still maintains her Han status (ATA, I Chiang, and Lava Kau 1995). Thus, by this sort 
of nomenclatural bias, Taiwan’s indigenous population failed to grow at an island- 
wide rate. Of course, another side effect is that those people who intermarry are unable 
to select their own ethnic classification and develop their own self-chosen identity.
In 1945, immediately after the KMT took Taiwan from the Japanese, an order 
was issued to restore ancestral Han names and to discard the superimposed Japanese 
names. Thus, the family names of all Han people living in Taiwan were recovered and 
the family lineages, which are essential to the continuous operation of the Han 
patriarchal system, were maintained. In sharp contrast, indigenous peoples were not 
only unable to reclaim their traditional names, but further were forced to adopt Han 
names in order to register for citizenship (ATA, I Chiang, and Lava Kau 1995).
Cultural discrimination is among the most severe encroachments upon 
aboriginal self-confidence. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, the standardized textbooks 
for elementary and middle schools edited by the government are devoid of any
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materials on different cultures, ethnic groups, and historical experience. Officially 
sponsored ethnic tourism manifest in the form of several aboriginal cultural parks is 
just another form of touristic consumption.
Since the previous regime in China (the Ching Dynasty) was founded by non- 
Han people (Manchus), both the KMT’s Republic of China (ROC) and Chinese 
Communist Party’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) worked to formulate ethnic 
policies which hold the multi-ethnic state in unity and keep order on the frontiers. The 
origins o f the KMT’s ethnic policy can be traced to its two “founding fathers”— Sun 
Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, especially as evidenced by Sun’s Three Principles o f  
People, which although vague, became the dogma within the KMT. Sun’s theory was 
that the five major nations within China: Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, and Tibetan 
form a single nation. This greater Chinese Nation existed by default through centuries 
of integration and assimilation (SunDa-chuan 1995b; Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). 
Chiang directed Sun’s theory to a more conservative turn and even denied the 
potential independence of each “nation.” In his thought, all members of the Chinese 
Nation came from the same origin (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). Therefore, there can 
only be one nation in China. Chiang’s philosophy obviously results in a Han-oriented 
ethnocentrism. However, as the two most important ideological figures in the KMT, 
Sun and Chiang’s theories were not only reflected in the design of the Constitution, 
but also in turn were adopted in the standardized school textbooks in Taiwan. The 
result is
Chinese, without the experience of recognition o f multi-ethnic 
context in a state, always accuse people who show any ethnic 
consciousness, other than that of the Chinese nation, of betraying 
ancestors or being traitors (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c).
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Within the framework of “traditional,” the “Chinese” KMT’s ideology (in
contrast to the “Taiwanized” KMT), Taiwan’s aborigines are only different racial
groups in the frontier regions. Two articles of the Constitution justify the
implementation of the paternalist administration of the KMT regime to the aborigines.
Article 168. The State shall accord to the various racial groups in 
the frontier regions legal protection of their status and shall give 
them special assistance in their local self-government 
undertakings.
Article 169. The State shall, in a positive manner, undertake and 
foster the development of education, culture, communications, 
water conservancy, public health and other economic and social 
enterprises of the various racial groups in the frontier regions...
(GIO 1997: 699).
It is these articles that justified the creation in 1929 of the Cabinet-level 
“Mongolian & Tibetan Affairs Commission” that surprisingly remains in charge of 
minority groups in the ROC, despite the obvious fact that very few Mongolians and 
Tibetans reside in Taiwan. Indeed few even come to visit. The status of the indigenous 
peoples in Taiwan is, by the KMT’s definition, as a frontier minority group. The state 
policy of modernization and assimilation truthfully reflects the KMT’s interpretation 
of the two articles in Constitution. Han-ethnocentrism, that is, the concept of the 
“Middle Kingdom,” considers that Chinese culture is, and has always been, superior to 
all others in proximity and because of this superiority all other groups encountering 
Chinese culture should be Sinicized (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c).
Before the establishment of the Council o f Aboriginal Affairs in December of 
1996, in both the central and provincial governments, only a low-level administrative 
section within the provincial government was in charge of indigenous affairs. Again, 
the existence of the Mongolian & Tibetan Affairs Commission is a product o f the
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KMT’s vision of a single Chinese Nation, and stands as a symbol of the KMT’s 
longstanding territorial claims to all o f China and Mongolia. On the other hand, the 
creation of Council o f Aboriginal Affairs is the product of numerous street 
demonstrations and political reforms (see Section 5.3), but yet is also the result of the 
“indigenization” o f the KMT regime.
From the above discussion, two separate justifications for ethnic nationalism can 
be identified in Taiwan. The KMT’s line of reasoning is antiquated as it was based 
upon expelling the Manchus out o f China proper (advocated by Sun Yat-sen, Han 
people’s ethnocentrism) so that the Han majority would mobilize to found the ROC 
(state of multinationals), which occurred in 1911. Later, the established ROC could no 
longer rely exclusively on ethnic appeal to consolidate its legitimacy and thus, led to 
the creation of the Chinese Nation (a state of single nation). The course of 
development of Taiwanese nationalism as “mainlanders should go back to China” 
(expel those foreigners), uses an ethnic appeal for mobilizing the majority Holo 
people. Then the slogan shifted to “Taiwan belongs to native Taiwanese only, 
especially the largest Holo group” (nationalism of a single ethnic group). In the latest 
development when a narrow ethnic appeal no longer justifies political legitimacy, and 
when progressive forces also criticized this Holo ethno-nationalism, then, and only 
then, the new Taiwan Nation concept has been constructed. The new discourse is that 
the “four major groups, Holo, Hakka, mainlander, and aborigine, constitute a 
multiethnic nation-state” (after Sun Da-chuan 1995b). Even in this latest development 
of discursive construction, there is still tension between mainstream Taiwanese 
nationalism and this call for indigenous sovereignty. The similarity in reasoning in
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these two national discourses is striking. “Different” peoples remain the first target of 
exclusion in the building of ethno-nationalism.
Any challenge to the myth of the fundamental homogenous nature of the KMT’s 
Chinese Nation was a major taboo during Taiwan’s martial law era. Han Taiwanese 
nationalists promote the concept of Taiwanese Nation in contradistinction to the 
KMT’s “alien” Chinese Nation, while indigenous peoples advocated various re­
positionings o f the indigenous nations within the larger political spectrum ranging 
from a moderate request for autonomy to radical rejections of the Han people’s rights 
to majority rule (BaShang 1998). It may be true that the KMT-constructed national 
discourse and its associated perspective of cultural hegemony are in decline and 
disintegration, however, a new, overwhelmingly acceptable national discourse has not 
yet emerged (Wong and Sun 1998). The injection of indigenous requests into the 
construction is, however, totally new, not only for Taiwanese nationalism, but also 
within the broader theoretical concepts of the modem nation-state. I will discuss this 
issue further in Chapter 7.
5.3 Indigenous Movements and the Formation of New Identity
The rise and development of the indigenous peoples’ movement, and in fact, 
almost every social movement in Taiwan, cannot be separated from greater socio­
political and historical circumstances. I identify three major factors that shape post­
war development of Taiwan, which in turn create the greater context for all social 
movements in Taiwan. First, there is the chronic external military threat represented 
by the PRC. Second, we must consider the so far “successful” economic development
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policies o f the KMT which transformed Taiwan in the post-war era. And thirdly, the 
recent political transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is also important.
The Chinese military threat enables and justifies the KMT’s oppressive control 
of Taiwan’s economy and society. Despite the constant threat o f invasion from across 
the Taiwan Strait, however, Taiwan has experienced successful economic 
development, though at a great expense to certain social and environmental conditions. 
It must be recognized, however, that economic success provided a material base for 
later political reform. The relatively smooth and non-violent political transition had 
opened a space for the emergence of various social movements since the mid-1980s. 
The indigenous peoples’ movement was among 13 other movements identified by 
Hsiao Hsin-huang (1989) as newly emerging social movements in Taiwan in the 
1980s. Each movement demands a range of reforms which must be implemented by 
the KMT regime in the fundamental nature of state-society relations and usually also 
includes requests for greater autonomy within the new, fragile, civil society which has 
recently emerged in Taiwan (Hsiao Hsin-huang 1992).
It would be misleading to identify a single factor or socio-political movement 
that “forces” this increasing tolerance of Taiwan’s authoritarian state towards civil 
protests which began in the 1980s. Even the most visible and popular political protest 
movements, mainly led by the Democratic Progressive Party and its predecessors, 
cannot alone be credited with this reversal. It was a combination of factors such as the 
successful economic transition, international pressures for reform, and the ROC’s 
increasing international diplomatic isolation that forced the KMT to seek internal 
support, which all contributed to the transformation from “hard” to “soft”
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authoritarianism in Taiwan (Winckler 1984). Nevertheless, these newly emerging 
social movements have played a critical role in accelerating the transition process 
(Hsiao Hsin-huang 1992). In this sense, there is an on-going synergy between political 
reform and the greater political participation represented by all o f these various 
movements.
5.3.1 The History of the Indigenous Peoples’ Movement in Taiwan
Different perspectives from different people have divided the indigenous 
peoples’ history into different periods (TaiBong SaSaLe 1993; Hsieh Shih-chung 
1994c). The points which are found to be in common to all of these different views 
include the decline o f aboriginal “master” status and the increasingly dominance of the 
“alien” powers. In the earliest era, aborigines were forced to either give up fertile 
plains areas to Han farmers, or else were relocated to other places which lacked 
ancestral connections. After this initial period, the Japanese isolation policy and the 
KMT’s protectionist policy also effectively delimited the boundaries between the 
majority (Han) and the minority (indigenous population). The lack of interactions 
between these two societies had the effects of both limiting the impacts of capitalism 
on the mountain subsistence economy, and deferring the modernizing process 
(TaBong SaSaLe 1993). Beginning around the late 1950s and early 1960s, many 
indigenous peoples, “pushed” by declining conditions within the mountain economy 
and “pulled” by the promise of better job opportunities in the plains, moved to urban 
areas. This was a “reverse flow of population migration” and resulted in a significant 
exodus to the cities (Chiu Yen-liang 1994; TaBong SaSaLe 1993).
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The origin o f the recent indigenous peoples’ movement can be traced back to 
1983 when the first underground magazine High Mountains Are Green was published 
by a group of indigenous college students living in Taipei (Chiu Yen-liang 1994; 
YiChiang BaLuer 1994; TaiBong SaSaLe 1993; Hsiao Hsin-huang 1992). The 
“Committee o f Minorities” of the “Conference of Editing among Non-KMT Writers” 
was founded in April 1984. It claimed that the principle of the organization was to 
unite all people, aboriginal or Han, who were concerned about the rights of minority 
groups. This emphasis on uniting Han and aboriginal people with the same ideas has 
had deep and lasting impacts on the framework of later developments related to the 
indigenous movement (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987:63). It also signaled that the 
burgeoning indigenous movement was gaining support among, and from, political 
opposition forces, that is, the anti-KMT forces (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b). In 
December 1984, the most important organization in Taiwan’s indigenous movement, 
at the time, the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines (ATA), was established with 24 
founding members. Eight months later, membership had grown to 53 members, 
including 14 Han people and 39 aborigines (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). The ATA’s 
members came largely from the people associated with the High Mountains Are Green 
magazine, but also included members of the “Committee of Minorities,” clergy of the 
Taiwan Presbyterian Church, students from seminaries founded by the Presbyterian 
Church, and some urban indigenous workers (YiChiang BaLuer 1994).
The ATA and its members continue to be the major initiators of virtually all the 
important events in the indigenous movement. Although from the vantage point of the 
late 1990s, the ATA’s political clout has declined significantly, its members and
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supporters still play considerable roles in awakening indigenous cultural and political 
consciousness. As a “protesting” organization, mainly against the KMT regime and its 
myths and dominant ideology, the ATA‘s “historical mission” has almost come to an 
end (Interview E). Taiwan’s population is no longer considered to be a portion of the 
single Chinese Nation. Taiwan is now recognized by most to be the multiethnic and 
multicultural state. That it is this idea has been gradually appreciated even in 
mainstream ethnic discourse. For example, many traditional tribal ceremonies are 
undergoing a renaissance as part of a wider cultural revival and as a re-assertion o f 
ethnic confidence and sovereignty, though there are still many problems left unsolved.
Land conflicts were one of the central concerns of the early ATA, which accused 
Han people and their regimes of invading aboriginal lands. For the ATA members, the 
absence of land with clear title meant no security, no distinct identity, and as a 
consequence, threatened cultural survival. The ATA in its early stage could only 
simply respond to problems with complaints and protests, rather than proposing a 
more integrated analytical framework for the indigenous land rights disputes. The goal 
to establish indigenous peoples’ autonomous zones and the radical idea of “natural 
sovereignty” (see Chapter 6) developed later.
The ATA, basing their opinion on past conditions, claimed that the KMT state 
could, for the purpose of public use or the vague definition of “national security,” 
reclaim reservation lands, the titles of which belong mostly to the State. Thus the 
reservation land policy was viewed as the main element in the process of destroying 
indigenous peoples through the steady acquisition of their territories and in turn, their 
identity (DuoAo 1985, sited in Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). In 1987, the ATA declared a
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“Manifesto of Taiwan Aborigines.” Six out of the seventeen articles related to the land 
rights of indigenous peoples (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c; Hong Chun-hu 1992: 91):
1. The aborigines have rights of basic protection for their lives (including rights of/to 
survival, work, land, property and education), autonomous rights, and a right to 
self-cultural identity (Article 2).
2. The traditional aboriginal territories must be able to practice local autonomy 
(Article 3)
3. The state must recognize the populations, regions, and social organizations of 
aborigines (Article 7)
4. The aborigines must have titles to lands and resources. Lands that were acquired by 
illegal measures in the past must be returned to the aborigines (Article 8).
5. The land rights must include surface, subsoil, and marine rights (Article 9).
6. Aborigines have the rights to take advantage of their resources for satisfying their 
needs (Article 10).
Central to the belief o f the resistant elites in the ATA is the “truism of 
aborigines” (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987). That is, “the consciousness on territorial rights 
is based on the ATA’s interpretation of what rights the aborigines should naturally 
have” (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). On the one hand, the “natural sovereignty” of the 
indigenous people is favored by indigenous activists in their struggles to re-acquire 
ethnic pride. On the other hand, modem nation-states and their legal systems can 
seldom, in reality, bear the challenge to sovereignty waged by their “citizens.” Thus, 
the issue of “natural sovereignty” is more a political one than a cultural one. It is 
raised because two different political systems, based on two different social and
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cultural behaviors have interest conflicts over the same space and each has evidenced 
claims for sovereignty over this space.
The furor regarding requests for indigenous land rights climaxed in three large 
demonstrations of the “Return Our Lands” movement from 1988 to 1993. The last 
march in 1993, which was also the International Year for the World’s Indigenous 
Peoples as declared by the United Nations, broadened its appeals to include the right 
of indigenous peoples’ survival. This appeal formally connected the land to the very 
survival of indigenous peoples and cultures and spearheaded the formation of 
indigenous peoples’ demands for “natural sovereignty.”
Studies in the successful mobilization o f indigenous peoples in the “Return Our 
Lands” movements indicate several causes. First, the improper reservation lands 
policies led to the loss of land acquired due to the power and influence of capital 
coming from the plains investors. Second, the aborigines registered in plains areas, 
mainly concentrated in Taitung and Hualien Counties, have no rights to the reserves 
and are often accused of “occupying” public lands once they make use of traditional 
tribal territories, despite longstanding unofficial recognition of their tenure in these 
places. Third, the churches in mountain hsians have to pay significant rents to the 
State no matter where they locate, whether on public lands or on private lands owned 
by church members (Lee Tsu-min 1991:31; YiChiang BaLuer 1994). It is the last 
point that ties the leaders o f “foreign” religions directly to Taiwan’s indigenous 
movement.
Unlike in the U.S. where some native Americans in certain areas were forced to 
convert to Christianity before 1930, the presence of Western religions neither implies
132
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
an aggressive invasion of a colonial power, nor represented a spearhead of imperial 
conquest to Taiwan’s indigenous population (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b). In the former 
case of the American Indians, the State’s actions sometimes led to nativistic cultural 
revitalizations, the selective renaissance of traditional religion, and the conferment of 
symbolic values to the selected cultural elements (Linton 1943). In Taiwan’s case, the 
Western religions provided a new spiritual support for seventy percent o f the 
indigenous population in Taiwan at a time when traditional religions were rapidly 
fading (The Voice o f Taiwan Indigenous Peoples, TVTEP 1997, Hsieh Shih-chung 
1987b; Table 5.1). Buddhism and Taoism are the principal religions of Han people and 
remain relatively unimportant within indigenous communities. Christianity, however, 
became a symbol of solidarity for aborigines from different tribes and a weapon for 
the resistance of the ongoing powerful assimilation trend. In brief, many Christian 
beliefs have been “internalized” into aboriginal culture (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b). 
Given the situation in Taiwan, where aboriginal traditional beliefs have long been 
disconnected from the daily lives and collective memory of the tribal members, though 
to some extent, cultural revitalization has occurred, no elements of traditional religions 
are involved in the cultural renaissance (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b).
Possibly, the extinction of traditional religions offered a new “spiritual space” 
for the new beliefs to “anchor.” Among all Christian religions, the Presbyterian 
Church and the Roman Catholic Church are the two most popular denominations 
within the people of the mountain hsian. The common Christian symbols -  God, Jesus 
Christ, the Cross, and the Bible -  blended with Taiwan’s indigenous peoples’ beliefs 
and helped form a new indigenous identity. The development of the pan-aboriginal
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identity and the burgeoning religious identity have added to the motivation and growth 
of the indigenous movements in Taiwan (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987a: 85).
Table 5.1 Self-Reported Religious Affiliations among Indigenous Peoples
unit: percentage




56.19 27.75 2.06 0.33 13.67
Indigenes in 
Plains
32.67 36.71 9.66 9.51 11.45
Indigenes in 
Cities
47.09 26.95 10.58 2.49 12.88
Source: The Survey on Economic and Living Qualities in Remote Areas in 1991, 
Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Government, 1993.
The history o f Christian missionaries in Taiwan is long, reaching back to the 
1600s when the Dutch occupied southern Taiwan, but the influences on the indigenous 
peoples’ movement are much more recent. The Taiwan Presbyterian Church set up its 
first seminary in 1949 intending to recruit indigenous students and clergy as future 
missionaries in tribal areas. The “localization” policy o f the international Presbyterian 
Church won the trust o f many of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. To the indigenous 
peoples, church-related activities are more trustworthy than the state-sponsored 
mountain policies (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987a:85-6). Moreover, the Presbyterian Church 
not only encouraged its recruited indigenous clergy to preach in their own native 
tongue, which apparently violated the KMT’s official language policy, but also 
collaborated with political oppositional forces to push for national socio-political 
reforms. This further endeared the missionaries to the leaders of the indigenous 
movements. Because of these activities, the Presbyterian Church has remained at odds 
with the KMT regime for a number of years.
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These local Christian clergy represent a new segment of the newly emerging 
indigenous elites distinct from those intellectuals who receive higher education in Han 
society. The foundation of the ATA gained support quickly from the church’s 
“religious elites.” In fact, some studies show that the church system provided the most 
extensive mobilization network for the spatially scattered indigenous settlements and 
that once the ATA initiated the “Return Our Lands” movement, they relied heavily on 
the church’s momentum and connections (Chung Ching-po 1990:68-77; Lee Tsu-min 
1991: 49-53; Hsieh Shih-chung 1987a:83-7). This suggests indirectly that the personal 
connections established by the churches have effectively replaced, to some significant 
extent, traditional indigenous social and political organizations.
The close cooperation between the indigenous movement and the Christian 
churches in promoting the social movement does not suggest that there is no tension 
regarding other issues. Although the Taiwan Presbyterian Church possesses “relative 
progressiveness” (Chen Ying-chen, cited in Chung Ching-po 1990:99), compared to 
other overly apolitical and conservative denominations, there are doubts about what 
positions some of the Christian ministers will take regarding the indigenous 
movements if hard choices must be made. Some ministers may not participate in the 
“Return Our Lands” movement for the sake of the pending extinction of Taiwan’s 
indigenous nations. Nor do the Christian clergy always conform to the indigenous 
movement’s contentions that “land is life” and “land is identity.” What is clearly 
central to the mission of these clergy is to “deepen” the relationship between the 
church and the indigenous peoples (Chung Ching-po 1990:77). The resistant 
indigenous elites who are not converted have complicated feelings about the role of
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Western religions in Taiwan’s indigenous movements. This is especially true for the 
leftwing-oriented intellectuals who are active and relatively important in policy 
formation for these movements (Interview E).
One of my informants told me that he has still some doubts about the foreign 
religions (Interview E). Christianity, the churches themselves, and their priests and 
reverends have altered the spatial relationship of tribal members and their living space. 
Ancient sacred places are displaced by the churches. Some ancestor worship and other 
traditional ceremonies are forbidden or discouraged or simplified by the local religious 
elites and clergy (Interview E). From the perspective of one of my informants, the 
church is the medium of social cooperation. It is necessary to get along with the 
church clergy since many tribal activities are led by the church (Interview E). From his 
point of view, the church has to transform itself to become “indigenized” (see Chapter 
5.2) as well, and change its “alien” characteristic to fit into the indigenous cultures 
(Interview E). However, only very limited “indigenization” actually occurs in 
churches and its extent also varies geographically. As an active promoter of nativistic 
culture, my informant did not conceal his dissatisfaction with the Western churches 
and some priests, though he himself is also a Christian (Interview E).
YiChiang BaLuer (1994) wishes to refute previous studies which emphasize the 
importance of using the mobilizing networks of the church and proposes a “mutual 
and reciprocal” linking of the ATA and the Christian church systems. Lee Tsu-min 
(1991:49) and Hsieh Shih-chung (1992 and 1994c) call the resistant indigenous elites 
“elites without people” given the fact that the initial ATA-led protests did not attain 
significant attention from the aboriginal communities all over Taiwan, and that in
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reality the successful mobilization of the “Return Our Lands” movement relied mostly 
on church-based connections. YiChiang argues that although the branches o f the 
Taiwan Presbyterian Church in the plains areas are relatively liberal, the churches in 
the mountain areas are still very conservative and in fact, remain under severe KMT 
party-state control (1994). The Presbyterian Church mainly provided the platform for 
mobilization and financial support, but the ATA was the actual group whose member 
carried out plans and promoted grassroots mobilization. For some, then, this is a 
complementary relationship. To argue that the ATA leaders have no tribal mass 
foundation and connections is incorrect, since many ATA caucus members are 
themselves clergy of the church and stay in constant contact with the grassroots 
organizations (YiChiang BaLuer 1994). However, the relations between Western 
religions and their proponents and these new indigenous movements should be 
situated and studied in broader cultural and historical contexts. Thus, to generate 
ethnic pride by challenging the existing Han hegemonic illusions and to reclaim the 
right of self-naming are additional goals of the current indigenous movement.
From the above discussion, it is obvious that indigenous movements involve not 
merely political mobilization and ideological conversion, but also struggles in cultural 
representation. The right of naming, as one of the most fundamental manifestation of 
cultural autonomy in the politics of multiculturalism, however, cannot be taken for 
granted by indigenous peoples, who still need to fight for this basic right of naming, 
their homeland, and landscapes for themselves.
One of the most significant breakthroughs in cultural politics is the dissolution 
o f the myth o f Wu-fang, who was said to be respected by the tribal members because
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he sacrificed himself to teach the savage headhunting/a/75 to stop the killing of 
humans. The “official legend” was adopted in the standard curricula o f all elementary 
schools and constituted one of the major origins o f the “stigmatized identity” designed 
to the aborigines. A hsian and a temple in Chiayi County were both named after Wu- 
fang. His statue was erected in front of the Chiayi City train station. The textbook, 
name, temple and statue could be considered as the embodiment of a Han hegemonic 
project (Chu Yen-liang 1994) and became major targets o f protests. In 1988, Wu-fang 
hsian was renamed as A-Li-Shan hsian with all Han delegates voting against and all 
indigenous delegates voting for the proposal to change the name (YiChiang BaLuer 
1994). Wu-fang’s statue was tumbled in 1988 with iron chains by the collective 
“illegal” efforts of a group of indigenous youths. Because of these efforts, Wu-fang no 
longer appears in the elementary school textbook as a hero who “tamed” the 
“savagery” of mountain people. The dissolution of such a state-sponsored myth 
signals the partial achievement of the “Name Correcting Movement” (see next section) 
at the local level.
The acquisition by Taiwan’s indigenous population of a proper name to replace 
the official government names of “mountain people,” “mountain compatriots”
(shanpao), “mountain people in mountain areas” (shandi shanpao) and “mountain 
people in plains areas” (pingdi shanpao) reflects another prolonged struggle in the 
field o f cultural politics. In 1984, the ATA promoted the use of Yuanzhumin, which 
literally means original inhabitants and was perhaps inspired by the English use of 
“aborigines,” to replace other traditional “stigmatized” names (YiChiang BaLuer 1994 
and 1995). In North America, the existence of the indigenous peoples who had lived in
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America for thousands of years before the arrival of white settlers is commonly 
recognized. In contrast, Taiwan’s school curricula under the control of the KMT 
regime did not provide similar information. Conversely, the standard textbooks 
propagandized Han settlers’ efforts to open the “wildness” of the frontier island. A 
“positive” recognition o f the existence of non-Han peoples in Taiwan was not 
available through official channels. Therefore, the new name Yuanzhumin was, in fact, 
totally strange to the majority Han people in Taiwan (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987b). 
However, the use of new name quickly became widespread among some liberal mass 
media outlets, academics, non-KMT forces, and various religious groups. Even this 
level of adoption was beyond the imagination of the ATA leaders (YiChiang BaLuer 
1994). Both the newly founded Democratic Progressive Party in 1987 and the Taiwan 
Presbyterian Church in 1989 declared their official support of the new name 
(YiChiang BaLuer 1994 and 1995). The support from the Presbyterian Church and the 
largest opposition party has far-reaching influence on the attitudes of indigenous 
political elites. Even the KMT’s indigenous elites who often opposed the ATA 
proposed reforms showed unprecedented support for the adoption of the new 
collective name for indigenous peoples (YiChiang BaLuer 1994 and 1995). It seems 
that the only serious opposition to the change came from the KMT’s most rigid 
ideologies (YiChiang BaLuer 1995).
In the 1992 National Assembly Conference for Constitutional Revision, the 
KMT insisted on the use of “mountain people registered in mountain areas” (shandi 
shanpao) and “mountain people registered in plains areas” (pingdi shanpao) as the 
official Constitutional names for Taiwan’s aborigines. Officially, the ATA strongly
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disagreed with the KMT’s proposal for the following reasons (YiChiang BaLuer
1993):
1. The uses of “mountain people registered in mountain areas” and “mountain 
people registered in plains areas” not only represents vestiges of the Japanese 
colonial legacy but also negates both ethnic symbolic marks and indigenous 
peoples’ “national” status.
2. The character, pao, in Chinese means siblings or people with the same origin.
To usepao as the official name for aborigines fairly demonstrates the KMT’s 
ethno-centrism and assimilation policy.
3. The dichotomy of indigenous population into “people registering in the 
mountains” and “people registering in the plains,” is associated with different 
administrative measures used to deal with these two groups and was 
disruptive to the solidarity of aboriginal pan-ethnic identity.
4. “Mountain people” {shanpao) is considered to be a discriminatory and 
obsolete name. Aborigines have their own many cultures, histories, 
ancestries and races. Their living space spreads over a broad territory and 
many aborigines currently live in the cities. Shanpao is then, in fact, a term 
which is itself the result of a distorted history and is not correct even with 
respect to the location o f these people.
Academics, including anthropologists and sociologists, supported the new name. 
They claimed that the ruling party, aborigines, or other citizens should not expect the 
academy to provide a “correct” or “best” name because the best name for minority 
groups was the name chosen by themselves (Huang Ying-kuei; Chiang Ping; Chen
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Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993). The principle seemed especially true for 
the indigenous populations of Taiwan. The academics also disputed the KMT’s 
interpretation that the name Yuamhiimin would be used to protest against the Chinese 
Nation and would eventually lead to separatism (Huang Ying-kuei; Chiang Ping; Chen 
Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993). Conversely, the deeply Sinicized 
aborigines express their active participation in politics that is overwhelmingly 
structured within the framework of Han culture.
Han people expressed concern that the recognition of the “shanpao” as the “first 
masters” who were “indigenous” to the island would lead to the re-establishment of 
aboriginal “traditional” land tenure system. However, this was over-romanticized and 
was clearly an exaggeration of the power of a name as a symbol (Huang Ying-kuei; 
Chiang Ping; Chen Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993) given the current ethnic 
power relations in Taiwan. A name change, of course, will in no way guarantee 
associated political and economic benefits, which depended mostly upon political 
reality. Moreover, even the restoration o f the traditional land tenure system will not 
actually benefit all members of the indigenous population because the firmly 
established and on-going capitalist development o f the mountain areas has 
significantly eroded any basis for the reestablishment of traditional livelihoods. Thus, 
the leaders of a responsible, sincere, indigenous movement will have to take the real 
world situation into serious account in their designs for a traditional cultural 
renaissance or, indeed, in the establishment of any form of aboriginal autonomous 
areas.
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The name-correcting movement had partially achieved its original goals as of 
1994. The name of shanpao (mountain people) was changed into Yuanzhumin 
(indigenous people), but not as originally expected Yuanzhumintzu (indigenous 
peoples or indigenous nations). The latter term placed greater emphasis on indigenous 
“national” status, while the former term only recognized “indigenous” status without 
regarding aborigines as another people or nation apart from the KMT’s central belief 
of “Chung-Hwa-Min-Tzu, ” the Chinese Nation. However, by way of compromise, the 
dominant KMT delegates in the 1994 Constitutional reforms still dichotomized 
aborigines into “aborigines in mountain areas” and “aborigines in plains areas” despite 
tremendous ongoing pressures from indigenous organizations and massive social 
sympathy towards the aborigines.
The prolonged indigenous movements and radical sociopolitical changes in 
recent years have resulted in some changes of the attitudes of the pro-KMT indigenous 
elites. Aboriginal representatives are not as quiet and submissive as before. They have 
started to criticize unreasonable government policies and have come to question the 
distorted history and past discriminatory policies levied against the aborigines (Hsieh 
Shih-chung 1994c). However, those pro-KMT elites only played a passive role in all 
aboriginal struggles. At the initial stage of the indigenous movements, these 
indigenous KMT delegates often waged a counteraction or provided intimidating 
information to offset grassroots mobilization (Lee Tsu-min 1991:22; YiChiang BaLuer
1994). To some extent, these KMT indigenous elites did reap interests and benefited 
from the indigenous resistant movements.
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Hsieh Shih-chung’s observations (1994c) that the pro-KMT elites (in his term, 
party elites) support the traditional ideology of the unification of China and oppose 
ATA-initiated movements no longer applies to all party elites. That the ATA 
emphasizes identification as “indigenous nations” and tries to integrate all aboriginal 
groups under the common banner of a pan-indigenous identity remains true. However, 
to say that party elites emphasize identification with the Chinese Nation is 
problematic. Although the party elites still endeavor to maintain the current condition 
of cooperation with the KMT regime, they may no longer uphold the idea of the 
Chinese Nation. My interview with the chief of Hoping hsian indicated that even this 
indigenous politician, quite successful at the local level would first identify himself as 
Taiwanese, rather than Chinese (Interview B). The combined effects of rapid socio­
political changes in Taiwan and the relative decline of the KMT’s authoritarianism 
also encouraged party elites to be more outspoken so as to gamer support from the 
newly emerging and gradually less manipulatable indigenous elites. Opinions and 
requests raised by the party elites in some aspects are identical to those in the ATA’s 
earlier proposal.
The indigenous resistant groups grew to as many as fifteen during the period 
from 1984 to 1990 (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). This period is also considered to be the 
“golden period” o f Taiwan’s various new social movements. It was also the time when 
the nearly four-decade long martial law was going to be lifted and the forces within 
the more mature civil society were ready to erupt against the prolonged authoritarian 
control. A division of labor within these social movements groups gradually appeared. 
The extent of topics o f concern broadened to cover other social and environmental
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problems facing the indigenous population. Among them, saving indigenous child 
prostitutes and protesting the nuclear waste site in Lanyu Island where the Dawu 
people (originally called Yami) live, were the two major events which also drew 
significant attentions from Taiwan’s society and the KMT regime. Other isolated, 
sporadic demonstrations occurred through the late 1980s and early 1990s (TaBong 
SaSaLe 1993).
The most recent indigenous peoples’ movements have developed around two 
broad issues. First, there is a call for establishing a Cabinet-level government agency 
to unify the dispersed authority dealing with the aboriginal affairs. Second, there is the 
demand for an addition to the “Aboriginal Articles” to the Constitution to protect 
aboriginal rights to autonomy, to veto (the aborigine-related legislation), and to 
provide for a greater say in issues related to development, culture, education, and land 
(National Assembly 1997).
The longstanding, if mis-named, Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission 
also became the target of protests during the struggling for the establishment of a 
central government agency in charge of aboriginal affairs (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c). 
The Commission was considered as a concrete representation of the KMT’s Chinese 
bias in that the ROC State would rather disguise its symbolic claim over China’s 
“frontier” territory than sincerely face issues related to aboriginal sufferings in 
Taiwan. The ATA led a demonstration in 1991 to demand the abolishment of the 
symbolic agency of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and to promote 
the establishment of a new Cabinet-level agency for minorities and indigenous 
peoples. In December 1996, the Council of Aboriginal Affairs under the Executive
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Yuan was founded during the government fiscal year. The immediate results of this 
poor timing included insufficient financial resources and an under-staffed institute 
since neither money nor personnel could be devoted within a fiscal year.
The passage of the bylaws of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs in November 
1996, however, did not draw wide applause from the indigenous peoples because of 
the compromise made during the process of legislation. The plains Han people 
effectively lobbied the lawmakers (see Chapter 6) to add an additional resolution 
concerning the reservation lands used by non-indigenous people. The amended 
resolution requires that surveys on the lands leased to Han people by either the state or 
the aborigines, and investigations regarding the land transactions between Han and 
aborigines, be immediately conducted. When legal discrepancies are identified, they 
demand that sound and fair decisions be made. The additional resolution is interpreted 
by the resistant elites as an ominous prelude to the deregulation of aboriginal 
reservation land. In short, it was seen as a capitulation of the KMT administration to 
the demands of both Han hegemonic culture and more pragmatically to large Han 
business groups which are renown for their land speculation all over Taiwan’s cities 
(Chapter 6).
The new indigenous movement, after the achievements of partial restoration of 
traditional cultural dignity and the founding of Council o f Aboriginal Affairs, has 
turned its attention to land rights and associated issues.
For the first anniversary of the creation of the Council of Aboriginal Affairs, a 
public hearing was held to examine the actual accomplishments of the new agency in 
the first year of existence. The chairperson was a former KMT indigenous legislator.
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Various indigenous organizations and officials from different ministries were invited 
to the meeting. Overall, the performance of the Council was not found to be 
satisfactory, especially for the resistant elites. Severe criticisms were raised by the 
aboriginal resistant elites on the following issues (Interview C):
1. The Executive Yuan is contemptuous of the Council and not willing to 
allocate a significant budget which is required for accomplishing the stated 
goals o f the Council.
2. The personnel and decision-makers of the Council were actually the KMT members 
who used to oppose the goals of indigenous movements. The Council must 
determine if such persons are suitable for the positions they now hold.
3. The Council lacks autonomy and relies heavily on the mercy o f other ministries 
even for aborigine-related issues.
4. The Council can neither protect the reservation lands from the invasion of 
business corporations, nor does it have the capability of presenting sound 
vocational training and employment policies to improve aboriginal economic 
conditions and job opportunities.
5. The severe shortages of medical infrastructure and facilities in the mountain 
hsians have resulted in many avoidable tragedies.
6. Native tongues and traditional cultures are still rapidly disappearing. The 
indigenous music and dances promoted by the government only reinforce 
stereotypes of the aborigines.
7. The Council remains reluctant to speak about issues related to aboriginal human 
rights. The issues include child prostitutes, nuclear waste sites in Lanyu Island, and
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most recently the forced relocation of indigenous peoples for the construction of the 
new reservoir in Pingtung County.
8. The KMT regime defers, or even destroys, the efforts of nongovernmental 
organizations to bring Taiwan back to the international stage under the name of 
Taiwan, rather than the government-preferred ROC. Thus, in the 1997 meeting of the 
United Nations’ Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Taiwan’s indigenous 
representatives were forced to remove “Taiwan” from their organizational name 
because o f protests from mainland China. The diplomatic policy o f the Council in the 
international indigenous community concentrates on little more than orchestrated 
displays o f Taiwan’s aboriginal music and dance, while largely concealing the many 
problems currently facing the indigenous population.
9. The Council lacks the legal capacity and insights to design future relations 
between the central government and the future aboriginal autonomous areas.
Because many superficial programs dominated the Council’s agenda in its first 
year, the resistant indigenous elites repeatedly referred to the Council and the new 
government policy as a whole as a form of “educational colonialism” and “welfare 
colonialism” (Interview C).
The Constitutional “Aboriginal Articles” movement is another major ongoing 
indigenous peoples’ movement. Following the partial success of the “name- 
correcting” movement that established the term of Yuamhumin in the Constitution, the 
“Aboriginal Articles” movement also aims at Constitutional reforms. The central 
concern of this movement entails the establishment of codified fundamental rights of 
the indigenous nations in a modern nation-state. Full recognition of these rights, such
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as self-government, rights to the use of fisheries and other natural resources, education 
and language policies, rights to cultural intellectual property, and some forms of veto 
power over legislation and development plans related to indigenous land and territory, 
will signal a revolutionary change in the current conceptualization and ideology of the 
traditional nation-state.
Although the new Constitution conferred a seemingly suitable term, Yuanzhumin
(indigenous persons) to the aborigines to replace the old expression shanpao
(mountain compatriot) in July 1994, guideline regarding aborigines-state relations
remains poorly specified in the Constitution. In the new additional articles which was
added to the Constitution in 1994, the general right to political participation is firmly
confirmed. This aboriginal article is as follow:
The state shall accord to the aborigines in the free area [i.e. the 
Taiwan area] legal protection of their status and right to political 
participation. It shall also provide assistance and encouragement 
for their education, cultural preservation, social welfare, and 
business undertakings. The same protection and assistance shall 
be given to the people o f the Kinmen and Matsu areas (GIO 1997, 
brackets added by the author).
The original proposal by the aboriginal representatives, which demanded a 
minimum quota in congressional seats and further asked that the representatives be 
elected from each indigenous group (according to the principle of “ethnic group 
justice”), however, did not pass (National Assembly 1997). The much-needed right to 
traditionally held lands, autonomy, and a right to veto for relevant laws proposed 
mainly by the indigenous representatives and the Democratic Progressive Party, were 
also turned down during the National Assembly meeting in 1997. Moreover, these 
proposals were considered as dividing political spoils of Constitutional reforms among
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major political forces in that “Aboriginal Articles” were simply issues which might 
best be described as trading interest for votes (Interview G).
To “dilute” the already symbolic and grudgingly awarded “national” status of 
the indigenous peoples, the aboriginal article actually passed by the National 
Assembly in 1994 was written in such a way as to intentionally include the people of 
the islands of Kinmen and Matsu (National Assembly 1997), which are considered to 
be “border regions in ROC’s free areas” under the KMT’s current political ideology. 
Like other minority people in ROC’s border area such as Mongolia, Tibet and 
Sinkiang (Xinjiang), the new document asserts that Taiwan’s indigenous people are 
also part of the great Chinese Nation, not a different “nation” or “people.” Ironically, 
perhaps, Taiwan’s aborigines are now associated with the “border areas” of the current 
territory effectively controlled by the KMT state. The association of minority groups 
with the border, the frontier or “geographically peripheral” areas also suggests a Han- 
centrism embodied in the mainstream hegemonic culture. This “frontier colonialism” 
(in Mercer’s term, 1997) and the patemalistically assimilationist policy was simply 
converted to a less obvious form in the new Constitution. Colonialism has altered 
indigenous peoples and their territory from sovereignty independence to protectorates 
as mere third parties (Kariya 1993) in negotiation between dominating political forces 
or even perhaps between private developers and government in terms of resource 
exploitations.
The ATA’s resistant elites participated actively in various elections from the 
early stage of the burgeoning indigenous peoples’ movement. Less than one year from 
the establishment o f the ATA, one member participated in an election of the
149
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
representative to the Provincial Council in the category of “mountain people registered 
in the mountain area” in 1985 but failed. Others participated in County Council, 
Provincial Council, and Legislative elections in 1986, 1989, and 1991. They all lost!
In retrospect, the resistant elites with no local faction affiliations, still crucial to 
Taiwan’s local elections (Kao Te-yi 1996), expected unrealistically that their efforts in 
awakening the indigenous peoples would lead to subsequent electoral victories. 
Moreover, the KMT state’s compromises to the ATA’s demands apparently have not 
loosened the party’s firm control over the indigenous society (Hsieh Shih-chung 
1994c).
YiChiang’s review of the indigenous movements provides several insights 
(YiChiang BaLuer 1994). First, the loose grassroots organization deters the 
development of the ATA. It is not because the ATA’s members are all urban elites 
without any tribal base and connections, but because the ATA’s members lack the 
requisite organizing skills. Thus, most of the ATA’s local chapters could not operate 
actively in the tribes and so had little influence on actual elections.
Second, there is a lack o f cohesive forces among different pro-resistance 
organizations. Because of the lack of effective communication and cooperation, 
mutual trust rapidly eroded away and the result was internal rifts. The geographically 
scattered indigenous tribes with different cultural backgrounds and different local 
contexts and issues underscore the difficulty of waging island-wide resistant 
movements.
Third, the presence o f the pro-KMT indigenous political elites counteracts the 
progressive indigenous movement. The current political elites are nominated by the
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KMT first and then elected by their constituents later. Indeed, under this system, it 
would appear that no independent could win elections without KMT affiliation. 
Therefore, the indigenous political elites in the KMT establishment always stood in 
opposition to the pro-resistance elites and so offset the effect of the aboriginal 
movement’s progressive policies and candidates. This tension was somewhat 
alleviated by recent developments. However, when goals of the indigenous movement 
are contradictory to the KMT’s policies, the political elites still tended to side with the 
ruling party and failed to form a united front for the common interests of all of the 
indigenous nations.
Fourth, there is a lack of political resources which limit what the movement can 
do. The growth and development of Taiwan’s indigenous movements occurred earlier 
than subsequent political democratization and the growth of party politics in Taiwan. 
Social resources are often largely absorbed by party politics and in general there is 
insufficient attention paid to aboriginal affairs.
Finally, there might have been premature participation in the elections. Elections 
were considered to be one strategy which could be used to arouse indigenous 
consciousness and to disseminate the ATA’s ideas to the grassroots in more effective 
ways. However, the tribal members may consider that the ATA’s efforts merely 
resulted in competition with strong KMT nominees for same positions. Failure in early 
elections may have cast doubts on the “legitimacy” and “truism” o f the indigenous 
movements. Even at present, the “game” of electoral politics designed by the Han state 
is incompatible with the direction of the aboriginal movement. Premature participation 
in election politics may have siphoned off considerable resources in the movements
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while actually effecting little change. Understanding of this problem in hindsight has 
come to be viewed as a critical problem (YiChiang BaLuer 1994).
5.3.2 New Indigenous Peoples’ Identity
Taiwan is on the verge of identity schizophrenia. On the one hand, the 
“Sinicizing” process imposed by the early authoritarian state had “misplaced” the 
identity of Taiwan’s people to that of an “imaged country”- the ROC. On the other 
hand, the “Taiwanized” KMT regime, represented by the current president Lee Teng- 
hui, and the native opposition party, the DPP, have jointly advocated a policy of 
“Taiwan-prioritism” (Wong and Sun 1998) which affirms the priority o f recognizing a 
Taiwanese identity. As a result, Taiwan people’s national identities are characterized 
by confusion and ambivalence because of these conflicting national discourses (Wong 
and Sun 1998). As an added distinctive characteristic of Taiwanese nationalism, 
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have been given a symbolic place in the construction of 
new Taiwanese nationalism. However, this does not guarantee, or even deny, 
indigenous peoples’ “national” status within this emerging new nationalist discourse.
From the aboriginal perspective, the subjectivity of indigenous peoples has been 
gradually lost to the encroachment o f foreign colonizers in the past four hundred 
years. The various degrees of interactions with the Western powers, the Chinese 
Empire, the Japanese during occupation, and the KMT constitute unique historical 
contexts within which the identities of the various aboriginal groups were formed, 
transferred, interrupted, and consolidated.
Prior to 1895, only some points and areas of Taiwan were under the effective 
control of these various regimes. Even the settlers and local elites during the Ching
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Empire had limited knowledge about the more remote areas of the Central Mountain 
Range and the East Coast of Taiwan (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). Han settlers distinguished 
aborigines unilaterally according to their degrees of Sinicization and assimilation. To 
the aborigines, their identity and geographical imagination were bound by their own 
“tribe” and their accessible hunting fields (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). No regular 
organization was set up for inter-tribal communication even within different tribes of 
the same indigenous group. Tribes formed the basic unit o f the subsistence economy 
as well as the organizations comprising the social and political structures (TaBong 
SaSaLe 1993). Separated by rough terrain and new settlers, tribes in many ways 
represented the boundaries of the indigenous social and political identities.
The first extensive field survey on the peoples and land of Taiwan led by 
anthropologists and biologists was conducted by the Japanese colonial regime in its 
early stage of control. The statecraft of the colonial regime was to apply western 
scientific and rational methodologies to the study of ethnology for the foundation of 
the colonial rule. The utmost purpose of these researches was to stabilize the order of 
the “East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” for the expanding Japanese war machine (Chen 
Chao-ru 1992). According to languages and customs, the aborigines were divided into 
six, seven, eight or nine groups (tzu) depending on different criteria (Pan Ying 1995; 
Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
The classifications had certain functions in terms of colonial statecraft.
However, they also extended the aboriginal identity beyond the boundary of individual 
tribes, collapsing geographically, linguistically, and customarily similar neighboring 
tribes into the same group {tzu). Regardless o f internal differences, for Taiwan’s
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indigenous populations, nuances of cultures were transcended and group 
consciousness was formed for the first time as the result of the Japanese classifications 
(Sun Da-chuan 1995b). The name of each tzu, creating another “layer,” provided new 
distinctions that separated “we” and “the other” in addition to the geographical 
differences (Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
In the later period of occupation, the Japanese imperial military aggressively 
recruited Taiwanese youths during World War II to supplement the inadequate supply 
of domestic youth for the war machine. The Japanese systematically enlisted 
indigenous youths because of their relatively high degree of loyalty to the Japanese 
Emperor and their reputation for enduring hardship. The successful implementation of 
“Japanization” policy in aboriginal societies also brought a new experience to the 
aborigines -  the creation of a national identity beyond the tribe (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). 
The effective mobilization of aborigines allowing the construction of loyalty towards 
the Emperor was the ideological base o f enlisting young men and forging their 
identification with Japan. It was the first time the indigenous peoples developed a 
consciousness of the modem state, well beyond the boundary o f their own tribes (Sun 
Da-chuan 1995a and 1995b).
The “honor” of identification with the Emperor did not come with the elevation 
of aboriginal status in the imperial division of labor. The primordial trans-tribal, trans­
ethnic aboriginal consciousness constructed by the Japanese Empire remained 
completely with a backward, stigmatized stereotype. The naming by colonizers, field 
work by anthropologists, and the presumably misguided identification with the 
Japanese Emperor mainly constructed by the imperial military together marked the
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beginning of the structural collapse of Taiwan’s indigenous cultures, their self- 
confidence, and ultimately their ethnic pride (Sun Da-chuan 1995b). Even before the 
arrival o f the KMT regime, Taiwan’s aborigines experienced the indoctrination of the 
modern state apparatus (and had made considerable sacrifice for its sake), and seemed 
to be tame and not “dangerous” to another colonial foreign regime, the KMT.
The Japanese extended state surveillance to Taiwan’s indigenous societies to an 
extent which the Ching Empire had never achieved. The KMT regime, based on the 
Japanese policies, furthered this “control and assimilation” policy in the mountain 
areas. Since 1970s, the state-imposed conversion of traditional names into Han names, 
the loss o f native tongues, the abolishment of tribal ceremonies, the resultant amnesia 
of culture and customs, the collapse of social and political structures, and the intrusion 
of foreign religions have replaced virtually all the clues and symbols for the formation 
of indigenous identities. Independent answers to the age-old question “Who Am I?” 
have become the most anxious concern for the aborigines in the 1980s (Sun Da-chuan 
1995b).
The emergence of the indigenous movement in the mid-1980s was not an 
isolated event. The eruption of this movement was closely related to the ethnic power 
struggles among Han people, new conceptions of society stemming from the liberation 
of civil society versus the authoritarian state, and the concurrent nativistic cultural 
renaissance of the native Han Taiwanese, as the opposite of the “alien” Chinese 
mainlanders. Ironically, some of the KMT’s assimilation policies have inadvertently 
had the side effect of uniting aborigines from different groups and cultural 
backgrounds on the basis of speaking and writing the same language -  Chinese.
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Essentially, almost all the resistant elites can speak fluent Mandarin and can 
manipulate the codes o f communication -  the Han characters. Perhaps, the 
superimposed national language policy has backfired after four decades of 
implementation. The same language and communication codes which were introduced 
for the promotion of assimilationist policies provided the primordial foundation for the 
pan-indigenous movement (Lee Tsu-min 1991:43; Sun Da-chuan 1995b). The process 
of modernization, on the other hand, provides similar cultural background and 
collective memories for aborigines of different tribes (Chen Tzung-han 1994:115). 
However, the number o f resistant elites is small and under a system where seniority is 
still an important factor, they are too young to have great influence within their tribes. 
Although democratically elected officials have replaced the traditional political leaders 
and the inherited aristocracy, the elders still remain more influential in many tribes 
than the youths. Because of these limits, the mobilization of people for the indigenous 
movement in the early stage had to rely on the support of non-KMT organizations or 
progressive Han intellectuals, as well as the networks of church members also an 
external ally (Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
The major cohesive forces of the early, urban-based ATA were largely 
recognition of the collective sufferings and stigmatized stereotypes associated with 
aborigines, and the anxiety over cultural extinctions (Hsieh Shih-chung 1987a;
TaBong SaSaLe 1993). Pan-indigenous identity and the significance of ethnic politics 
were not the major concerns of these early resistant elites in the movement. Finding 
solutions to individual cases and problems were the main functions of the ATA, whose 
relationship with the urban aboriginal working class was built upon this sort of
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“service in crisis” rather than upon similar political beliefs. An ATA member’s 
reflection points out that the service relationship was, on the one hand, to alleviate the 
responsibility of the KMT regime for the aboriginal sufferings; on the other hand, this 
relation and pragmatic approach did little to facilitate the awakening of aboriginal 
consciousness and further political resistance efforts (YiChiang BaLuer 1994).
The promotion of the proposed new name for Taiwan’s aborigines, Yuanzhumin, 
has had an unprecedented influence on indigenous elites, both those who are pro- 
resistance, and pro-KMT. The new name provides a new ethnic mark and represents a 
solid foundation for the formation of a new collective identity as Taiwanese 
indigenous people. That is, the name characterizes a pan-indigenous identity which 
transcends individual differences. Unlike Kazemzadeh’s definition of the so-called 
pan-movement, which is “dedicated to the unification of a geographic area, linguistic 
group, nation, race, or religion” (cited in Hsieh Shih-chung 1994c), Taiwan’s various 
indigenous peoples are separated by different languages, customs, socio-political 
organizations, and further are scattered throughout a vast geographical area. The 
prerequisites for forming a pan-movement are limited. Contrary to the observation of 
Lee Tsu-min (1991), even the KMT’s standard educational system and national 
language policy offers some function towards overcoming different cultural 
backgrounds (Hsieh Shih-chung 1992). The promotion of new name Yuanzhumin has 
contributed to the final formation of Taiwan’s aboriginal movement and has proved to 
be a rally point for the growing “united front” of indigenous elites, both the KMT and 
non-KMT members (Hsieh Shih-chung 1992). However, the merely symbolic value of 
a new code could not possibly provide sufficient impetus and material base for a
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movement to grow. The differences between Han and Austronesian peoples, the 
changing socio-political environment in Taiwan, and the structural disintegration of 
ethnic cultures and prides are, perhaps, the fundamental reasons for the rise of 
indigenous movements.
An opposite trend has developed after the collective name for aborigines 
Yuanzhumin has been accepted by the majority o f population. The collective 
bargaining position emerging from the name-correcting movement had partially 
achieved this goal. However, a more subtle differentiation between these two terms, 
Yuanzhumin and Yuanzhumintzu, was necessary to demolish some deep-rooted 
stereotypes. While Yuanzhumin (indigenous people) refers to only individual 
aborigines, Yuanzhumintzu (indigenous nations) brings up the concept that each 
individual indigenous group is in fact a unique people, or a nation. Taiwanese are in 
fact constituted by, neither a single nation, nor four ethnic groups as I mentioned in 
Chapter 1 (not to mention the traditional KMT-promoted Chinese Nation). From 
aborigines’ perspective, Taiwanese are constituted by ethnic Han people and a diverse 
Austronesian people that contains many nations, and each indigenous group is 
qualified to be called a nation. This is a radical deviation from the orthodox, one­
dimensional Chinese nationalist discourse and totally beyond the historical context 
that the old KMT and its hard-liners’ (the New Party) can comprehend (Chen Chao-ru 
1992).
Despite the fact that Taiwan’s aborigines belong to some vague Austronesian 
macro-group, the origin o f which is believed by many scholars to be in Taiwan, 
indigenous peoples do not choose to call themselves as “Taiwan Austronesian” or
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simply Austronesian. During the process of establishing and strengthening their ethnic 
identity, the aboriginal leaders have not looked abroad toward the geographical South 
or East of the Pacific Realm where other Austronesian peoples live. Instead, they insist 
that they are “indigenous” to the island of Taiwan (Huang Ying-kuei; Chiang Ping; 
Chen Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993). This phenomenon reveals the 
indigenous elites’ identity with Taiwan, a quasi-nation state, rather than with other 
Austronesian peoples living in different countries. This difference of “inward looking” 
versus “outward looking” consciousness could be attributed to the geographical 
boundaries o f nation states that confines the aborigines’ social and political 
imaginations. However, this “inward looking” orientation may also be interpreted as a 
careful evaluation o f potential political leverage within Taiwan. In Taiwan’s settlers’ 
society, “indigenous” to this land embeds different meaning to other latecomers, and 
an associated “true” identity with this land. Therefore, the aboriginal leaders believe 
that the product of the “inward looking” name Yuanzhumin can serve to re-establish 
ethnic dignity and consolidate the ethnic interests (Huang Ying-kuei; Chiang Ping; 
Chen Mao-tai; Shih Lei; and Chu Hai-yan 1993).
The demarcation of geographical areas into different administrative regions 
reflects the operation of power and ideology over time and space (Sun Da-chuan 
1995a). New national territorial planning and the subsequent re-designing of 
administrative units will involve socio-political contests over ideological and material 
interests. The final resolution of the indigenous peoples’ requests will inevitably 
encompass and incorporate this complicated spatial politics, which involves not
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merely visible economic, political, and ethnic interests, but also invisible emotional 
affinities of place and identity.
In brief, this chapter provides a critical view on the KMT’s construction of 
Chinese consciousness in Taiwan to replace the Japanese colonial legacy. The KMT 
used an “imagined geography” to legitimize its authoritarian rule over Taiwan. The 
democratic movement roughly beginning in the 1970s not only loosed the KMT’s 
controls, but also inspired the development of the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism, 
to counteract the official infusion of Chinese nationalism. The rise of the indigenous 
movement in the mid-1980s, on the other hand, offers a critical re-examination on the 
discourse construction of Taiwanese nationalism.
The major goals of the indigenous movement in Taiwan are reviewed under the 
frameworks of political economy and cultural politics: the “Return Our Lands” 
movement, the “Name Correcting” movement (from the term “mountain people” to 
the term Yuanzhumin), and the “Constitutional Revision” movement. I also examine 
the always crucial but at the same time, controversial, role of Christian religion and its 
clergy in Taiwan’s indigenous movement. Finally, I argue that the development of 
indigenous movement has forged a new identity not only among the various aboriginal 
groups/tribes, but also posed important challenges on the dominant national and 
cultural discourse.
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CHAPTER 6. LAND RIGHTS CONFLICTS, ETHNIC RELATIONS,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN THE FIELD RESEARCH 
AREA OF LI-SHAN, TAICHUNG COUNTY, TAIWAN
The Li-Shan area is located in the upper stream of the Da-Chia River ranging in 
altitude from fifteen to twenty two hundred meters. The whole Li-Shan area is within 
the watershed area of the Te-Chi Reservoir which was built between 1969 and 1974 
(Chang Chang-yi 1981; Figure 6.1). A brief introduction on the history and resources 
of the Li-Shan area and its relationship with Taiwan as a whole are essential to 
understand contemporary ethnic conflicts and local politics. The official four ethnic 
categories: Holo, Hakka, mainlander, and aborigines are all present in Hoping Hsian. 
However, from aborigines’ perspective, the first three groups can be generalized as 
Han people. The differences among these three groups are relatively minor compared 
to those between the Han people and the aborigines. Conflicts over land rights are 
concentrated on reservation lands where only aborigines can possess titles. In these 
instances, Han people can only hold lease rights transferred from aboriginal landlords, 
or in some cases from the State. Because of the reservation lands policy, land conflicts 
develop along this split of ethnic groups. In the case of the mountain hsian, ethnic 
divisions almost parallel the class division of rich and poor.
The extent of slopeland development in Li-Shan for temperate-zone agriculture 
extends beyond the boundaries of the reservation lands. Beginning in the 1970s, 
agricultural development was extended into national forest lands and created a serious 
environmental problem when the Te-Chi Reservoir was affected by rapid siltation 
which halved the projected life of the dam (Chang Chang-yi 1992). The problem was 
so severe that the government was forced to take actions to defer or halt the rate of
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Figure 6.1 The Map of the Li-Shan Area
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deterioration. A provincial-level agency, the Li-Shan Administration Office, was set 
up in 1967, but in turn, was relegated to a township agency under the jurisdiction of 
Hoping Hsian in 1979. The “behind the scenes reasons” for this move were complex 
and ambiguous, but it was generally believed that the Office was unable to effectively 
coordinate local forces to perform its designated duty for planning and overseeing the 
developmental process in the whole area (Chang Chang-yi 1992).
Despite earlier efforts to promote apple production in the region, a disincentive 
for apple cultivation in the upper basin developed later. The KMT government 
liberalized its trade sanction on apples to import the fruit from, mainly, the U.S. in 
1979. By the summer of 1980, the retail price for apples had plunged fifty percent and 
the income of fruit farmers fell to less than half the previous level (Chang Chang-yi 
1992). In response to a new state policy, farmers became interested in the production 
of other fruits, such as pears, peaches, and varieties o f “luxury” apples in order to once 
again minimize market risks.
Working to prolonging the life of the Te-Chi reservoir and to ensure the safety 
of downstream residents, the government endeavored to eliminate cultivation on all 
lands with a slope greater than 28 degrees. That is, all fruit trees on such slopes would 
be cut down. Given the fact that the average estimated cultivation slope is 30- to 35- 
degrees in the Li-Shan area (in some areas this even reaches 60-degrees) (Chang 
Chang-yi 1981), the government’s response to ameliorate the environmental crisis 
encountered tremendous resistance from local groups. The deadline for eliminating all 
unlawful cultivation was postponed from 1979 to 1989, and then to a currently 
undecided date due to effective lobbying and more importantly, severe public
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resistance. Several arsons that resulted in the burning of some hundreds of hectares of 
forest were reported between 1983 and 1984 after the official announcement that the 
fruit trees in extreme slope areas would be cut (Chang Chang-yi 1992). Local farmers 
turned the mountain hsian into a “site of resistance” against the State policies.
The above discussion demonstrates that there are great profits to be made 
through the development of the reservation lands in the Li-Shan area, particularly for 
the cultivation of fruit trees. The economic potential of the region entangled with the 
ensuing environmental degradation has made the Li-Shan area a political “hot spot.” 
Land rights conflicts in Li-Shan have thus become charged not only in the arena of 
ethnic rights, but also for economic and environmental reasons.
6.1 Ethnic Tensions and the Rise of PPRA
In most cases, lands within the reservations are not actually owned by the 
occupants, either aborigines or Han people, but by the State, specifically the Taiwan 
Provincial Government. However, current state policy holds that ownership of 
reservation land can be conferred to indigenous people if they can establish proof of 
continuous use for five years. Still, reservation land cannot be pledged directly as 
security for mortgages and loans even though ownership has been conferred to some 
aborigine, partly because the land title can only be transferred among indigenous 
peoples. This lack of “real” ownership, arguably, restricts access to improvement 
capital and limits the motivation for the aborigines to improve their lands and intensify 
production. This “semi-public” ownership system contributes, at least partly, to the 
financial problems which are common among aborigines under the current profit- 
seeking banking system. While there are clear problems associated with land
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ownership by indigenous peoples at the present time, those rights which are conferred 
due to ethnic status do not extend to Han people living in the area.
6.1.1 The Emergence of the PPRA in Hoping Hsian
In early 1993, a group mobilized mainly through an appeal to Han residents in 
the area was founded in several mountain hsians, the Association of Promotion Rights 
for Plains People Living in Mountain Hsian (hereafter, Plains People’s Right 
Association, or PPRA). The PPRA is growing most rapidly in Li-Shan of Hoping 
Hsian, Taichung County. Within four years, the organization has become a powerful 
local political organization and pro-growth coalition which quickly absorbed 
numerous several other small social groups in the Li-Shan area. The PPRA has three 
major goals: first, to strive for the deregulation of aboriginal reservation land; second, 
to lobby for the right of Han people to be eligible for candidacy for the political 
position of chief o f mountain hsian, the head of a subcounty unit; and third, to request 
the government to change the current term, “indigenous peoples,” back to the original 
legal term “mountain compatriots.”
The establishment of this organization was stimulated in response to the pan- 
indigenous movement which climaxed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Three major 
demands of the aborigines were perceived by the organizers of the PPRA as major 
threats which endangered their positions in the current establishment. First, the 
“Return Our Land” movement which requested the State to return or restore 
reservation lands that were either illegally utilized by the non-indigenes or taken by 
eminent domain, back to aboriginal control. Second, the “Name-correcting 
Movement” discussed earlier which called for the right to self-naming and demanded
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an official name change from “mountain compatriots” to “indigenous peoples.”
Finally, the “Constitutional Revision Movement” which demanded for an “indigenous 
provision” in the Additional Articles o f  the Constitution to the guarantee o f rights to 
development, self-determination, education, and cultural autonomy of the indigenous 
peoples. All these concerns and the PPRA’s political mobilization are justified by the 
principle of equal treatment of all ethnic groups in the Article 7 o f the Constitution:
All citizens o f the Republic of China, irrespective o f sex, religion, race, class, or party 
affiliation, shall be equal before the law (PPRA 1997a: 81).
At the present time, PPRA leaders request the complete deregulation of 
reservation land and support the sale of such land on the free market. This would 
return these lands to the jurisdiction o f normal laws pertaining to land, instead of 
incorporating such land under the Provision. The official data shows that the area of 
the reservation land leased out to the plains people is slightly larger than the area 
actually used by the aborigines in Hoping (Table 6.1). Even these figures may be 
inaccurate. The actual area utilized by Han people, estimated by local residents and the 
PPRA members, is believed to be much larger (PPRA 1997a:60; Lin Fang-chi 
1984:112).
Under current regulations, only indigenous people can legally own title in the 
above land categories. On the other hand, private companies are almost all owned by 
the plains people, including hotels, restaurants, pharmacies stores, or supermarkets. 
Topsoil and tilling rights are ideally possessed exclusively by the aborigines. The 
vaguely defined “miscellaneous” category in reality constitutes a large proportion of 
the reservation land in Hoping hsian. This apparent conflict was only clarified after
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my interview with the chief o f Hoping Hsian, Mr. Lin. The land assigned to the 
miscellaneous category refers to the private land transactions between indigenous 
people and Han people, but little proof of such transactions is available (Interview B).
Table 6.1 The Use of the Aboriginal Reservation Land in Hoping Hsian
Item Area in Hectares Percentage (%)
Total Area 6323.92 100.00
Tilling Rights 179.02 2.83
Topsoil
Rights
Forest Land 10.13 0.16
Construction Land 2.10 0.03
Uses Without 
Fees







Han People 1726.69 27.30
Private Company 87.59 1.39
Miscellaneous 2805.47 44.36
Source: Hoping Hsian Government, 1997. % Calculated by the author.
The State is also a highly visible player in the reservation lands controversy in 
Hoping Hsian. The state-owned Taiwan Power Company, the Ministry of National 
Defense, Forest Bureau of Provincial Government, and the public veteran farms run 
by the Vocational Assistance Commission for Retired Servicemen are actually among 
the biggest users o f reservation land. In these cases, at various times, the State 
exercised its right of eminent domain to take the lands and then excluded these lands 
from the classification as aboriginal reservation land. From the perspective o f a Han 
sovereign state that seldom takes into consideration problems related to human-land 
relationships, there is no difference between the state-owned lands and the aboriginal 
reservation lands. They both belong to the State, regardless of the appearance of laws 
promulgated to permit exclusive use of reservation land by indigenous peoples. In
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other words, aborigines have essentially lost their sovereignty over their ancestral 
territory to the modem State.
The PPRA also requested another change in longstanding regulations. The 
PPRA demanded that the government opens the hsian chief candidacy to both Han 
people and aborigines to more democratically reflect the current population 
composition. At present, Han people outnumber aborigines by seven to three in 
Hoping hsian (Interview D). If the elected officials could be Han, they probably would 
be Han. The aborigines would have little chance to win any official posts given 
population and economic disparities. Aborigines under current laws are guaranteed to 
have at least one seat on the County Council and further hold exclusive rights for the 
position o f chief for all of the thirty mountain hsians in Taiwan. This manifestation of 
Taiwan’s “Affirmative Action” has increasingly encountered resistance from 
mainstream Han society which requests equal treatment of all peoples. I shall discuss 
the “myth” of equality among the people of Taiwan in Chapter 7. The PPRA also find 
the use of the term “indigenous people” which was approved by the National 
Assembly in 1994 to be objectionable. There is more to this debate than just words. 
Given the current situation, the use of the term “indigenous people” reflects 
recognition of the long term occupation of Taiwan by these indigenous peoples which 
in turn at least holds a promise for access to land and land ownership. Once the Han 
people are seen as “non-indigenous people,” the PPRA argues, they will loss various 
rights in the mountain hsians (Interview D). In internal newsletters and petition letters 
to a variety of government agencies and representative bodies, the PPRA constructs an
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interpretation which aims to deny the indigenous status of the aborigines while 
strengthening their own position under the rubric of social equity (see next, section).
Many new political organizations have emerged in the post-martial law era in 
Taiwan. What makes the PPRA special is the party’s strategy to present itself as a 
marginalized, oppressed group of victims persecuted under current laws which, in its 
view, are overwhelmingly preferential to the aborigines. The organization’s broad 
political affiliations span three major parties and include abundant financial resource 
(as evidenced by the costly mailing of thousands of petition letters) (Interview D). The 
influence of the PPRA is most evident in Hoping Hsian but certainly also reaches the 
central government in Taipei where the PPRA mobilizes tremendous resources to 
lobby lawmakers and so successfully block or alter the directions of relevant 
legislation. Such gerrymandering includes stopping the revision of the “Provision o f  
Development and Management o f Mountain People’s Reservation Land ’ in the 
Executive Yuan (Election flyers, see interview H). The PPRA is both the product and 
consequence of the development of Hoping Hsian's locally specific history and 
geography. A comprehensive analysis of the PPRA in terms of political, economic, 
social, and cultural aspects is essential to understand the ethnic tension in the Li-Shan 
area.
The emphases on social justice, and the protection and promotion of the rights of 
underprivileged indigenous groups were conceived as intimidation by some plains 
people living within the mountain hsian o f Taiwan because their own lives have 
dramatically different social and historical contexts from those o f the indigenous 
peoples. Cultural difference and, of course, economic interests also contribute to the
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formation of the different views of these two ethnic groups. With the rise of the PPRA, 
racial discrimination seems to play an implicit role in the views of at least, some core 
members.
Locally, PPRA’s demands include the request that land patents be conferred to 
the non-indigenous people who either lease or buy reservation lands from aborigines 
despite the fact that such transfers are currently illegal. Further, then, they request that 
all lands be subject to the rules o f the free market for pledging and as securities for 
loans. Non-aborigines should also be entitled to continue to control other state-owned 
lands that were leased out to them, and again, these lands should be subject to the 
principles o f the free market.
Nationally, the PPRA opposes the term, “indigenous peoples,” and suggests a 
return to the previous term of “mountain compatriots” or the politically neutral, 
academic name of Austronesian. In fact, however, core members of the PPRA deny 
the existence of indigenous peoples in Taiwan all together (PPRA 1997b). By denying 
the indigenous status o f the aborigines, the PPRA suggests that the aborigines’ 
demands represented by issues such as the “Return Our Land” campaign, request for 
official change in names, and self-autonomy will lose ground. With potentially 
tremendous support from some financial syndicate giants (tsai-tuan) which are renown 
for their real estate business and land speculations (Interview G), and well-connected 
political and social networks, the upsurge of the PPRA organization in several 
mountain hsians appears not only much easier, but also more effective in terms of 
achieving political gains than those of its indigenous counterpart, the Alliance of 
Taiwan Aborigines in urban areas. Starting from local small organizations in Nantou
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and Taichung Counties, the PPRA has made itself a nationwide organization within 
four years, but the organization’s base, and indeed most of the PPRA’s pragmatic 
concerns, remain centered in Hoping Hsian.
The foremost political affinity o f the PPRA is based upon the power of many 
KMT’s delegates within the central government, including many legislators and 
representatives of the National Assembly. However, the PPRA’s political connections 
extend well beyond the KMT. The group also has sought support from the largest 
opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and also from the smaller 
New Party, which spun off the KMT in 1993 and is considered as more conservative 
in the political spectrum. What makes the group so powerful is that grassroots 
supporters o f the PPRA encompass local partisans from all three parties, though 
generally the DPP is considered friendlier toward the aborigines and their concerns. 
Nevertheless, the KMT-inclined force is central to the goals o f the PPRA because only 
the KMT is able to exercise its influence over the mountain society through its 
institutionalized connections and local control over a variety of important agencies. 
These include the Farmers’ Association found in nearly every hsian, many board 
members o f local temples, the police, the head of the hsian Council, and the secretary 
of hsian government (Ku Yu-chen and Chang Yu-fen 1997). Through the mediation of 
these local leaders, a well organized mobilizing structure, and a highly efficient 
political lobby, the PPRA is able to stir the blood of a massive number of Han 
supporters, who previously were politically less important, such as fruit and vegetable 
farmers, small business people, retired servicemen and policemen, and hotel owners. 
The ubiquitous request for ownership of land with titles characterizes most of the
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PPRA potential and current supporters in mountain hsian. However, instead of 
directing criticism to the decision-makers of the ruling KMT, indignation and 
antagonism are directed toward the indigenous peoples in order to realize the PPRA’s 
political goal.
6.1.2 Ethnic Discourse and Tension in the Mountains
The emergence and growth of the PPRA clearly indicates that the current 
reservation land policy and its enforcement neither satisfies the requirements of the 
indigenous movement for greater autonomy, nor those of the land-starved new Han 
settlers. An examination of the PPRA’s ethnic discourse that has mobilized Han 
people living in aboriginal areas is essential to provide insights into the ethnic tension 
in central Taiwan. The selected English name for “Plain People Right Association” is 
the “Chinese Rights Association” which, hardly reflects actual interests, issues, and 
political reality o f its members in the mountain hsian. It does serve undeniably well to 
delimit the boundary between “we” and “the other” by appealing to racial/ ethnic 
differences, and implies that aborigines are not “we,” the Chinese. Such a name also 
demonstrates that the social cleavage in mountain society cuts through racial/ethnic 
boundaries which are frequently mobilized by politicians. In order to produce an 
effective political mobilization along ethnic lines, the constructed discourse must 
incorporate an impending threat, be emotional, and easy to follow. The following 
discourse appears widely in the PPRA’s newsletters, propaganda, petitions to the 
government, and was restated in my interview with the organization’s president, Mr. 
Wu. The PPRA argues that to enshrine aboriginal rights is a “racist threat” and 
therefore is a violation of basic human and property rights for any other ethnic groups
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living in those areas. Further, once the indigenes acquire land titles and possibly 
establish an autonomous zone in the future, the plains people will be forced to give up 
their properties and land and will quickly be ousted by their “mountain compatriots” 
of the mountain hsian. To go even further, these distinctions parallel the contrasts used 
by the mainstream, KMT-promoted, national identity to discriminate between the 
“Chung-Hwa-Min-Tzu” (Chinese Nation) and the “Nan-Tao-Min-Tzu” (Austronesian). 
These distinctions, local and national, emphasize the differences between “we” and 
“the other.” From the PPRA perspectives, the aboriginal intention to elevate the legal 
status of the Provision from administrative decree to law, regardless the objection of 
the Han people in the mountain hsians, will “racialize” national territory and result 
into genocide (PPRA 1997b). Also the organization argues that a protectionist 
orientation for reservation land policy will create the prerequisites for the future 
establishment of an indigenous autonomous zone, which will inevitably lead to a 
dangerous split of national territory (PPRA 1997b).
There are also racist overtones to this dogma. Many members believe the 
“mountain people” possess different blood lineage and ideology, and so, think 
differently from the Han people (Interview D). However, an unexpected side effect of 
this PPRA discourse is to provide a catalyst to elevate the indigenous peoples’ 
movement to a “nation-to-nation” level. I will discuss the concept of indigenous 
peoples as nations in Chapter 7.
National identity is a highly controversial and not-yet-resolved issue in 
contemporary Taiwan. The raising of this identity issue not only shows the dominance 
of “Chinese identity” discourse in Taiwan, as I discussed in Chapter 5, but is also a
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reflection of the political predilection of the PPRA. Indigenous peoples in Taiwan 
have been accused by the PPRA of not identifying with the “Chinese Nation.” Despite 
considerable academic proof to the contrary, the PPRA holds that the aborigines’ 
actual time of arrival in Taiwan was only four hundred years ago when the Dutch and 
the Spanish brought them to Taiwan as “hunting” slaves from Southeast Asia. In the 
same argument, they maintain that the “slave-needing” Western powers also relocated 
the Hakka people from Kuangtung to Taiwan as agricultural slaves (Interview D). In 
the PPRA’s petition letter, even the specific sources o f the indigenous peoples are 
identified without any ethnographic support. Paiwan, Rukai, Yami (Dawu), Amis, and 
Puyuma are said to come from the Philippines. The Atayal and Bunun are said to 
come from Indonesia, and the Saisiat, incredibly from distant Nepal (PPRA 1997b). 
When I asked for the sources upon which these spurious arguments were based, Mr. 
Wu replied that these must be kept secret for future use in debates with the members 
of the indigenous movement (Interview D). Using this argument, therefore, the PPRA 
maintains that the “so-called” indigenous people of Taiwan should be renamed as 
minority groups or mountain people, and maintains they are not “indigenous” at all. 
They argue that the real indigenous people in Taiwan are only the Pin Pu Tzu (the 
“cooked” fan  or plains aborigines as they were referred to in the Ching Dynasty), who 
were assimilated by the greater Han population and so are nearly indistinguishable 
from the plains Han people. In short, they argue that, Taiwan is not the origin of 
human kind, and hence every ethnic/racial group migrated to Taiwan (PPRA 1997a: 
108), so by this argument, there are no indigenous people. According to the PPRA 
dogma, the only difference between the groups which now people Taiwan is their
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arrival time. Thus, the PPRA’s ideological conclusion is that as there are no 
indigenous peoples in Taiwan, the aborigines’ claim for ancestral lands and prior land 
rights should be rejected (PPRA 1997b).
It is not only the strategy, which might be called “if we go back time far enough, 
there would be no indigenous peoples anywhere”, that the PPRA adopts, which is 
objectionable. In fact, according to the hard-line PPRA position, there are no 
indigenous peoples in Taiwan since all of these groups are now assimilated into the 
KMT-promoted Chinese Nation, or else they are simply extinct (PPRA 1997a: 98).
The PPRA’s political strategy is clear. Fatuous arguments that the virtually 
extinct peoples, the Pin Pu Tzu, are the real indigenous peoples in Taiwan are a 
transparent attempt to negate the debate. From this distorted perspective, there are no 
existing peoples that are “indigenous” to Taiwan, so the current residents in the 
mountain hsians, both Han and indigenous people, have no legitimate position which 
can be used to claim prior land rights. In the end, the consequence of such unfounded 
opinions seems to be apparent as Han people with much more abundant capital will 
quickly buy out the reservation lands from aborigines. If these indigenous peoples lose 
their land, their identity may well be lost as well.
The PPRA also objects to the name of the Provision concerning the reservation 
lands. They officially suggest a return to the original name used in 1948, the 
“mountain area” reservation lands, be considered. Neither “mountain compatriots’ 
reservation lands” nor “aboriginal reservation lands” are acceptable terms to the PPRA 
because under either designation there is no space for Han people living in the 
mountain hsian (PPRA 1997b). Only those lands owned by indigenous peoples can be
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called “aboriginal reservation lands” . PPRA officials argue that government-owned 
reservation lands should be correctly named as “mountain area” reservation lands to 
ensure the Han people’s share in the reserves (PPRA 1997b).
In addressing the land rights conflict, the PPRA offers its own solution, which to 
a large extent reflects their stereotypes of what the aborigines should be like.
Following the model of publicly owned veteran farms near the Li-Shan area, the 
PPRA recommends the establishment of similar farms which could be collectively 
owned and run by tribes. Individual aborigines would then lease lands from the 
regional indigenous farms so that illegal land transactions can be stopped or limited. In 
advocating this policy, the PPRA argues that with such an approach the tribal culture 
and way o f life can be preserved while the economy can be developed through a 
special production/marketing program (PPRA 1997b). This proposed solution is 
certainly predicated upon Han people’s cultural images of the aborigines and 
represents the unilateral desire of a dominant group to shape and reconstruct the way 
of life of minority groups with less political and economic power.
Complicating things further is the fact that the PPRA even has some aboriginal 
members who share similar views with respect to the resolution of reservation land 
disputes. As prominent players in local politics, it is necessary for the PPRA to co-opt 
aborigines to buttress its claim that the organization represents a multiplicity o f ethnic 
groups and so dilute the effects which racial bias, embedded in its core members, has 
on new prospective members. Even an important figure from the early “Return Our 
Land” movement and the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines is on the board of one 
organization, the Association of Promoting Land Resource Use, which is dominated
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by the PPRA but also incorporates some aborigines as symbolic showcases. Although 
this organization does not seem to fulfill its functions as a lubricator of inter-racial 
tensions, and as the indicator o f major aboriginal agreements regarding the relaxation 
of the restrictions on the reservation land ownership, it does demonstrate that the 
PPRA is aware of its own racial bias and is trying to minimize the negative publicity 
associated with racist sentiments.
6.2 Land Rights, Local Politics, and the PPRA
Despite the PPRA’s claim that it wishes to focus its campaign on the central 
government and congress, mainly the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly 
(Interview D), the PPRA is still deeply involved in many local level elections. The 
January 1998 election for the position of chief of Hoping Hsian was the first election 
in which the PPRA ever declared formal support for a certain candidate. Since the 
KMT is the only political party among the three major parties to extend its influence to 
the mountain hsian (Interview F; Ku and Chang 1997), it is not surprise to find that the 
incumbent who was the officially sanctioned KMT candidate, had to run against three 
other opponents who were also all KMT members. The PPRA’s president revealed 
that one of the four candidates was alleged to be “bought out” of the election by a 
donation of NT$500,000 (about US$ 16,000) to quit further campaigning (Interview 
H). Among the three “real” candidates, one’s political credibility was severely eroded 
by the widespread allegation about his withdrawing from the election and hence 
resulted in a loss of many potential votes. Only two candidates stayed in the election 
as legitimate competitors for the post of hsian chief. Political strategies, such as pre­
election negotiations, trade-offs, bribes, the use of negative allegations, and rumors are
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not unusual in local elections. What make Hoping special are these most severe land 
right conflicts and their association with ethnic cleavages in the hsian.
The only opponent who was wholeheartedly endorsed by the PPRA and 
affiliated organizations, however, posed a sharp challenge to the incumbent. Neither 
side ignored the issues that the PPRA brought to the table in the past few years 
regarding the deregulation o f the reservation land. The candidates’ party affiliation in 
this level o f election is not considered as important as in the legislators’ or county 
chiefs’ elections. Often, however, candidates of the opposition parties with their 
limited resources are unable to effectively participate and mobilize supporters. At this 
local level election, more typical is infighting within the KMT’s different local 
factions for administrative control over the resources and the ensuing profits, than 
party-to-party challenges representing opposite ideologies or political parties. While 
other parties have made inroads in national elections, in rural area, the KMT remains 
dominant.
The incumbent complained that the KMT does not provide any material 
assistance to him and that he must continue to campaign using almost exclusively, his 
own resources (Interview H). Just six months ago, in my first interview with him, he 
still claimed that he maintained a good relationship with the core members o f the 
PPRA and reckoned that the PPRA’s proposition regarding the opening of land titles 
to the Han was a reasonable request (Interview B). However, this election destroyed 
his close relations with the PPRA, which was not satisfied with his moderate position 
on the deregulation of the reservation lands. Local progressive indigenous leaders, 
including the reverends of the local Presbyterian Churches, tended to support the
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incumbent to counteract the influence of the PPRA’s more extreme candidate. 
Surprisingly, the head of the local chapter of the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines 
(ATA), in contrast to common political expectations, endorsed the PPRA’s candidate. 
Local leaders o f the Li-Shan Presbyterian Church use this as the proof of the betrayal 
of founding principles of the ATA and indicate that it is the evidence of local ATA’s 
collaboration with the PPRA. The decline of the ATA in terms of political clout as an 
island wide indigenous organization, as I discussed in Chapter 5, exposed its local 
chapter to the manipulation of other better-organized and well-funded, possibly hostile 
Han groups. Thus in the Li-Shan area, the PPRA achieved its goal of a superficial 
integration of ethnic groups and was able to disguise its ongoing demand for land 
deregulation as representing a consensus of both Han and indigenous peoples.
In response to these manipulations, the local progressive indigenous leaders 
created two election flyers which implied that a powerful business group (tsai-tuan), 
renown for its land and real estate speculations in central Taiwan, stands behind the 
PPRA as a major source of financial support. To counter, the PPRA also produced 
several flyers appealing mainly to Han people which touted the PPRA’s 
accomplishments including the blocking of the Provision to become formal law, 
influencing legislation associated with the bylaws of the Cabinet-level o f Council of 
Aboriginal Affairs, and fighting for Han people’s ownership of both reservation lands 
and state-owned slopelands. The two sides both vowed to get permission to confer 
land titles for aborigines for the lands in question, and at the same time, promised to 
protect the continuation of leasing rights for the Han people. In a word, the main 
themes of this election are encircled around land rights and ethnic space conflicts
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between the dominant Han and the minority indigenous peoples. What distinguish 
these two candidates are not their political promise or ideology, but their individual 
supporting forces behind the scene. The contested and politicized space in the 
mountain hsian shapes local social and economic development and on some 
occasions, sparks discussions related to the creation of indigenous autonomous zones 
and national territorial planning.
Still, it was not the winning candidate’s persuasive political agenda or even party 
affiliation that was decisive to the election results, since all candidates were KMT 
members. In the end, it was local connections, kinship relations, and the effective use 
of greater financial resources that matter. The incumbent beat the challenger by less 
than a hundred votes but the newly elected official clearly will not resolve the issues. 
Table 6.2 demonstrates the inadequacy, and incorrectness, o f using a simple 
dichotomy to equate the PPRA with the KMT, reactionary forces, business interests, 
and a Han-exclusive organization. In turn, it is also incorrect to associate all aborigines 
with progressive, anti-KMT, and pro-indigenous peoples’ legislation and policies. 
Neither the PPRA nor the indigenous movements are internally homogenous. Most 
Han people and organizations involved in the indigenous movements can be 
appropriately portrayed as progressive. In fact, aborigines participate in the 
movements selectively, according to their personal interpretations o f the issues at 
stake. The “Return Our Lands” movement drew a considerable amount of support 
from the aborigines while other movements attracted far fewer supporters. As we can 
see from Table 6.2 and from previous discussions, many aborigines are in fact KMT 
members, if perhaps not as staunch as their Han counterparts. The KMT still garnered
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Business people (perhaps with 
higher connections),
Retired servicemen,
Heads of local chapter of 
Farmers’ Association
Urban-based indigenous elite, Pro- 
DPP (or Pan-indigenous 
identity),




Local politicians from KMT, 
DPP & NP,
Small businesses operators, 
Heads of small, local 
farmers’ organizations, 
Some “co-opted” indigenes
Indigenous local opinion leaders, 
Local Presbyterian Rev.& their 
local connections,
Few support from public sector
Grassroots
Supporters
Han farmers (without 
specific party inclination), 
mostly less educated, rely 
heavily on agriculture as major 
income source
Few! (with rising “indigenous 
consciousness”?)
Better educated than the average 
Some farmers
Many of them KMT members
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the majority of votes from the indigenous people who voted in almost every election 
(Walis YuGan 1994a).
At the same time, the core and grassroots members o f the PPRA also often have 
dramatically different political and economic “characters.” Core members tend to be 
relatively wealthy and engaged in non-farming activities. The head of the PPRA is the 
president of a construction company based in Taichung City. Many powerful business 
groups, the tsai-iuan, with their close relations to government officials, invest in 
construction companies for both real estate and land speculation activities in Taiwan. 
These core members, then, possess effective political strategies to bring the requests of 
the PPRA to the media and further can establish broad connections with members of 
the Congress and the various local Councils across three major parties because of their 
prosperity. Again, aborigines seem to occupy only symbolic positions in the PPRA. 
Some enthusiastic local farmers, usually heads of farmers’ organizations, are among 
people that the PPRA eagerly seeks to absorb. The highest level o f PPRA supporters 
are generally from farmers who have worked on orchards or vegetable farms for 
decades without earning land titles. My interview with a group of Han farmers enabled 
me to realize the heterogeneous characteristics which separate the core and the 
grassroots supporters of the PPRA’s. From the perspective of the Han farmers, their 
demands for land titles are, to a large extent, reasonable and relate quite simply to 
individual gain.
A situation which might be termed the “Paradox of Democracy” emerges in this 
case. Without the recent democratization trends in Taiwan, there would be no PPRA, a 
group that is now able to challenge the official KMT’s candidate in local elections.
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With the recent democratic reforms in Taiwan, given the fact that in many mountain 
hsian, Han people outnumber the aborigines both numerically and economically, if the 
outcome is based simply on majority vote, indigenous people will probably no longer 
benefit from the protectionist reservation land policies established by the KMT. In all 
probability, any deregulation of the reservation lands will lead to the concentration of 
lands in the hands of a few, most possibly by the tsai-iuan (giant business group).
Such an outcome would force even more aborigines to leave their homelands, seeking 
jobs in cities for their livelihoods. If the tension between the indigenous movement 
and the PPRA is considered as just another contest among interest groups for limited 
resources, that is, if we have to solve the problem of land rights in the context of 
interest-group pluralism as in many democratic countries, the paradox of democracy 
will work in favor of the majority or the more powerful. In fact, treatment of the 
indigenous movements as simply new requests by a newly emerging interest group is 
exactly the way the conservative scholars portray these indigenous movements (for 
example, see Hong Chun-hu 1992:87). I shall discuss more about this paradox of 
democracy and the effects of recent democratic reform in Taiwan on the indigenous 
peoples’ movement in the next chapter.
6.3 Responses to Han Dominance by Indigenous Peoples
In response to the macro-socioeconomic conditions facing the aborigines, 
various reactions ranging from political struggle to efforts centering on cultural 
restoration for the tribes have emerged. Still, this is more complicated as the issue also 
affects the development of mountain lands and natural resources and the call for 
autonomous zones by various indigenous groups with different ideologies and political
183
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
stances. Walis YuGan identifies two types of pro-KMT indigenous elites. First, under 
the cultivation of the KMT’s party-state apparatus, those elites favored by the KMT’s 
central authority are provided with power and resources which enable them to stay in 
the high positions associated with the current KMT power structure (1994a). Such 
people include the heads of the local party organizations, legislators, or officials in 
aborigine-related departments in the provincial or central government. Thus, they are 
socialized into the KMT’s cultural and political structures and maintain certain “haloes 
around their heads” to win respect from their respective tribes. At the same time, they 
inevitably alienate common members of their tribes by being unable to stay in 
residence long enough to build significant local relationships and tribal connections.
The second group, those elites who stay in the mountain area with their tribes 
members (Walis YuGan 1994a). By acquiring posts in local sub-county government, 
and because of factors such as relative higher levels of education, party-state support, 
personal wealth, and clan and religious connections, they are able to mobilize more 
resources than average tribal members. Internal colonialism, discussed in Chapter 2, 
constrains the opportunities of members o f minority groups to move upward on social 
ladders. The higher the minority members move up, the greater confinement they 
reportedly experience (Hsieh Shih-chung 1994a). Limited by their minority status, 
discriminated by the majority population, and awaked by the reality that the Han elites 
occupy better positions than aborigines do, these indigenous elites are forced to stay in 
their mountain hsian to rely on more familiar local political and economic resources. 
These resources, in turn, support these local indigenous elites as they participate in 
local elections and help them build legitimacy and influence. In order to be successful
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at this “bottom-up” strategy, elites must collaborate closely with the establishment and 
tend to engage in conservative or alternately reactionary activities to defend their 
personal political resources (Walis YuGan 1994a). This association, almost without 
exception, makes them conservative and pro-KMT (Walis YuGan 1994a). This 
process of conservative socialization and the financial and administrative benefits 
which pro-KMT organizations devote to co-opt indigenous elites, as in the case for the 
Mountain Development Association in Taiwan, enable the KMT to maintain its 
dominance in the mountains and indigenous societies.
I will next discuss other kinds of indigenous elites: those engaged in anti-KMT, 
culturally conscious indigenous movements. Such persons can also be divided into 
two “locational” types: those who live and work in urban areas, or those who went 
back to their tribes in the mountains after the climax of the beginnings of the “urban” 
indigenous peoples’ movement. The sites of resistance change, but the enthusiasm of 
these people for awaking the indigenous national consciousness remains the same. The 
early stage of the indigenous rights movement in Taiwan, as pointed out by Hsieh 
Shih-chung (1992), was initiated by indigenous urban elites who received higher 
education and were more familiar with the working of the Han-dominated political 
system. Nevertheless, the fact that these resistant elites did not actually live in tribal 
areas limited the capability o f these urban indigenous elites to engage in grassroots 
cultural revitalization and reflection. Basically, their effectiveness was minimized 
precisely because they lacked the necessary influence in their respective tribes. The 
urban indigenous elites are, in short, elites alienated from the masses (Hsieh Shih- 
chung 1992).
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The second type o f progressive indigenous intellectuals chose to go back to their 
tribes, and turn peripheral mountain areas from space of oppression into sites of 
resistance (Keith and Pile 1993). These “grassroots indigenous intellectuals” 
developed different political strategies and faced different struggles from their urban 
counterparts. This is true at the present time as well as in the past. “Tribalism” is 
conceptualized as an embodying social, cultural and indigenous movement which 
emphasizes bottom-up, democratic participation, grassroots organization, local 
resistance, and cultural consciousness. It is an evolving concept and embodies a new 
set of guidelines for the grassroots indigenous movement (TaiBong SaSaLe 1993; 
Interview E). Such “tribalism movement groups” often must confront local vested 
interests also represented by tribal members. The grassroots, place-specific, nature of 
“tribalism” enables the development of both a positioned knowledge, and “alternative 
cultural politics” (Chiu Yen-liang 1994), which are situated in local social and 
historical contexts. Despite the fact that “tribalism” has mostly developed in southern 
Taiwan, the direct confrontation between the indigenous peoples and the PPRA in the 
Li-Shan area has become part of collective anti-colonial struggles to foster a pan- 
indigenous consciousness in Taiwan. In this sense, these local land conflicts are not 
only a major concern o f the Atayal people in Li-Shan, but also of importance to all 
indigenous nations around the island.
The several revisions of the Provision in the past five decades reflect the 
dilemma that the KMT has faced as they seek some intermediate position between 
“protectionist” and “developmentalist” policies. From the beginning, the KMT, 
maintaining the earlier Japanese policy, designated the resources in the mountains and
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forests as state-owned property. To avoid allegations that the KMT was appropriating 
aboriginal lands and resources, the State promulgated the Provision in the name of the 
protection and the promotion of indigenous interests. Nevertheless, capitalism always 
produces core and periphery in the formation of regional uneven development and 
accumulation. The peripheralization of the indigenous mountain economy, the 
reservation land policy alone clearly has failed to guarantee aboriginal land interests. 
Capital from plains investors utilizes loopholes in the Provision to penetrate into the 
mountain subsistence economy and over time has altered the whole production 
system. This has been going on since the KMT controlled Taiwan, and so is virtually 
impossible to reverse at the present time.
In 1985, another executive order, the Provision for Enhancing the Management 
and Promoting the Exploitation and Development of the Reservation Lands, forced the 
mountain administration to admit the reality that the leasing of reservation lands to 
Han people from the plains was common (Walis YuGan 1994b). The mountain 
administration faced an even more severe problem ten years later, whether to permit 
Han farmers to officially hold title to the reservation lands that they had previously 
cultivated illegally (Walis YuGan 1994b). In the administration’s efforts to elevate the 
Provision to law status, similar problems reoccurred: “Should the new law be 
protection- or development-oriented?” and “Should the illegal use o f reservation lands 
be legalized, even though non-indigenous people are currently using a considerable 
amount of land without legal environmental constraints?”.
The position of the mountain areas in the national territorial plan is at the core of 
conflicts regarding reservation land rights. What is at stake is not only the issue of
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management of the natural resources in mountain areas, but also the cultural politics 
which incorporates the attitudes o f the mainstream towards the claims for “national” 
status by indigenous peoples. Thus, the territorial plan has always been in large part an 
ideological struggle for reaching a compromise among various interests and satisfies 
different ideological requests.
The PPRA’s demands for the deregulation o f both reservation lands and the 
candidacy of hsian chief, and the PPRA’s seemingly plausible denial of aborigines’ 
“indigenous” status have had dramatic impacts on the direction and strategies of the 
indigenous movement. Despite their various platforms on topics such as culture, 
education, health reform and land reform, the targets of the early indigenous 
movements have always been the state apparatus and the ideology which it promotes. 
The emergence of the PPRA in recent years has forced the major architects of the 
indigenous movement to re-direct their orientation towards resistance to the 
involvement of the gigantic business corporations, which, through their surrogates in 
the mountain hsians, speculate on reservation lands as prime real estate for the 
construction of high value mansions and similar types of developments.
As always, land is at the center o f the definition of the indigenous nations in 
Taiwan. From the aboriginal perspective, the aggressive annexation o f reservation 
lands by Han capitalists accelerated the emergence o f demands for “natural 
sovereignty” (BaShang 1998; Interview G). Natural sovereignty refers to the collective 
ownership of Taiwan by various indigenous peoples based on traditional tribal 
territorial claims which existed before the establishment of any quasi-state or national- 
state organizations. That is, before the arrival of the currently dominant Han group and
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the consolidation of ruling power in the form of a State, Taiwan’s indigenous nations 
had, historically, sovereignty over this island. The long-term goals are to restore the 
traditional territory o f each indigenous nation and regain the right of autonomy. The 
current reservation lands are the basis for future autonomous areas and therefore, need 
to be protected against further Han capitalist takeovers (BaShang 1998). The PPRA’s 
denial of aborigines’ “indigenous” or “primordial” status seems too fatuous to defend. 
The indigenous movement has chosen to move forward rather than to engage in 
debates with the PPRA over such baseless historical constructions. Still, these 
blatantly false claims catch on with many Han people living in the region for political, 
economic, and social reasons.
According to BaShang, an indigenous activist, the new version of the Provision 
needs no basis in law, unlike the preceding ones that were based on the law of 
Conservation and Use o f Slopelands (BaShang 1998). Legal procedures and 
mechanisms of democratic negotiation in delimiting the boundaries o f the reservation 
lands must now be established. To protect the Constitutional right to development, 
which was approved by the National Assembly in 1997, a restriction on the transfer of 
titles of the reservation lands whereby only aborigines can hold such titles is necessary 
for any sustainable existence of the indigenous nations (BaShang 1998). A supreme 
land court composed of Taiwan’s aborigines should be set up to deal with the 
contradictions resulting from differences in provisions between common land laws 
and the future edition of the Provision. The aborigines must have the authority to 
review the land use applications filed by non-indigenes, and to circumscribe land use 
within a certain area, to maintain a relative majority o f aborigines living within any
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given political unit (BaShang 1998). This raises an interesting gerrymandering 
question in manipulating the demarcation of electoral districts. Democracy, besides its 
majority rule, has an implicit geographical dimension.
These proposals and goals discussed above are radical but they represent the 
ideal situation. Their feasibility is obviously questionable, given the fact that Taiwan 
has the one of the highest population densities in the world and further that there is 
already a spatial mix of ethnic groups which has lived in these areas for around fifty 
years since late Japanese era. However, these ideas do highlight the “national” status 
desired by the indigenous peoples and also reflect the social, cultural and political 
imaginations o f a radical indigenous, democratic state. Cultural pluralism, which 
emphasizes the co-existence of different cultures, advances to alternative cultural 
politics, which in turn, not only stresses the co-existence, but also the empowerment, 
of minority groups in every aspect.
My interview with the current Hoping chief, Mr. Lin, represents, to a large 
degree, the perspectives of pro-KMT, conservative, indigenous elites on these issues. 
Lin is a typical KMT-cultivated local indigenous politician with a good education, a 
wealthy family, and possessing the skills required to manipulate the spoken and 
written codes of the dominant language. While he is an aborigine, Lin believes that 
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples were driven by land-hungry Han settlers into 
mountainous areas, a very popular mistake that is held widely in Taiwan. 
Anthropological evidence shows that Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have resided in the 
mountains since time immemorial (Shepherd 1993:2). During my interview, he 
insisted that the plains areas of Taiwan are the “real home” of aborigines and that
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mental obsession with ancestral lands and traditional culture will restrict the pace of 
modernization in mountain areas (Interview B). From Lin’s perspective, indigenous 
peoples are bound to their lands in the mountains and by such a “binding” lose 
economic and educational opportunities which are crucial for successful competition 
with the plains Han people. To focus on the land rights issue, from his perspective, is 
to exacerbate the ethnic problems in the mountain hsian and ultimately, he believes, 
provides no way out for the aborigines. In Lin’s view, the real issues at stake are 
improving the standards of living, increasing job opportunities, and providing better 
access to higher education. In a word, modernization is the only direction to go. The 
“Return Our Lands” movement alone cannot solve the problems facing the indigenes 
(Interview B).
Lin’s perspective on the “Return Our Lands” movement is NOT to get back 
lands which have already fallen into the hands of Han people who have been using 
these plots for decades, but rather to demand NEW reservation areas which could 
come from the existing stock of state-owned lands -  mostly state forest lands. In my 
opinion, this is exactly how a local politician in the Li-Shan area would respond to the 
PPRA’s request, whose members are also within his constituency. By taking such a 
position, he will not offend Han people by stripping them of the rights of using the 
reservation lands already acquired, legally or illegally. Moreover, he can partially 
fulfill indigenous demands by arguing for the expansion of the area o f the reservation 
lands. In short, by diverting the conflict from locals, either indigenous or Han, to the 
state, Lin would hope to gamer local votes from both ethnic groups.
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From my extensive interviews with Mr. Lin and observation of the overall 
political trends, it is obvious that the pro-KMT indigenous elites tend to adopt an 
assimilationist position and emphasize the development of the mountain economy, 
including capital investment represented by the construction of infrastructure and big 
public buildings. For such pragmatists, there is no need for an inquiry into the colonial 
relations between the State and the aborigines. The legitimacy of the KMT-state is 
“water under the bridge” and as such is not questioned. Loyalty to the Han-state is 
beyond doubt. In TaiBong SaSaLe’s words, this kind of developmental trend is 
“development of the KMT’s style” (Interview E). Little attention is paid to the 
formation or cultivation of an indigenous consciousness or the urgency of cultural 
survival, which are, indeed, the central concerns of the tribalism and radical 
indigenous movements. Local indigenous politicians do participate in the traditional 
harvest ceremony and some other cultural displays which are designed to appeal to 
tourists. As I discussed in Chapter 4, the relations between tourism development and 
indigenous cultural preservation are dynamic and dialectical rather than one­
dimensional. Whether this tourism supports the “positive” development of minority 
cultures depends on the social, cultural and political forces that promote such 
activities. We hardly see any progressive plan from local indigenous politicians in 
their promotion of indigenous culture and ethno-tourism.
The critiques o f the PPRA by indigenous groups seem unanimous. All the 
people I interviewed tended to treat the PPRA as a homogenous group with an openly 
racist ideology. The reluctance of resistant elites to consider the internal differences of 
the PPRA probably results from the hostile antagonism of the PPRA’s leaders towards
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the goals and aspirations of the indigenous peoples’ movement. As a matter of fact, 
many of the grassroots PPRA’s supporters in Li-Shan are industrious fruit growers 
who have made their livings in contested ethnic space from as early as the 1960s under 
the auspices or the acquiesce o f the State. These farmers, some of them “re-settled” 
mainlander veterans, make their living from lands on which, for decades, they have 
spent considerable capital and labor. The policy to develop slopelands and grow 
temperate-zone vegetables and fruits was in fact, developed and encouraged by the 
government in the 1960s. These Han residents who are also long-term residents 
repeatedly complained that the government did not offer any substantial assistance in 
either production or marketing because their leases on lands were illegal. This is the 
dilemma from the perspective of the KMT government. Providing governmental 
assistance would be tantamount to recognize the legitimacy of the many illegal leases 
acquired by these Han farmers. In fact, these farmers may actually contact the PPRA 
only when land disputes arise, but otherwise are not interested in the debates 
(Interview F). The Han farmers’ long term use of these lands represents a great 
challenge to any attempt to establish an indigenous autonomous zone in such 
ethnically contested space. It is not just an issue of compensation, in crowded Taiwan, 
it is also about livelihood and tradition for these people as well.
6.4 Land Use and Environmental Conservation in Li-Shan
The relationship between land use and environmental conservation was the main 
concern of the early geographers working in the Li-Shan area (Chang Chang-yi et al 
1982; Chang Chang-yi 1989; 1992). Slopeland use, water resource utilization, and an 
assessment of environmental impacts of land use change were particularly stressed in
193
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
these early researches. Cultural differences, reflections on relevant laws, discourse on 
ethnic space, evaluations on the effects of the intrusion of capitalism, and the 
subsequent changes to the production system by new residents have not been covered 
by previous geographical studies. However, the environmentally oriented geographical 
studies associated with estimates of “carrying capacity” in the Li-Shan area and the 
direct threats to environmental safety related to the usable lifetime of the Te-Chi 
Reservoir were important in awakening early environmental consciousness in 
contemporary Taiwan. These environmental concerns are not only important in their 
own right, but also because they brought a wide range of issues, including ethnicity in 
the Li-Shan region, to a wide audience in Taiwan.
6.4.1 Agriculture and Environmental Degradation
Soil erosion due to the cultivation of steep slopes in the Li-Shan area was so 
serious that seventeen check dams in the upper reaches o f the Da-Chia River built 
between 1976-80 in an effort to protect the reservoir had all silted up by 1980 (Chang 
Chang-yi 1992). Monitoring siltation of the reservoir was started as soon as the dam 
was completed in 1974. The annual average silt deposition was far greater than 
originally anticipated (1.16 million cubic meters between 1974-76, and 1.67 million 
cubic meters between 1976-78) (Chang Chang-yi 1989:66). As in many such cases 
around the world, there is little agreement on the major causes of the soil erosion in 
Li-Shan which resulted in accelerated sedimentation in the reservoir. The slopelands 
are prone to both high rates of natural erosion and landslides during the typhoon 
season. Road construction (the major cross-island highway, and the roads for the 
maintenance and management of the reservoir) are also responsible for some of the
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problem. The problem, however, has clearly been aggravated by widespread intensive 
cultivation on slopelands. Some suggest that through even the most cursory 
observation, it is clear that improper slopeland cultivation is probably the main cause, 
although it is very difficult to quantify this contribution because of the presence of 
intervening natural possibilities (Chang Chang-yi 1989:65-66). Certainly, these 
problems have intensified as more and more slopeland is brought under cultivation.
Many factors contributed to the essentially unconstrained slopeland development 
in the Li-Shan area. The placing of economic gains over environmental concerns in 
the past few decades within both private and public sectors is an important reason. 
Shortsighted policies encouraged the pursuit of short-term profits at the expense of 
environmental deterioration. Chang Chang-yi identified another dimension, ineffective 
government actions due to the lack of a centralized authority in the Li-Shan area. He 
called for the establishment o f clear-cut authority among of the many government 
agencies in the Te-Chi watershed area (Chang Chang-yi 1992).
The irony of history can be clearly seen thirty years later at the same 
geographical site. In the early years of the 1960s when the KMT needed to settle an 
enormous number of the retired servicemen who came to Taiwan with the KMT in 
1949, the regime sought every possible way to promote development and the 
exploitation of natural resources in Taiwan. The first cross-island highway was 
constructed mostly by those veterans. In this sense, the cross-island highway 
represented a WPA (Works Progress Administration)-style effort for job allocation. 
The other goals associated with the opening of the highway were population dispersal, 
transportation network improvement, and the more effective use o f water resources.
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However, these goals, according to Chang Chang-yi, have still not been fulfilled. Even 
if some of these goals were achieved, the extensive degradation of the physical and 
socio-economic environments which resulted from cultivation on the steep slopes 
throughout the region virtually offsets any associated benefits (Chang Chang-yi 
1989:ix). Environmental protection, indigenous cultural survival and ethnic space 
preservation were not priorities of the KMT’s decision-makers in this early period. In 
1957 and 1963 respectively, two large public farms, Fu-Shou-Shan and Wii-Lin were 
set up near Li-Shan to accommodate the retired military personnel. Large-scale 
orchards and vegetable farms were developed in these steep slopelands to grow 
temperate products because the altitude o f these slopes permitted such a use.
The situation changed in the late 1980s when those veterans, once praised as 
heroes who opened the “internal frontier” in the mountains, were blamed together with 
the Atayal indigenous peoples and other Han farmers for the environmental 
degradation in Li-Shan area and the many environmental problems associated with 
shortening life of the Te-Chi reservoir.
6.4.2 Soil Erosion and Land Use as the Socioeconomic Results
Soil erosion, although in some cases is resulted from natural process, is often 
exacerbated by human activities. In turn, it becomes a social and political issue when 
the “problem” is manipulated by people who can affect public opinions, and further 
when the State decides on a particular course of action which invariably leads to 
conflicts of interests (Blaikie 1985, Chapter 1). The conflict o f interests may explicitly 
be confined to soil erosion and environmental conservation issues, or more 
complicated but related political aspects, such as the struggle for control of territory or
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for the appropriation of surpluses generated by lands in question may become a central 
aspects of the problem (Blaikie 1985: 2).
Once the relations between land use and soil erosion were recognized in the 
study area, they became politicized issues to be debated and discussed in a supposedly 
neutral and scientific manner. Intervention by state institutions, which inevitably had 
to take a side on the issue in order to engage in an “effective” action, quickly 
followed. Intervention, of course, affects the livelihood of the land users in eroded 
areas and sometimes has profound influences in other areas. The interventions may 
take the form of changes in the laws, the land tenure system, or even result in a new 
Constitutional provision related to the national territorial plan. These changes can also 
alter price/market mechanisms and credit/loan availabilities, and the foreign earnings 
capability of the State (Blaikie 1985:2). Foreign advisors and experts, usually from 
First World countries, are often invited to such affected areas to conduct more detailed 
and “convincing” research and to provide a more feasible and “objective” solutions. 
Not surprisingly, all of these measures were done in Li-Shan as discussed in Chapter 
4.
Following the advice of American advisors, a special agency, the Mountain 
Agricultural Resources Development Bureau, was established in 1961 (Chang Chang- 
yi 1989:88). Ironically, the word “development” was still in the name of the bureau. 
The bureau’s main responsibilities were to plan development and manage the 
exploitation of slopeland, regulate development funds, promote ecologically and 
economically sound agricultural practices by farmers on the slopelands, and conduct 
field surveys and laboratory soil experimentation (Chang Chang-yi 1989:88-89).
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Following the line of reasoning reflected in the bureau’s major functions and 
responsibilities suggests that land use patterns were considered to be the sole cause of 
soil erosion. Solutions for halting or restricting soil erosion were limited to just this 
technical dimension. In this manner, problem of soil erosion, and hence the siltation of 
the Te-Chi reservoir, was detached from all social, cultural and political contexts. 
Eventually, the bureau failed to perform its proper role, perhaps in part because these 
other dimensions were not considered.
As soil erosion continued and natural fertility declined, farmers have to apply 
more and more fertilizers. The intensive growth of fruit in large area makes the use of 
fungicides and insecticides necessary. Agricultural chemicals were, in turn, washed by 
the rain into the river and the reservoir, resulting in eutrophication that threatened 
water quality in the down stream urban areas. The two large public veteran farms and 
the numerous fruits and vegetables growers, Han and indigenous alike, soon became 
the objects o f public condemnation. The environmental stress forced the government 
to take actions against widespread if “illegal” cultivation of the slopes. However, due 
to fierce local resistance, the forced felling of illegal fruits trees and the ensuing 
reforesting policy were not able to proceed (Chang Chang-yi 1992; Interview F).
To say that it was only the selfishness of the local vested interest groups 
resisting the implementation of the new environmental preservation policy is to 
oversimplify the multidimensional historical and geographical contexts of the 
problem. The historical role of the State in creating the problems is completely 
ignored. In fact, the State is among the biggest users of the slopeland in Li-Shan. The 
highway network, the hydroelectricity facilities in the Te-Chi reservoir, the army base,
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the two veteran farms, and the national forestlands are all State’s properties and 
projects. Further, the State initiated the “agriculture up to the mountains” policy to 
encourage the production of temperate zone fruits. Geographically, the inequalities of 
economic and power relationships between the urban areas and the mountain areas are 
both the results and causes of upstream land use patterns.
The people in the economically-marginal mountain areas have few choices to 
make a living other than exploiting natural resources. Also, people in mountain areas 
have less political clout to mobilize necessary supports and buttress persuasive 
discourses to defend their own actions and interests. The rapid growth of the PPRA 
among the Han farmers can partly be attributed to its familiarity with political 
operations in the core, urban area and its effective national Congress lobby. However, 
given the relatively common business orientation of PPRA core members, as widely 
recognized by the indigenous movement organizations and local leaders of the 
Presbyterian Church, the rise of the PPRA may eventually widen the gap between the 
core and peripheral areas.
There is at least one thing in common, if not more, between the Han and the 
aboriginal farmers. They all emphasize their efforts in preserving the soil from erosion 
and in cooperating with the government in promoting and instituting environmental 
protection. Han farmers stress that farmers will logically protect their fields from soil 
erosion because the land and soil are the material basis upon which they depend to 
make a living (Interview F). The indigenous minister o f the local Presbyterian Church 
claims that the eutrophication occurring in the Te-Chi reservoir should not be blamed 
on the farmers’ use o f fertilizers and pesticides. Instead, he thought the abundant
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amount o f trees that were submerged by the completion of the Te-Chi dam were to 
blame for the water quality problem (Interview G). Indigenous fruit-growers also 
assert that local farmers cherish their land resources and do every possible thing to 
prevent erosion from happening. They suggest that the sources of silt comes from 
natural processes, road construction, and the reforestation program which, ironically 
perhaps, cut down the old trees in order to plant the new ones (Interview G).
As I mentioned above, it is not an easy task to distinguish between natural 
erosion and the accelerated erosion caused by human actions. The local farmers in Li- 
Shan, regardless of their ethnicity, utilize their specific local knowledge in defending 
and preserving their livelihood from being disrupted by State intervention.
In the process o f this resistance, various organizations were bom. The 
organizations reflect the ethnic boundaries found in Li-Shan. For example, the Li-Shan 
Farmers’ Rights Committee was an indigenous group led by a former local 
Presbyterian minister. The Han farmers also formed a variety of organizations. 
However, these organizations were all short-lived and dissolved after the agreement to 
postpone the cutting down of fruit trees was achieved. Some of the Han people’s 
organizations were absorbed by the PPRA subsequently (Interview F). However, it is 
the PPRA’s ethnic-charged discourse that shifts the Han farmers’ frustrations 
originally aimed at the State, to a more divisive ethnic hostility towards the aborigines.
Local land use patterns deeply reflect the social, cultural, political and economic 
structures o f a certain community as well as the natural potential o f the land. They 
cannot be changed overnight by the experts’ calls for conservation. Conservation is a 
physical process as much as a social one. Its success depends mostly, not on the
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technical (improved seeds, agricultural engineering, laboratory experiment on 
preservation, etc.), but on the social dimension (Blaikie 1985:50). In other case studies 
around the world, it is striking “how indigenous rights movements, conservation 
politics, food security, the emphasis on local knowledges and calls for access to, and 
control over, local resources crosscut the environment-poverty axis” (Peet and Watts 
1996:35). The land degradation problem in Li-Shan proves that the application of 
merely technical solutions alone cannot be successful. Possible solutions may well be 
derived from the ecological wisdom of indigenous peoples around the world. The 
long-term sustainability of their way of life has not only been recognized but also 
highly appreciated in facing the global environmental challenge. The land itself 
possesses cultural and spiritual values for many indigenous peoples, in addition to 
economic value. However, any romanticization of the indigenous cultures and their 
way of life as ecologically sound are not only unrealistic but also misleading for a true 
understanding of the current situations. I will further discuss these environmental 
issues in Chapter 7.
In this chapter, I present a critical review on the rapid development of a Han 
people’s organization “Plains People’s Rights Association” (PPRA) in the Li-Shan 
area, a counterpart of “Alliance of Taiwan’s Aborigines” (ATA) in series land 
disputes. The PPRA has relatively abundant financial resources and political 
connections that enable its rapid growth in national and local political arena. The 
PPRA denies the “indigenous” status of Taiwan’s aborigines, argues that there are no 
indigenous people in current Taiwan, and accuses the indigenous activists of being 
separatists, who do not identify with the concept of Chinese Nation. The PPRA
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demands the deregulation of reservation lands, open the candidacy of the heads o f 
mountain hsiam  to Han people, and revise the Constitution to call the aborigines as 
“mountain people.”
On the other hand, the virtually unlimited development of slopelands in Li-Shan 
has resulted in serious environmental problems. The rapid siltation from the upstream 
agricultural cultivations threatens the safety of the Te Chi reservoir. I introduce a 
socio-political perspective into this seemingly “pure” scientific environmental 
problem, and argue that the problem cannot be fully comprehended without 
considering the “situated” local social, political, and historical contexts.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACTS OF THE 
INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT ON TAIWAN’S SOCIETY
Based on the above discussion, the chapter provides three major conclusions, 
which are all rooted in the land issues, as answers to the central question of this 
dissertation: the impacts o f the indigenous movement, which is centered around land 
conflicts, on Taiwan’s society (including the indigenous societies, of course).
Among geographers, or more generally, practitioners of social science, many 
notions that were taken-for-granted by academic community have now been exposed 
to reexamination and renewed scrutiny in new social and political contexts. In Taiwan 
particularly, the transition from an authoritarian, one-dimensional regime to a more 
democratic and diversified society releases unprecedented forces and energy which 
radiates from the civil society and, in time, impacts the State. The rigid military 
regime has relaxed and the gigantic bureaucracy and its policymaking process have 
gradually opened up to the public domain. Different social movements have 
contributed different insights to reform both the society and the State, and as a 
consequence the value system as well has been transformed. However, the far- 
reaching influence and implication brought about by the new social movements are 
different from the dubbed interest-group pluralism which is prevailing in welfare 
capitalist societies.
Iris Young forcefully argues that the welfare society depoliticizes public life by 
restricting discussion and debate to simply distributive dimensions in a context of 
interest-group pluralism where each group competes for its share o f public resources 
(1990:Chap 3). In such a social and political context, public support is not the 
necessary condition for victory, but rather successful negotiations with other interest
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groups and the formation of political alliances are crucial to victory. Such “strategic” 
politics fosters political cynicism: “those who make claims of right or justice are only 
saying what they want in clever rhetoric. This cynical system often forces movements 
claiming justice ... to identify themselves as merely another interest group” (Young 
1990:72). Two major defects are embedded in such an evolution to interest-group 
pluralism. First, the privatized form of representation and decision-making that the 
interest-group pluralism encourages does not require the expression of group-interest 
to appeal to basic principles of social justice. Second, the inequality o f resources, 
organizations, and power allows some groups to dominate the public forum while 
other voices are muted (Young 1990:92). Thus, the “paradox of democracy” refers to 
the phenomena that the materially and politically more privileged groups are more 
likely, not only to promote their perceived interests, but also to successfully achieve 
goals than those less privileged minority groups.
Young suggests possible solutions to this paradox (see Young 1990:92-95). An 
extensive redistribution of wealth and restructuring of the control mechanisms for 
capital and resources are necessary conditions to link democracy and justice. A 
challenge to the given structures and procedures for making distributive decisions is 
essential to advance the material equality necessary to faster more equitable political 
participation. A greater democratic system, rather than limiting democratic decision­
making to certain aspects is another way out for the paradox. Democracy in one 
institution will reinforce democracy in another institution. Thus, group members are 
able to develop the capacities for thinking about one's own needs in relation to the 
needs of others. Finally, the paradox cannot be eliminated as long as any group is
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being stereotyped, silenced, or marginalized by virtue of the group’s essential 
differences embedded in its cultural and physical characters. Only when the oppressed 
groups are able to express their interests and needs in the public forum on an equal 
basis with other groups can the paradox be terminated.
If Young represents the construction of social justice in a framework of
postmodern “celebration of differences,” Harvey, then, will be the upholder of modem
“Enlightenment project” in his pursuit of universal justice. Since relationships between
individuals get mediated through market functions and state powers, Harvey insists
that we have to “define conceptions of justice capable of operating across and through
these multiple mediations” (Harvey 1996: 349).
“Only through critical re-engagement with political-economy, 
with our situatedness in relation to capital accumulation, can we 
hope to re-establish a conception of social justice as something to 
be fought for as a key value within an ethics of political solidarity 
built across different places” . .. Struggles to bring a particular 
kind of discourse about justice into a hegemonic position have 
then to be seen as part of a broader struggle over ideological 
hegemony between conflicting groups in society. (Harvey 1996:
360-361).
In Taiwan’s case, the juxtaposition of the dominating and the dominated groups 
is manifested in the two groups which I have introduced as the PPRA and the AT A. 
Despite their internal heterogeneity (see Chapter 6), the “characteristics” presented by 
their core members reflect important contrasts. The PPRA portrays itself as the victim 
of the KMT’s mountain policies. However, in its petition letters to the government and 
the propaganda it produces for the average audience, PPRA positions often blatantly 
reflect Han people’s cultural hegemony as well as stereotypes about the different 
“other,” the aborigines. For example, the PPRA proposes to establish indigenous
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collective farms, following the model of veteran farms, to accommodate aboriginal 
land right claims and ethnic cultures (Section 6.1.2.). By such a measure, the “land” 
factor and its connection to indigenous culture are carelessly wiped out. The ATA, on 
the other hand, lacked financial resources and further, was a novice in the Han- 
dominated political arena. The indigenous movement was considered by most as 
simply another movement among many other social protests movements which 
emerged at the same time (Hsiao Hsin-huang 1992). In other words, only the political 
and economic aspects of the indigenous movement were emphasized, while cultural 
policy and territorial planning were not only neglected by the academics, but also by 
the indigenous elites themselves.
Overlapping and shared progressive ideas among many of these new social 
movements made it difficult to distinguish the particular indigenous movement 
impacts on world politics, or even more specifically, its influence on Taiwan’s state 
and society. However, it is undoubted that the development of the indigenous 
movement in Taiwan touches points which characterize the nature o f the growing 
worldwide indigenous movement and further provides retrospection on the island’s 
history extending far beyond the four-hundred-year Han settlement. First, culturally, it 
challenges the Sino-centralism that has been promoted through the mainstream media 
and the Chinese nationalist ideology o f the KMT as well as the various oppressions of 
colonialism on these minority groups. Second, politically, it contributes to the 
reexamination of the concept of the nation-state, not only in Taiwan, but also at the 
world scale. Third, environmentally, the traditional ecological wisdom manifested by
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these indigenous groups is now being given attention while the ideology of “almighty 
modern technology” is simultaneously coming under scrutiny.
7.1 Cultural Hegemony, Colonialism, and Multiculturalism
Most commentators agree that hegemony is the key concept in Gramsci’s Prison 
Notebooks and his major contribution to the development of Marxism (Sassoon 1991). 
In his early writings, he used the term to refer to the system of alliances which the 
working class must forge to overthrow the bourgeois state and to serve as the social 
base of the new workers’ state (Sassoon 1991). In his prison writings, the term was 
applied in the way that the bourgeoisie establishes and maintains its rule (Sassoon 
1991). The domination of ruling class over other classes relies not only on material 
and economic forces, but also on the conversion o f the ruled to accept the belief 
system of the ruling class, its social, cultural, political and moral values, with 
involvement o f less violence (Joll 1983). However, hegemony is not a static presence, 
but a “moving equilibrium,” dynamic and evolving process which is created and re­
created in a web of institutions, social relations, and ideology (Lay 1994; Sassoon 
1991). Later, the concept of hegemony goes beyond the class dominant relations to 
other social relations, such as racism and patriarchy (Lay 1994). In my research, I refer 
to hegemony as the presence of uneven ethnic power relationship in which Han State 
superimposes its value system to the “other” peoples, the indigenous peoples in 
Taiwan, through delicate social and cultural relations and institutes embodied in the 
KMT’s mountain policies.
Cultural hegemony not only serves to project values which are fundamentally 
alien to one group from a dominant group, but also in the process erodes dignity and
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ethnic confidence that are supposed to be basic human rights. One of common features 
of indigenous peoples around the world is their suffering which results from this 
cultural hegemony. Hegemony deepens and solidifies inferiority by negating ethnic 
dignity and imposing a stigmatized identity. Moreover, hegemony incorporates more 
than the ideology of a dominant group. It also includes the embodiment o f this 
ideology, the values and beliefs in everyday practices and socio-political institutional 
arrangements (Ley 1994). Under such socio-political circumstances, economically 
disadvantaged indigenous peoples are even more vulnerable to assimilation policies 
instituted by the dominant group.
Influenced by the aboriginal struggles and the advocates of multiculturalism
within some First World countries, the earlier International Labor Organization (ILO)
convention which stressed the integration and assimilation of indigenous population
has been replaced by a new version of the convention written in 1989, which states:
Considering that the developments which have taken place in 
international law since 1957, as well as developments in the 
situation o f indigenous and tribal peoples in all regions o f the 
world, have made it appropriate to adopt new international 
standards on the subject with a view to removing the 
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards.... (ILO 
Convention no. 169, 1989; cited in Wilmer 1993: 179.)
The new convention urges governments to respect the integrity o f indigenous 
cultures. This basic right is correspondent with the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights o f Indigenous Peoples. However, this convention is not a document which is 
actually capable o f protecting indigenous peoples from infringements on their basic 
rights by States. It is merely a report which prescribes a normative regulation that 
should be embraced by participatory States regarding indigenous affairs (TIVB 1994).
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The State, of course, still keeps the rights of legislature and administration. In this
aspect, it is different from the U.N. Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, which states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, in 
accordance with international law. By virtue of this right, they 
freely determine their relationship with the States in which they 
live, in a spirit o f co-existence with other citizens, and freely 
pursue their economic, social, cultural and spiritual development 
in conditions of freedom and dignity....(U.N. Document 
E/CN. 4/Sub .2/1991/36)
Under the articles o f the Declaration, the sovereign authority of the modem 
nation-state is curbed by the relative autonomy of the indigenous nations. Only by 
empowering these indigenous nations can they be free from both state-imposed 
assimilation policies and reified stereotypes which are reinforced by mainstream mass 
media and other information distributors. This empowerment apparently does not exist 
yet in most parts of the world. As Kariya (1993) points out, in the current 
“establishment” constructed by the dominating group, the government agency charged 
with indigenous affairs is in a state of contradiction. On the one hand, it has the 
responsibility to assist indigenous peoples. On the other hand, it is generally perceived 
as the source of indigenous oppression, both in the past, and at the present time.
The representation of “the other,” the way “otherness” is structured and 
construed by the dominant, colonizing group, and the cultural imprints left on the 
colonized groups are some of the major focuses o f post-colonial literature. Indigenous 
peoples around the world, as the objects of internal colonialism (see Hsieh Shih-chung 
1994a; Walis YuGan 1994a for Taiwan’s case and Wilmer 1993 for others), are 
colonized through institutionalized social and political arrangements, such as
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education, mass media, the legislature, the power of naming people and landscape, the 
ethnic division of labor, and the stereotype. It is a colonialism of wars and 
exploitations, as much as it is about the colonization o f minds and bodies (Corbridge 
1993) and of ethnic space itself. Colonialism that is thus defined is much more 
difficult to overthrow or transcend. Colonial values and practices can easily survive 
long after political de-colonization (Corbridge 1993).
While “classical colonialism” is often associated with imperialism during 
territorial expansions and economic exploitation (Watts 1994), internal colonialism is 
often presented in tandem with cultural imperialism. This cultural imperialism 
involves a universalization of the dominant group’s historical experience and culture, 
and the formalization of this history, as common social norms (Young 1990:59). 
According to this interpretation, cultural imperialism is similar to the concept of 
cultural hegemony. In fact, according to Raymond Williams, hegemonism is use as an 
alternative to imperialism in some current cases (Williams 1983:144). Despite the fact 
that hegemony implies some notion of consent within the mass o f the population -  that 
is, the acceptance, either willing or unwilling, o f the value system and institutional 
arrangements of the dominant group (Sassoon 1991), however, the ultimate foundation 
of cultural hegemony, like colonialism, is still the military threat, or use, of force.
In Taiwan’s specific context, the efforts to integrate Taiwan into Japanese 
empire were replaced by Sino-centralism since the end of World War II. History and 
geography had their instrumental function in constructing and changing national 
identity. The KMT’s conception o f “Chinese” was portrayed as a highly homogeneous 
culture and people incorporating five major ethnic groups (Han, Manchurian,
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Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uighur). Ethnicity, then, is relegated to a secondary aspect of 
identity after nationality. Different ethnic groups came to solidarity under the banner 
of national security and economic development In contrast, expressions of ethnic 
differences were perceived as threats to national solidarity. Taiwan’s “Local dialects,” 
such as Hakka, Minan, or Austronesian languages, were prohibited from being spoken 
in public; Taiwanese folksongs were kept outside the State-controlled mass media. 
Local geography and histories were restricted in school curricula and kept from the 
public arena. Han Chinese supremacy was taught as dogma in primary schools in 
sharp contrast to the portrayal o f the headhunting savage aborigines.
According to the argument of Taiwanese nationalists, Han “Taiwanese” have 
also been oppressed by this cultural hegemony and the colonial rule of the foreign 
KMT regime (Chen Fang-ming. 1995). It should be reasonable to consider that 
Taiwan’s aborigines suffer a sort of “double oppression” from both Chinese and 
Taiwanese national discourses due to their ignorance of the aborigines’ request for 
national status. Given the early KMT ideology, indigenous social and cultural systems 
were dismissed as backward and worthless. Simply put, they needed to be modernized. 
However, indigenous peoples were, in accordance with the Constitution, to be giving 
status as citizens with the chance of assimilation so that in time, there would be no 
distinctions from other Han people IF they were willing to acquire Chinese language 
and culture. One major goal o f the indigenous movement in Taiwan is to subvert the 
one-dimensional cultural politics imposed by the KMT regime created through these 
extensive social and political controls.
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The emergence of the indigenous movement in Taiwan has its own peculiar 
backdrop. Many factors which are inextricably intertwined contribute to this 
remarkable outburst in the mid- to late-1980s. These include: extensive urbanization, a 
sound material base resulting from rapid economic development in the past few 
decades, the lifting of martial law, the intensifying exploitation of minority people 
under the capitalistic economy, and increasing tolerance toward social movements 
associated with the decline o f the authoritarian party/state control (Hsieh Shih-chung 
1987b). However, conservative scholars tend to eschew the issue that indigenous 
people are in fact “peoples” (or “First Nations,” to use the term of Canadian Indians), 
rather than just another interest group asking for their share of national resources, or 
alternately as but an underprivileged minority demanding more political and social 
equity. In Hong Chun-hu’s dissertation (1992:64-82), despite his discussion and 
review o f Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory, Modernization Theory 
underlies his suggestions of “solving” the indigenous “problems.” Such “solutions,” in 
my view, are culturally biased and so are politically futile. Aborigines are often 
regarded in the same light as other economically and politically weak groups, such as 
workers, women, homeless people, and pollution victims. Clearly, the cultural 
dimension, including its special connection with particular spaces, is missing from 
either Hong’s or the PPRA’s considerations with respect to relations between the State 
and the indigenous nations.
Serious political reforms in Taiwan which started in the mid-1980s brought, of 
course, changes in other dimensions. Taboos were lifted and minds were emancipated. 
Staid cultural policies, as other social policies, are no longer a “given” condition, but
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rather a field of contesting ideas, ideologies, and of course, cultural politics. Ideology,
thus, is not a “fixed” product of either a certain mode of production or a specific
economic structure, as the classical Marxism might argue, but rather is a new field of
political struggle (Sassoon 1991). It is under these socio-political contexts, that the
concept of multiculturalism, at least from my perspective, was developed to
accommodate different perspectives and worldviews existing in a nation-state. This
concept is, of course, evolved in the West but also rapidly spread to the rest of the
world. The establishment of multiculturalism, as explicated by Kobayashi (1993), has
experienced three stages:
“first, the ‘demographic’ stage, a state o f ethno-cultural diversity 
towards which no coherent official policy exists; second, the 
‘symbolic’ stage, wherein it is official policy to recognize and 
promote multiculturalism, without a firm commitment to bring 
about its objectives; and third, the ‘structural’ stage, at which 
legislative reform provides the basis for social change.”
Canada was among the first countries to promulgate an official multicultural 
policy, the third stage in Kobayashi’s classification. This policy is a further step from 
the “original dual languages” and “dual cultures” policies designed especially for the 
two largest ethnic groups in Canada: the English and the French. However, this policy 
relinquishes the rights o f cultural development o f the First Nations and other 
immigrating groups (Chen Mao-tai 1993). The primary goals for the implementation 
o f multicultural policy are not only to tolerate cultural differences, but also to 
countervail political centralization (Chen Mao-tai 1993), which often gives dominant 
groups privileged over minorities. The idealistic outcome of this multiculturalism is to 
create a social condition in which individuals can not only form one unity under a
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single social and political entity, i.e. a nation state, but also permit the preservation of 
a personal cultural singularity and the right to be different.
Industrial capitalism, personal rationality, democracy, equity before laws, and 
civil rights are the essential conditions for Canadian multiculturalism (Chen Mao-tai 
1993). However, uneven regional development, especially the differences resulting 
from both different degrees of urbanization and industrialization often trigger ethnic 
conflicts over economic issues (Chen Mao-tai 1993). The lack of integration in forging 
an expected national “unity” renders the Canadian multiculturalism as only a 
“multicultural mosaic” (Chen Mao-tai 1993). However, it is the expectation of some 
future (national) integration which is implied in the multicultural policy that reveals its 
defects.
Due to the inequity of resources and political clouts among different cultural 
groups, an unreflective multicultural policy, or even an egalitarian, every-group-is- 
equal cultural policy will inevitably lead to the situation that the policy strives to avoid 
-  the dominance of few larger groups. This is the result of the “myth of equality.” 
Equal promotion and opportunity should be the minimum protection of minority 
groups. Therefore, multicultural policy cannot succeed without considering extensive 
resource redistribution in social, political and economic fields. Moreover, in an 
arguably postmodern era when differences are supposed to be celebrated and 
respected, the human “mosaic,” which emphasizes the individual singularity rather 
than integration, is a less oppressive measure for ethnic minorities in their struggles to 
resist assimilation policies.
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In Taiwan, the reforms induced by the indigenous movement and other new 
social movements have currently propelled the State and mainstream social values to 
move forward the transition from the second to the third stage of multiculturalism 
defined by Kobayashi. Symbolic multiculturalism and respect of cultural differences 
are at ieast recognized among some State agencies and progressive groups, and are no 
longer conceived as threats to national solidarity.
It is at this stage that one o f the most prominent ideas in post-colonial literature, 
“hybridity,” comes into the focus. The idea of hybridity is that the transaction of the 
post-colonial world is not a one-way process. It is not that the oppression obliterates 
cultural traces of the oppressed, or the colonizer silences the colonized in absolute 
terms (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 1995). The capability for some distinctive aspect 
of the oppressed culture to survive, even under the most potent suppression, makes it 
integral part of the new cultural formations which arise from the interactions between 
the native and, if  I may say, the imperial culture. Hybridity not only happens in post­
colonial societies where colonial powers invaded to consolidate political and 
economic control. It also occurs when settler-invaders dispossess indigenous peoples 
and force them to assimilate to new social patterns (Ashcroft, Griffith, and Tiffin 
1995). New cultural forms are produced even though the older forms continue to exist, 
perhaps with some modifications. The degrees that these new cultural forms become 
“hybridized” varies greatly across situations, between cultures, and from place to place 
(Ashcroft, Griffith, and Tiffin 1995).
Recently, the “hybridized dimension” of Taiwan’s culture, that is, the 
combination of the influence of the Han Chinese, the Japanese, the Americans, and the
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most unique to Taiwan, the indigenous cultures, are generally cited within Taiwanese 
national discourse (see the book edited by Shih Cheng-fong 1994). Although the term 
“hybridity” or “post-colonial” are not necessarily specified, terms such as 
“multicultural” or “multiethnic” gradually have become acceptable. Cultural hybridity 
seems to be a reality, rather than simply an abstract concept circulated only within the 
academic elite. However, this does not mean that Taiwan’s culture as “hybrid” can be 
accepted by the majority o f people when it comes to important political implications -  
that is, an “impure” and perhaps a new culture is developed in Taiwan independent of 
Chinese culture advocated by the old rigid regime.
I have discussed the impacts of tourism development on indigenous harvest 
ceremonies in Chapter 4. In my opinion, these ceremonies illustrate the “hybridity” 
most clearly in that they have become adapted to the changing socio-economic 
conditions and bestow different meanings upon w hat, on the surface, seem to be 
traditional customs. Traditionally, the harvest ceremony was held at a certain time of 
the year with complicated rites which were often linked to particular hunting and 
religious activities. However, the nativistic cultural revitalization movement which has 
evolved in Taiwan’s modem capitalist society clearly reflects modifications. The time 
of the ceremony has been changed to weekends or holidays to accommodate the 
schedules of tribal members who, mostly youths, either work or study in the cities. 
Prolonged rituals must be cut short to fit both the needs of tourists coming from 
outside and the schedules of the young, working, tribal members. The sacred spaces in 
the mountains, perhaps, will be replaced by other places offering easier accessibility to 
the tourists and to the participants.
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Some traditional rituals are “banned” by local churches and Christian leaders 
(Interview G). Commercial performances in aboriginal cultural parks that compete for 
“authenticity” (which is often turned into “exotic”) of traditional cultures in order to 
seek to maximize tourism profits, and sometimes, mislead the ongoing process of this 
indigenous cultural renaissance (for example, see Hsieh Shih-chung 1994d). However, 
this current cultural revitalization, to some degree, does arouse ethnic identity and 
pride for some aboriginal performers, despite the fact that their performance/culture is 
no longer “pure.” Perhaps, this “hybrid” culture will develop into a new form of 
“authentic” culture in the future as the product of social adjustment.
So, what are the nature and the direction of indigenous movements, particularly 
that occurring in Taiwan? Is the movement an ethnic movement embedded with 
exclusiveness? Or is it a means of functional social transition in a democratic society? 
These kinds o f questions might be attributed to the lack of delicate discourse 
construction on the indigenous movement and Taiwan’s aborigines’ relatively 
restricted connections with an international perspective, due to Taiwan’s international 
isolation. These questions also reflect the insufficient acknowledge of ethnic 
differences in Taiwan’s society (Walis YuGan 1992), and therefore lack the 
consensus, experience, and social and geographical imaginations to find appropriate 
solutions. The indigenous movement, its ensuing nativistic cultural revitalization, and 
the concurrent calls for territorial autonomy have imposed upon every sincere social 
movement and its activists a moral demand. The indigenous movement demands every 
person to reflect upon the relationships among the State, the civil society, the impacts
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of cultural hegemony on Taiwan’s population, the dying indigenous nations (see Sun 
Da-chuan 1991), and the human-land relations.
7.2 Indigenous Sovereignty and the Ideology of the Nation-State
The politics o f representation is epitomized in the process o f nation-state 
building in which the homogenization process demanded by mainstream nation-state 
ideology subjugate the representation of “otherness.” In other words, politics is 
involved in the formation of identity of nations and all incorporated ethnic groups.
Thus, the prototype of the modem nation-state, quite opposite to common assumption, 
is not natural, primary and permanent so as to precede history (Hobsbawm 1990:14). 
Rather, the fundamental ideology of the nation-state, that is, nationalism, is a product 
o f construction, manipulation, invention, and imagination (Anderson 1991;
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The boundaries of nations are thus artificially created, 
constantly floating, negotiating, and breaking up over time. Contemporaries are often 
unselfconscious about their uses of the term “nation” so that it means different things 
in different context at different places. From geographers’ viewpoints, the definition 
and organizations of modem nation-states are now essentially stmctured around 
territory, which links the construction of national discourse to this spatial dimension of 
national territory. Even those “nations without states” have a space to where they are 
spiritually linked. Following the restricting principles of both self-determination and 
the nation-state, it seems that a nation is assumed to form only one state and its 
citizens constitute one “indivisible whole.” Since states are, in the modem era, mostly 
spatially “fixed” and, on the contrary, peoples are spatially mobile, this notion of “one
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nation, one state” neither fits the current reality, nor can such an interpretation judicate 
boundary, territorial, and national disputes across the globe.
When indigenous sovereign claims collide with modem nationalism, conflicts 
rise. The most prominent case comes from Quebec, Canada. Both French Quebecers 
and indigenous Inuits in northern Quebec are seeking recognition of their respective 
ethnocultural distinctiveness in Canadian state. Competition by these two groups was 
lively when Quebec political leaders rejected requests by First Nations people for 
indigenous sovereignty in recent years (Salee 1995). As a result, this tension led to a 
highly conflictual dynamic relation which renders a social and cultural coexistence 
extremely difficult (Salee 1995). The history of colonization shows that indigenous 
peoples, the First Nations, were not the beneficiaries of post-WWII independent 
statehood. This fact seems to be epitomized in the request of the Canadian First 
Nations. While French Quebecers asked to separate from Canada given a main reason 
of cultural distinctiveness, Quebec’s indigenous people’s demand for sovereignty, 
based on the same reason, was crudely turned down. So far, neither group has 
achieved political sovereignty.
7.2.1 Indigenous Sovereignty, the Chinese Nation, and Taiwanese 
Nationalism
In Taiwan, self-autonomy rather than the establishment of indigenous 
sovereignty is the goal of the indigenous movement. In the estimation of the 
indigenous elite, an appeal for complete sovereignty within an island state is 
practically infeasible and politically harmful to their future campaigns, despite the fact 
that the current Han-dominated KMT state has no legitimacy from their point of view.
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Chinese anthropologists conducted research on minority groups in Southwest 
China during the Second World War (mainly because the KMT’s Nationalist 
government had moved to Sichuan province). Their studies on those minority groups 
were later criticized as mostly used only extensive reviews of ancient literature to 
identify the origins of the minorities in question. Often, these studies led to a priori 
results that the current ethnic groups originated from some ancient groups mention of 
which are found in ancient Chinese historical records (Hsieh Shih-chung 1990, cited in 
Chen Chao-ru 1992). In a word, the early anthropologists lacked the concepts required 
to establish ethnic histories from their fieldwork (Hsieh Shih-chung 1990, cited in 
Chen Chao-ru 1992). Crude conclusions could be partially attributed to the limits of 
the wartime environment which forced these scholars to depend almost exclusively on 
such ancient records rather than actual field observations. However, their often a priori 
conclusion on the origin of ethnic groups could not be simply attributed to this 
difficult environment (Chen Chao-ru 1992). Again, it is more about ideology then the 
harsh wartime circumstances.
The problems embedded in the reports of these early anthropologists regarding
ethnic origin become clearer once we review their theoretical construction with respect
to the formation of the Chinese Nation.
“The major factor for the formation of the Chinese Nation is 
assimilation. Because the appropriate emanation of the Chinese 
culture, the peoples in surrounding areas are touched and 
generated some kind of centripetal, pulling force. This force 
enables these people to seek for light, so they are willing to come 
to merge with us” (Ruey Yi-fu 1953, cited in Chen Chao-ru 1992, 
translated by the author).
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The above paragraph reveals at least two implicit messages. First, ironically, 
although early research on minority groups relied on extensive reviews of ancient 
Chinese historical documents, the final research results were often ahistorical. Second, 
these early studies indicate how subjective researchers can be as they sought to 
understand minority groups (Chen Chao-ru 1992). The orthodox Chinese cultural 
supremacy and one-dimensional Sino-centralism are haunting, and remain to the 
present.
Some of these anthropologists came to Taiwan with the KMT after 1949, but 
remained interested in the “origin” of Taiwan’s aboriginal minorities. Not 
surprisingly, studies related to this issue again resulted in the conclusion that the 
culture of Taiwan’s “mountain savages” is linked to common “Chinese” ancestors 
(Way Hui-lin 1967, cited in Chen Chao-ru 1992). Archeological discoveries in pre- 
historical sites o f Taiwan were often used to prove this ancient connection of Taiwan 
with China by some subjective speculation (Chen Chao-ru 1992). The power of the 
Chinese ethno-centralism ideology is so prevalent that it infiltrates virtually every 
aspect of daily life and is even internalized into supposedly “impartial” social science.
As part of the measures carried out in the process of “empire building,” Japanese 
anthropological studies on Taiwan’s aborigines still exerted great influence long after 
the KMT took control o f Taiwan. The early anthropologists who came to Taiwan with 
the KMT had to rely heavily on the Japanese studies to construct their theories on 
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. However, the internalized Chinese orthodoxy inevitably 
led their academic researches into a linear perspective supposing a clear relationship 
among peoples and nations. In summary, the linear evolution is Han Chauvinism —
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Chinese Orthodoxy China’s Minority Groups Taiwan’s Aborigines (Chen Chao-ru 
1992). This ethno-central nationalism provided the ideological basis of later 
assimilation policies. Anthropologists, as well as geographers (discussed in Chapter 
5), offer their knowledge and research for the construction of concepts favored by the 
ruling elites, intentionally or insidiously. These imaginative historical and 
geographical constructions generated by intellectual elites went unchallenged for 
decades until the mid-1970s when a mature civil society was ready to question the 
political taboos and set the stage for an eruption of challenges in the mid-1980s.
From the very beginning in the mid-1980s, the evolution o f the indigenous 
movement has been inextricably intertwined to the development of socio-political 
reform movements in Taiwan. The publicity o f Taiwanese nationalism, a breakthrough 
of the KMT’s political taboo, also stimulated the imaginary and theoretical 
constructions of potential “natural sovereignty” desired by the indigenous movement. 
However, the reality of true power relationships has subtly subordinated indigenous 
demands of either sovereignty or self-autonomy to the demand of Taiwan 
independence. The current political strategy is that Taiwan must be first independent 
from China, and then, and only then, it is possible for its aborigines to negotiate any 
further recognition of their cultural distinctiveness. Certainly, the premise o f this 
strategy is that the new Taiwanese nationalism is more tolerate and willing to 
accommodate differences than the old Chinese nationalism.
The emergence of the concept of the “Taiwanese nation” has its material base 
embedded in rapid economic development, the islandwide traffic network laid by the 
Japanese, and perhaps as Anderson points out (1991), in the growth of print capitalism
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whose prerequisite is a high literacy rate. In Taiwan, current debates on nationalism 
centered mainly on different Han sub-ethnic groups. Only a small proportion of the 
debate is devoted to dealing with the relationship between the aborigines and the State 
(see the various essays in Chang Mao-kuei et al 1993). Chao Kang (1996), on the 
other hand, distinguishes two types of nationalism in the current Taiwan context. 
“Ethno-nationalism” refers to the nationalism that emphasizes “primordial factors” 
such as blood relationships (or kinship) and language. From this perspective, these are 
the essential conditions for forming a nation. In this situation, a nation is identical, 
then, with an ethnic group. The other concept of nation comes from progressive 
liberalism, with emphasis the equal union of a sovereign people. Common ancestors or 
language are not used to draw boundaries between “we” and “the other.” Instead, 
“liberal nationalism” concentrates on expanding the base of solidity to strive for the 
universal rights for entire body of citizens (Chao Kang 1996). However, even this 
“liberal nationalism” cannot fully account for, and accommodate, the indigenous call 
for sovereignty due to its lack of consideration regarding marginalized groups. A 
(grassroots) “democratic nation” is proposed by Chao Kang within which a coalition is 
constructed among the socialist left, progressive liberals, and marginal groups. A 
Nationalism which aims at “increasing the country’s wealth and strengthening military 
force,” which most likely will benefit dominant groups and international powers, is 
denounced by this vision of national imagination.
In fact, the evolution of Taiwanese nationalism is perhaps, more appropriately 
seen as centered around the changing concept of “Who are Taiwanese?” In tracing the 
evolution of this concept we can easily distinguish different phases for a collective
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definition o f what is meant by “Taiwanese.” These phases are by no means clear cut 
and are subject to debate as far as who is incorporated is concerned. At the dawn of 
the Taiwanese nationalist movement in the 1970s, Taiwanese were referred to only as 
the Holo people, which is the largest ethnic group in Taiwan, whose language was 
called Taiwanese (taiyu). This literally means Taiwan’s language. Later, when the 
opposition camp needed to expand its social bass to exert pressure on the ruling party, 
the Hakka group was incorporated into the formed definition of “Taiwanese.” The 
Hakka rights movement is, in fact, one of the eighteen social movements identified by 
Hsiao Hsin-huang (1992) as of 1989. The emergence o f the Hakka rights movement 
reflected both a desire for a separate ethnic identity from the larger Holo group as well 
as the recognition that inadequate attention was paid to the Hakka group in the process 
of political democratization.
Ironically, indigenous peoples were recognized as “Taiwanese” only after their 
ethnic voices were heard and recognized after the mid-1980s. Indigenous peoples, the 
once sole masters of the island of Taiwan, have been subordinated and silenced by the 
succeeding alien regimes since their first contact with the outsiders some four hundred 
years ago.
Mainlanders, even to the present, are still hardly accepted as Taiwanese by hard­
line nationalists. However, some Taiwanese nationalists are in fact, mainlanders or 
their second generation offspring. The definition of Taiwanese, then, was extended 
later to any people in Taiwan who identify themselves with Taiwan, rather than China.
Repeated newspaper poll surveys report that, after the early 1996 crisis in the 
Taiwan Strait when the PRC held several military exercises to intimidate Taiwan in
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advance o f its first ever popular presidential elections, self-identity o f people as 
Taiwanese soared to the highest point while a self described “Chinese identity” 
reached the lowest ever level. The case exemplifies the fact that external threats can 
exert significant influence over domestic identity politics and help to form a sense of 
social coherence for the population as a whole. This external military intimidation of 
“China vs. Taiwan” gradually replaced the internal ethnic tension of “Taiwanese vs. 
Mainlander” as the largest socio-psychological force for mobilizing Taiwan 
sentiments. Indeed, these events led to a new construction of nationalism discourse. A 
KMT party now led by native Taiwanese and the shift of the party to a “Taiwanized” 
representation also substantially lessened its alien characteristics and helped gain 
support from the native population.
7.2.2 The Relationship between the Indigenous Movement and Han 
Taiwanese Nationalism
Although the indigenous movement is viewed by many as simply another social 
movement in post-martial law Taiwan, there is one dimension of the indigenous 
movement that is genuinely neglected by any other of the current movements; that is, 
the relations between the two “peoples” in a countiy where “quasi-colonialism” is still 
of great concern to many indigenous activists. The cultural and political implications 
of the indigenous movement cover a broad spectrum of socio-political reforms that 
would require radical institutional rearrangements ranging from a bona fides 
comprehensive territorial plan to significant changes in school curricula. This section 
will focus on the various possible interactions between the indigenous movement and 
Han-Taiwanese nationalism which might evolve in the near future. The discussion 
mainly follows the framework provided by Chang Mao-kuei (1995), but also
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incorporates my own re-interpretation and modifications based on more recent events 
and conditions.
I have discussed the status of Taiwan’s aborigines in the “Chung-Hwa-Min- 
Tzu”, or Chinese Nation in Chapter 5. Basically, within the framework of the Chinese 
Nation, Taiwan’s aborigines are not granted special status. They are not even included 
in the five major peoples that constitute Chinese Nation. Indigenous peoples are at 
most, minority groups or mountain compatriots in the “frontier/border areas.” On the 
other hand, the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism, especially the so-called “new 
Taiwanese” discourse, recognizes the aborigines’ as an integral part of the new 
Taiwanese nation. Aborigines, together with Holo, Hakka and the “new immigrants”
(to replace the old, and sometime incorrect, name of “mainlanders”) are the four major 
components of the Taiwanese Nation. Indigenous peoples are, then, “nations within a 
state.” This dynamic framework keeps open the possibility o f “adding” other new 
elements into the forming nation and relies less on blood relations or the belief of 
common ancestors.
The realization of this more idealist Taiwanese national discourse is still to 
contingent upon the result o f Han people’s political struggles in the greater political 
economy (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). In the face of political interest conflicts, Han 
people’s interests are likely to take priority over indigenous peoples’ interests. 
Aboriginal affairs might be only a by-product in the process of compromise and 
political negotiation. Thus, it is a difficult task to find a right “spot,” or position for the 
indigenous movement in relation to the Han people’s nationalist movements, 
regardless of either a Chinese Nation or Taiwanese Nation outcome. It takes political
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insights and strategies to situate the minority movements at a vantage point and to find 
a balanced place within the intricate socio-political conditions which currently 
dominate, so that the indigenous groups can play a role which might be called 
“decisive minorities” in the political arena dominated by Han people.
Table 7.1 shows the six possible relations between the indigenous movement 
and Han people’s nationalism. At a time when the independence/ unification issue is 
considered as the “fundamental” problem on Taiwan’s future, the indigenous 
perspective offers a new way of thinking on this issue. Central to interpretations of the 
table are the definitions of two terms: “identify”, and “accept.” According to Chang 
Mao-kuei (1995), “identify” is defined as the status in which recognition, passion, 
value and activity are all in a balanced situation. It represents a positive attitude, which 
includes the tendency to adopt real supporting activities towards the identified object. 
“Accept” simply means some degrees of consent on dominant ideology and values. 
The latter term lacks the necessary sentimental attitude which is embedded in the term 
“identify.” To adopt an “acceptable” attitude towards either the Chinese or Taiwanese 
Nation could be the result of either utilitarian and opportunist approaches, or merely a 
choice conformable to the will o f dominant ideology, without other options (Chang 
Mao-kuei 1995). In brief, “identify” means an active support while “accept” simply 
indicates a passive consent.
In situation (I), no efforts need to be taken or made. It follows the whole 
assimilation policies provided by the KMT and accepts the whole set of ruling 
institutional arrangements developed by the ROC government. Under this condition, 
Sinicization will continue to be prevalent in every aspect o f daily life. Those KMT
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Table 7.1 The Possible Relations between Indigenous Movement and Han
People’s Nationalisms
Han People’s Nationalisms




2. maintain status quo
(I)
1. politically Sinicized
2. one component of Taiwanese 
























2. aboriginal-Han (Taiwanese) 
struggles
(VI)
Source: After Chang Mao-kuei 1995.
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“mountain” legislators who always helped the KMT establish its legitimacy might fit 
into this category (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). Another possibility is that the indigenous 
movement might identify with another Han regime, the PRC. In this case, the 
aborigines will need to face the independence/unification choice just as their Han 
counterparts must face the issue. The leaders of the indigenous movement will then 
side with the pro-unification force in current Taiwan, and national identity will take 
priority over ethnic identity.
The second situation is to take the side of the progressive, idealistic forces 
within the largest opposition party, the DPP, and to identify with the Taiwanese 
Nation. The progressives are the sole, and most probable, supporters for indigenous 
autonomy (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). To identify with the Taiwanese Nation it is 
probably assumed that Taiwanese Nation will be more progressive and more tolerant 
to different cultures than the rigid concept of the Chinese Nation. However, taking this 
position poses two problems. First, the Taiwanese Nation may not be as progressive as 
it is supposed to be. The nature of Taiwanese nationalism will depend on what kinds 
of socio-political forces emerge in forging the character of the new nation-state. This, 
again, will be decided mostly by Han people’s political struggles. Second, it is quite 
possible that the aborigines’ cultural uniqueness will be lost in the resulting Sinicized 
politics. The indigenous movement has to take the risk to be co-opted into the pro­
independence camp to fight the trend towards unification promoted by the KMT hard­
liners, the Chinese New Party, and the PRC. Aboriginal affairs certainly will not be in 
the top priorities o f the political agenda which will invariably be dominated by Han 
people.
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In situations (III) and (IV), the indigenous people do not identify with either the 
Chinese or the Taiwanese Nation. Rather, the position is chosen either because of 
instrumental or strategic positioning, or because there is no other feasible options at 
the time this choice must be made (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). Under these 
circumstances, the indigenous people will tend to partially accept the current 
institutional arrangements and government policies but strive for some extent of 
autonomy. This autonomy will maintain indigenous peoples’ status as effective 
“pressure groups” or we could anticipate them forming political alliances to escalate 
their influence (Chang Mao-kuei 1995). Thus, ideally, the indigenous movement will 
not be ignored or terminated by the overwhelming social, political, and economic 
forces associated with the unification/ independence issue. Nevertheless, there is no 
exact way to figure out the “right distance” that should be kept between the movement 
and these two national discourses. In situation (III), the indigenous movement will ally 
with the “Chinese KMT” and the Chinese New Party, while in situation (IV), the 
alliances will be, perhaps, the “Taiwanese KMT” and the DPP.
Situations (V) and (VI) enable the indigenous groups to completely alienate 
themselves from the unification/independence issue surrounding Han people’s politics. 
The indigenous movement will deny the legitimacy of the current establishment and 
engage in the opening of some new fronts for aborigine-Han ethnic struggles (Chang 
Mao-kuei 1995). By so doing, there will be few alliances with any groups. The 
ensuing social disorders perhaps will cost the present achievements of the indigenous 
movement and might even bring even crueler persecution and suppression from the 
majority Han people (Chang Mao-kuei 1995).
230
R eproduced  with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
As I pointed out above, the nature of the currently constructing Taiwanese 
nationalism may be different from that of Chinese nationalism. From the indigenous 
activists’ point o f view, Taiwanese nationalism might have more progressive elements 
which are willing to accommodate indigenous requests, such as self-autonomy, which 
is virtually impossible under the ideology of orthodox Chinese nationalism. Since a 
complete break with Han nationalism will probably “cost” too much for the 
indigenous movements, the real political situation tends to be a combination between 
(IV) and (V). That is, indigenous leadership neither identifies nor accepts the Chinese 
Nation, but maintains an allied relationship with Taiwanese Nation within the attitude 
of “not identify with but accept” the ideas of the newly formed nationalism (Chang 
Mao-kuei 1995).
Nevertheless, from my own observation, it seems pro-KMT indigenous leaders 
may oscillate between the situations of (I) and (II), reflecting power/ideology struggles 
inside the KMT party. This could also reveal the reality of the currently confused 
identity facing the KMT indigenous elites.
Another perspective regarding the future relationship between the indigenous 
movement and Han Taiwanese nationalism is to locate the indigenous movement on a 
geometric plane where the unification/independence issue forms the vertical axis and 
continuum of a left/right political orientation forms the horizontal axis. On this chart 
(Figure 7.1), there are four constant variables, the political Left and Right and the 
Unification or Independence of Han people’s nationalism. The indigenous movement 
and its various factions will all assume some positions on this chart. Other social 
movements can also be located in this chart together with the indigenous movement.
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Figure 7.1 The Chart of Left/Right and Unification/Independence
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The tendency towards each “pole,” or the “degree” of the tendency can be 
measured by the distance from the center, where zero is politically neutral. In the case 
of the indigenous movement, a neutral positioning on the Unification/Independence 
issue can not be interpreted as “not identify with and not accept” any kind of Han 
people’s nationalism as define by Chang Mao-kuei. Rather, the neutral position should 
be interpreted as a “confused identity” or just mere indifference.
The selection o f these four variables by no means imply that these are the more 
“fundamental” factors than others, or that the unification/independence issue should 
take priorities over other social movements. It simply means that these are the four 
important factors which have emerged from my approach on the relationship between 
the indigenous movement and Han people’s nationalism. For example, the 
Presbyterian Church-led indigenous movement would probably locate within Sector 
two (2) where a pro-independence stance is clear but has varying degrees of 
inclination towards the political right. The “tribalism” movement, with its goal on 
grassroots radical democracy and its emphasis on nativistic cultural rehabilitation, 
would be located within Sector three (3). The indigenous delegates associated with the 
Chinese New Party in the National Assembly would situate within Sector one (1). 
Some progressive indigenous activists who are influenced by certain old left-wing Han 
intellectuals, mostly political prisoners imprisoned during the forty-year-long martial- 
law era and now associated with the small Workers’ Party (lao tung dang), are best 
situated within Sector four (4). The overall trend, i.e. the “mainstream” indigenous 
movement, will be slightly left-oriented and heavily pro-independence. That is, the 
right and lower comer of Sector (3) within the area of (A).
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There is a seemingly strong tendency towards radicalism within some of the 
indigenous activists. The more radical the person becomes, the greater justification the 
person tends to enjoy. This radical inclination tends to escalate and politicize all 
indigenous requests for reform and change to a state of nation-to-nation affairs where 
Han people are viewed as illegal intruders. By defining Han people in this way, the 
goal of peaceful ethnic co-existence is significantly undermined. “Natural 
sovereignty,” arguably the most controversial idea in the worldwide indigenous 
movement, at its most extreme form, could be another form of ethno-nationalism, 
where citizenship is only conferred to members o f specific ethnic groups, in this case, 
the aborigines. In fact, some conservative forces, such as the PPRA, will co-opt the 
idea and polarize its implication to create an impression that all supporters of the 
indigenous movement aim to expel all the Han people to beyond the Taiwan Strait. 
However, in its “softer” form, natural sovereignty is a revolutionary concept in re­
examining the dominant ideology of “state” sovereignty and could lead the way to 
building a culturally diverse political entity, which may not ultimately be in the form 
of current nation-state.
For the land-related issues, the prevalent radicalism within the indigenous 
resistant elites is epitomized in the ideas of one of my main informants. He insists that 
the “starting point” in the (future) negotiation between the aborigines and the Han 
government, should be the official recognition that the indigenous peoples are entitled 
to the original reservation lands as defined by the Japanese during the colonial era 
(Interview A). Although this is a justified argument to me in terms of ethnic justice, its 
feasibility remains highly doubtful. Its real implementation would inevitably trigger
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extensive social disorder, which in turn, would possibly negate the present 
accomplishments of the indigenous movement and give rise to intense ethnic hatred 
directed quite locally as well as nationally at the indigenous population.
The much-publicized idea of aboriginal self-autonomy receives relatively little 
attention and discussion in terms of actual plans. The absence of any theoretical 
construction in the substantial details of the idea of self-autonomy would simply create 
another beautiful but empty radical slogan. The self-government issue involves 
intricate social, cultural, and political affairs that are specific to each geographical 
location. Different indigenous groups in different areas of Taiwan require special 
designs for the implementation of self-autonomy, not to mention the role which the 
direct application o f previous experience abroad might possibly play in this new 
condition.
7.3 Nature, Landscape and the New Human-Land Relations
The watershed area of Te-Chi Reservoir has experienced more negative side 
effects from human activities than any of the other major reservoirs in Taiwan. The 
ecological consequence of excessive development of slopeland in the Li-Shan area 
was cautioned against long ago by many scholars, including geographers (Chang 
Chang-yi 1992). A landslide monitoring project is being built to watch closely the 
potential hazard.
As public environmental awareness increases in Taiwan, the steep slopeland 
cultivation practiced in the Li-Shan area immediately became the object of public 
condemnation. Both indigenous and Han farmers are blamed for the visible 
environmental deterioration. Virtually the whole environmentalists’ argument is
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focused on slope cultivation and its possible consequences. The role of the 
government is thus confined to the elimination of “illegal” cultivation, which was set 
as the cultivation of any land exceeding 28 degrees. As the problem evolved, the state 
was tactically detached from assuming responsibility for its own policies which 
contributed significantly to the problem. Rarely did anyone blame the mode of 
production and the developmental ideology which the potentially dangerous land use 
patterns reflected. The “scientific fact” of the 28-degree limit encounters no challenge. 
Moreover, the continued use of the Te-Chi reservoir seems to be taken for granted by 
the academic community and environmentalists and continues to be justified by the 
developmental ideology long promoted by the government.
The environmental concerns in the Li-Shan area seem to give too much 
emphasis to the technical dimensions of the problem while at the same time ignoring 
locally specific social and historical conditions. Few look at the problem from the 
viewpoint of the greater political economy, which would probably reveal that the 
intensive utilization o f marginal land is the result o f displacement o f both forestry land 
and the related subsistence economy by a profit-seeking capitalist mode of production. 
However, the political economy does not determine quite as many locally specific 
outcomes as some radicals would expect (Bebbington 1996). Of course, there are 
many perspectives on this issue that clearly involves more than just environmental 
issues in the plains areas, and the presence of the indigenous population. Often 
missing from most studies, is the question regarding how locally specific historical 
and geographical contexts help to shape the current social and political relations found 
in the Li-Shan area. What are the implications of the landscape changes which have
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occurred in the past forty to fifty years? And how can we interpret these changes 
predicated on efforts to bring about “modernization”? Does the presence of indigenous 
peoples provide any unique perspective to the current situation? And lastly, perhaps, is 
the even more fundamental question “What is the relationship that we want between 
Nature and society?”
One of the most significant historical events in the Li-Shan area is the 
colonialism experience of the local aborigines. The Japanese established the Taiwan 
Power Company in 1919 to exploit the hydroelectric power potential o f the upper 
reaches o f the island’s major rivers (Chang Chang-yi 1989:39). Although hydrologic 
surveys were conducted on the Da Chia River by the colonial government in its 
attempt to develop mountain resources, the Te-chi reservoir was actually not 
constructed by the KMT government until 1969 (Chang Chang-yi 1989:61). The 
introduction o f the capitalist mode of production and the commercialization of local 
agrarian products such as fruit following the opening of the cross-island highway in 
1960 accelerated the displacement of the traditional indigenous way of life. Li-Shan’s 
high altitude not only enables the growth of temperate-zone fruits and vegetables in 
Taiwan, but also draws Han people, with their capital, and a different social and 
political economy into the mountains. With respect to changes in social and political 
structures, those with positions in public office and as clergy in Western religions have 
replaced the traditional symbols of authority. The heads of the hsian, the village, and 
the peasants’ organizations, and even the local cadres of political parties now exert 
more influence than traditional tribal authorities.
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Human labor, together with capital investment from beyond the region 
transformed the “natural,” “primitive” landscape into a different “cultural,” if more 
“profitable” landscape (at least from the Han people’s point of view). The sacred 
landscapes, often associated with the traditional symbols of authority, are now viewed 
from a different, more secular stance. If landscape can be “read” as a “text,” the 
continual changing landscape can then possess different embedded meanings at 
different times, for different people, and for different places.
In the Li-Shan area, previous geographical studies focused on the conservation 
of nature, on deforestation due to slopeland cultivation, and on the safety of reservoir 
(see Chang Chang-yi 1989). The so-called “natural” landscape has never been 
problematized. As a matter of fact, in the discourse construction of the “natural” 
landscape, some people and voices are systematically silenced, or even erased, while 
certain voices are granted the authority to speak for others (Willems-Braun 1997). In 
Li-Shan’s case, the cultural meaning of the landscape for the aborigines is absent from 
previous studies. The cultural interpretation of the landscape gives way to the 
environmentalist’s explanation of “natural” landscape and “resource management,” to 
profit-driven commercialized agriculture, and to law-enforcement government 
agencies. However, the dichotomy of voice and voiceless does not necessarily mean 
that the separation is cut precisely along the ethnic lines, or that the indigenous people 
in Li-Shan are all silenced. Resistance does occur in various forms, including most 
importantly for this research, the re-assertion of ethnic identity. The heterogeneity 
within the indigenous people also makes internal divisions possible.
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The nodes of this triangle of the new hegemonic discourse, thus, are the farmer,
the environmentalist, and the state bureaucracy. Local indigenous people’s culture is
disenfranchised from their surrounding landscape in the proposed “solution” for this
local environmental problem. The new regimes of power and knowledge authorize
particular visions and provide a new legitimate base for state intervention, while at the
same time, either consciously ignore or unconsciously filter out certain visions/voices
in the discourse construction of Li-Shan’s environmental problem. That is, the voices
of the indigenous people who live in the area are ignored. In the fields of conservation
and resource management, nature is made to appear as an empty space separated from
indigenous cultural activities (Willems-Braun 1997).
Native village sites became tied to a traditional, nonhistorical 
culture, and separated from a surrounding landscape that was 
figured, in turn, as a field for the enterprise of a dynamic modem 
culture. Colonial discourse... did not erase, it displaced. Erasure 
occurred, to be certain, but not through lack of attention 
(Willems-Braun 1997).
In the “colonial gaze” of both the Japanese and the KMT, primitive culture and 
pristine nature in the mountain areas were the objects of colonial conquest. The 
relation between indigenous culture and nature were simply a subject of 
anthropological studies. In the construction of colonial discourse on resource 
management and development, “nature” in the indigenous territory was displaced from 
its local contexts and relocated into the abstract spaces of the nation-state (Willems- 
Braun 1997). In the context of the colonial history, nature was made available as a 
landscape of resources rather than cultural and social landscapes (Willems-Braun
1997). In this sense, nature becomes an object of “imaginative geography” (after Said 
1986) in the process of socio-political construction for conquest and exploitation. This
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nature, thus, is less a “natural” product than a human factor. Thus, the State was able 
to resolve the problem of indigenous rights of access, presumably by assigning 
aborigines certain portions of the “wilderness” as “reservation lands,” while the rest of 
the “nature,” with no visible signs or traces of culture, could be appropriated into the 
administrative space o f either the empire or the nation-state. The whole “wilderness” 
was then subject to “rational” management, or conservation, or development. For a 
developmental state in which economic growth was the legitimate base of continued 
power, rational resource management in essence, was to encourage development, 
according to local geographical conditions. Li-Shan, therefore, became the largest area 
for the production of temperate-zone fruits in Taiwan.
For indigenous peoples in Taiwan, colonial relations with the state did not end 
when the Japanese empire collapsed after WWII. The new developmental programs 
imposed by the KMT threatened to re-inscribe colonial histories throughout the 
indigenous territories and erased the efforts of the present-day struggles for indigenous 
sovereignty. The natural “wilderness” of the Han people’s rhetoric, which is subject to 
political and economic calculation for state administration and resource exploitation 
respectively, is a highly “cultural” landscape in the local aboriginal rhetoric (Willems- 
Braun 1997).
The ongoing “modernizing” policies and processes which occurred in the Li- 
Shan area have generally been considered as an example of domination over nature by 
modernization. After the emergence o f the pan-indigenous movement in Taiwan, the 
“primitive” aborigines are, willingly or unwillingly, located “closer” to “mother 
nature,” and considered to possess more environmental ethics associated with
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sustainability. In fact, however, recently indigenous ecological wisdom has received 
wide attention throughout the world. It is so broadly conceived that some define 
indigenous peoples as having a special relationship with the earth. Indigenous peoples 
seem to exist inseparably with the nature and they are also inextricably connected with 
the concept of sustainable development in “alternative” development discourse 
(Merchant 1992:222-227). This is one of the most positive social representations and 
imaginations incorporated in mainstream constructions of indigenous peoples, despite 
the fact that aborigines’ descendants may be assimilated into “modern” citizens and 
lose connections with the (mainstream construction of) “nature.” Ironically perhaps, 
and despite these widely held perceptions, the process of land and resource 
appropriation is continuing in various indigenous territories. Those displaced are 
forced to relocate and frequently moved to even more peripheral areas where their 
connections with their own ancestral lands are terminated. Given the effects of mining, 
fishing, logging, and pollution in many indigenous areas, the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples in 1981 identified multinational companies “as the most 
immediate and serious threat to the survival of Indigenous Nations o f the Fourth 
World” (Wilmer 1993:128).
A simple bisection which stresses that modernity marks the transition from
harmony with nature, to the exploitation of nature, is, however, problematic. Willems-
Braun (1997) argues that,
... what differentiates premodern from modem relations with 
nature is not harmony versus domination so much as different 
knowledges and technologies that articulated nature as a social 
object and made it available to economic and political calculation 
in new ways, (original italics)
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Knowledges and technologies are thus socially constructed and cannot be value 
free. This is particularly clear in the social movements which incorporate ideas of 
indigenous knowledge and practices into their alternative choices (Bebbington 1996). 
On the one hand, indigenous agrarian technology is not only “an instrument of 
environmental manipulations, but is a symbol speaking to rural people of their social 
history and relationships, a sign by which they read their identities and their 
relationships with past, present, and future” (Bebbington 1996). On the other hand, 
colonial knowledge as well as modem technologies help contribute to the creation of 
Li-Shan’s current landscape and geography as Taiwan’s biggest production area of 
temperate-zone crops.
A new human-land relationship which is inspired partly by indigenous 
ecological wisdom is evolving among environmentally conscious individuals and 
groups. A plan which incorporates traditional hunting ethics with modem wildlife- 
management is being put into practice in Southern Taiwan. Perhaps counterintuitive, 
the academics involved in this plan claim that hunting may actually help protect the 
environment and assure sustainable resource use (Chang Chin-ju 1997). The pressure 
on Taiwan’s wildlife populations has rarely come from the aborigines who have 
practiced hunting for thousands of years. Rather, urbanization and capitalism not only 
brings environmental problems directly to cities where industrial pollution is 
prevalent, but also indirectly to the mountains by “luring” indigenous people to leave 
their homes for wage incomes. Thus, the deserted villages and empty households only 
make it easier for outside intruders to come in and “hunt” for profits. At present, rare 
and /or wild animals are sold as commodities without the full complement of
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traditional religious, ethical, social beliefs, and cultural meanings. By returning these 
“natural” lands to indigenous people, involving them in resource management 
decisions, and “recovering” the ecological wisdom embedded in their traditional life, 
the possibility o f sustainable development seems to be greater. This combination of 
modern academic and traditional knowledge can potentially also create new income 
sources to bring back youths from the cities. This return migration of indigenous youth 
is an important goal of the new “tribalism” (Interview E).
A solid material basis (viable economy, food, shelter, and water) is the 
prerequisite to sustain a cohesive cultural identity. However, under the current policy 
context, the material basis in indigenous territories is genuinely threatened either by 
the deteriorating conditions in the rural economy due to the uneven development 
found in these places in Taiwan, or by unsustainable developmental policies. To 
recover the economy in mountain areas demands the creation of new types of non­
agrarian activities (Bebbington 1996). Eco-tourism is a solution proposed by one of 
my informants who is the major figure in the “tribalism” movement. He calls for 
returning the nature to the aborigines’ management with the cooperation from 
academics (Interview E). As “modem mountain guardians,” regulated hunting and 
harvesting by indigenous peoples, in fact, will not only maintain the health of the 
ecosystem, but also could possibly rejuvenate entire aboriginal communities both 
socially and economically. He argues that, by so doing, the young aborigines will have 
to learn traditional wisdom from experienced hunters to become professional tour 
guides in order to lead “eco-tourists” into the “nature” that is filled with “cultural” 
meanings. Through such activities and as a further benefit, urban dwellers will learn to
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respect indigenous cultures and thus, aborigines will re-establish ethnic pride while at 
the same time, they will be able to deriving an income from traditional cultural 
practices.
The call o f tribalism, in fact, corresponds to the new trend of international 
conservation strategies to involve indigenous peoples, whose ways of life and identity 
are tightly linked to particular places and territories, into resource management and 
establishment of protected areas (Stevens 1997). Historically, the establishment of 
many supposedly “uninhabited” national parks has posed major threats to the cultural 
survival and sovereignty of indigenous peoples (Stevens 1997). Through the 
involvement of indigenous peoples in conservation activities, both mainstream and 
indigenous societies are more aware o f human rights and sovereignty issues raised by 
the establishment o f national parks and other protected areas. This theory (and trend) 
o f indigenous involvement in grassroots conservation can also be mirrored in the 
development of tribalism in Taiwan. “New” types of national parks based on this 
principle in which indigenous peoples share policy making and management 
responsibilities with government agencies, can be seen in many countries (Herlihy 
1997; Nietschmann 1997). Indigenous peoples are not only involved in conservation 
activities, but also in re-gaining the “rights to interpret” their homelands by engaging 
in indigenous map-making projects initiated by scholars from outside (Herlihy 1998).
In Taiwan, another successful example of indigenous management of natural 
resources comes from Shanmei Village in Chia-yi County in southern Taiwan where 
the collective cooperative efforts of the villagers have systematically prohibited 
outsiders from electrocuting and poisoning the fish in Tanayiku River. The Thao
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indigenous people set up their own protected area which stretches 15 kilometers along 
the river, and then established the “Shanmei Village Environmental Protection 
Association” in 1989 (Cheng Yuan-ching 1992). Many aboriginal areas drew capital 
from outside business groups for the development of tourism only to see their 
environment destroyed, but Shanmei is an exception (Cheng Yuan-ching 1992). Lands 
are held by the aborigines because of a democratically reached consensus among 
villagers to protect their lands and environment from commercial development. 
Although the villagers do not apply the term “tribalism”, such aboriginal conservation 
actions hold out hope for cultural preservation and possibly economic renaissance to 
the indigenous community as well as attracting youths back to their tribe.
The relations between society and nature are, of course, dynamic and constantly 
changing. The modernist binary discursive construction, however, tends to separate 
these two into “pure” and irrelevant domains and ignores their deeply interrelated 
realms (Swyngedouw 1996). In this discourse, nature belongs to the purely physical, 
natural world and is only transformed by the social (Swyngedouw 1996). Nature itself 
as a historical-geographical process is completely neglected so that the hegemonic 
culture has the legitimacy to exploit the “primitive” physical world. Nevertheless, 
when the concept of nature is considered as socially constructed and culturally varied, 
we also need to be alert to the danger of slipping into the extreme relativism (Proctor
1998).
A new human-land relation can only be constructed through a different dynamic 
natural-social process, and through respecting different cultural perspectives toward 
nature. Different cultures utilize and interpret nature in different ways, just like
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different eco-systems, and as such these perspectives also have their own places in the 
physical world. If eco-diversity is crucial to the balance of the natural/physical world 
and the sustainability of resource management, similarly, perhaps, cultural diversity 
will be the essential way for humanity to raise its chances to survive on the earth 
(Ming Li-Kuo 1997). In this regard, however, I agree with the humanistic view that 
the current environmental protection and ecological conservation should not be the 
end to surpass human values, but a means to a more culturally diversified, livable 
world.
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CHAPTER 8. RETROSPECT AND LIMITATIONS: THE 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF STUDIES
The final chapter will provide an extensive retrospect considering the research 
process and the obtained results. I also discuss some limitations o f this research and 
offer other possible directions for further studies.
Although the land rights claims of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples is the major 
focus o f my research, other issues are essential and unavoidable in dealing with the 
relationships between lands and aborigines. Under current socio-political conditions, a 
call for indigenous separatism, as many indigenous activists seem to suggest, is an 
impasse. Moreover, indigenous ethno-separatism will not only draw hostility from 
every social class and political platform, but also such radicalism will offset the 
previous efforts in constructing indigenous movements. As the movement was 
initiated by social minority and political underprivileged groups, it is worthy of 
sympathy and support. My observation is that the pursuit of radicalism misled some 
indigenous activists into either ethno-nationalism or indigenous chauvinism. The 
former, as I analyzed previously, cannot benefit the progressive movement. The later 
is simply another loser’s psychological desire to displace the winner’s hegemonic 
status. To use Fanon’s “Black Skin, White Masks” as a parallel example, the ideology 
of aboriginal chauvinism reflects only the deep frustration of self-esteem. Some 
indigenous intellectuals are aware o f this possibility and call for a more tolerate and 
less self-centrist approach in awakening indigenous peoples’ consciousness at the 
grassroots level (Sun Da-chuan 1995b).
Indigenous youths, face both a rapidly deteriorating traditional culture, and an 
increasing lack of understanding of the ancestral lands, mountains, and forests
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surrounding the tribes. They must resist not only the tremendous pressures for further 
Sinicization, but also ignorance of their own cultures and traditions. Therefore, each 
individual expressions of aboriginal consciousness, such as speaking aboriginal 
languages, engaging in traditional hunting, participating in religious ceremonies, and 
becoming involved in nativistic cultural activities, regardless these activities are 
carried out by Han or indigenous people, are resistances against hegemonic cultural 
assimilation. The study of the “geography o f resistance,” either in daily life or in the 
national political arena, will deploy a new perspective in search for a more reasonable 
and egalitarian ethnic relationship. It is also from the accumulated successes of minor 
resistance that the minority groups may one day have their say in the formation of 
some form o f “cultural hybridity” in post-colonial societies.
Land conflicts between indigenous peoples and the dominant groups around the 
world seem to surround economic interests. Many cases actually involve multinational 
corporations, and/or a coalition of State and business groups (Wilmer 1993:128-31). 
To indigenous peoples, land issues also involve the formation of identity, culture, 
religion, and way of life. The meaning of land is always far beyond simple economic 
interests. In this regard, the ecological wisdom of indigenous peoples has many issues 
in common with environmentalists. My concern is how the global 
environmental/ecological movements can combine both local knowledge and down- 
to-the-earth activities in order to be successful. The experiment of “tribalism” in 
southern Taiwan to involve indigenous people in local natural resource management 
presents a prospective alternative for the construction of a new society-nature 
relationship.
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The capitalist modes of both mass production and mass consumption seem never 
suitable to the indigenous peoples’, arguably, sustainable way of live. Any discussion 
on “sustainable development” without mentioning the alteration of the current 
economic system will be largely in vain.
From the global/local dichotomy, another interesting perspective is derived by 
an examination of the impacts of the development of both democracy and technology 
on various locations. On the one hand, the objectives of the “farmer-first” approach, 
introduced by Bebbington (1996), are to promoted farmers’ participation in 
agricultural development, to engage in the democratization of farmers’ organizations, 
and to “challenge prevailing ‘taken-for-granted’ power relationships in which the rural 
poor are always convinced of as ‘clients,’ recipients, and the objects of somebody 
else’s development strategy.” The democratization o f farmers’ organization at the 
local level in Taiwan is a particularly urgent issue since heads of many local farmers’ 
organizations have a common reputation of being the surrogates for gigantic business 
groups or even underground gangster organizations. For farmers, simply having the 
right to vote for their organization’s head is not enough to improve the long power 
imbalance between farmers themselves and the agri-business networks centered in the 
metropolitan areas. So far, the farmers in Li-Shan still rely heavily on advice from 
private agri-business groups for critical information on the application of agri­
chemicals to their crops. The private companies monopolize essentially all information 
sources of the Li-Shan farmers and enable the perpetuation of this uneven power 
relationship between rural farmers and core capital.
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On the other hand, especially for the indigenous farmers in Li-Shan, the 
application of modern technology seems to signal an increasing distance from the past, 
from traditional “authentic” indigenous cultures, and reflects an increasing 
dependency on the elite groups (Bebbington 1996). However, this could also be an 
opportunity to escape from the old social relationship (i.e. domination, discrimination, 
and oppression) with the dominant groups. The result of the application o f modem 
technology depends upon how the indigenous farmers are incorporated in the political 
economy context and through what ways the farmers are offered accesses to modem 
technology.
The establishment of indigenous autonomous zones might be a very remote but 
meaningful goal for activists. The demarcation of the autonomous zones in a small 
island like Taiwan requires, of course, a tremendous amount of negotiation, political 
compromise, and requires an imagination of a broad future picture. Not only the 
current administrative structures and boundaries require adjustment, but a new attitude 
towards “the others” is also needed in developing a peaceful and mutual beneficial 
solution. In my view, it is the inability, by all, to imagine both a new relation among 
ethnic groups and the possibility o f “shared sovereignty” over a certain territory o f a 
nation-state that manifests the largest obstacle in the creation of the true autonomous 
zones within a nation-state. The long-established idea of nationalism that demands 
both the homogenization represented by a “national culture” and the citizens’ loyalty 
to the State erects an almost invincible ideological hurdle for founding a difference- 
sensitive multicultural nation-state. Thus, land conflicts also incorporate the political
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struggles over cultural politics, once the geography-sensitive indigenous peoples are 
involved.
The suggestion from the core members of the PPRA to relocate the aborigines to 
collective farmland reveals the disrespectful mainstream attitude towards minority 
groups. The long-time stiff indoctrination of reactionary nationalism within the 
compulsory standardized education has certainly contributed to the formation of Han 
chauvinism in Taiwan.
As social values and “high” or “low” culture are defined and measured from the 
perspective of dominant Han culture, the indigenous populations in Taiwan have few 
items left for the formation of a positive ethnic identity. It is not surprising that the 
landscape has become the center of identity formation for indigenous peoples. What is 
a “natural” landscape o f mountains and forests from a Han perspective, is the 
landscape full o f cultural and religious meanings for aborigines. The interpretation of 
landscape in the development of tourism, frequently mentioned in the tourist 
brochures, thus, becomes another political arena for indigenous peoples to regain their 
rights to interpret the landscape that is possessed with cultural meanings. In fact, I find 
that new pan-indigenous identity in Taiwan is forged partially through the recovery of 
landscape meanings to local indigenous communities. For example, the peak o f the 
Pei Da Wu Shan has recaptured its status as the sacred mountain for both Paiwan and 
Rukai peoples in southern Taiwan, while Da Pa Chien Shan is sacred for Atayal 
people in central Taiwan. Before the emergence of the indigenous cultural renaissance, 
these two mountains were simply the objects of conquest for both Japanese colonial 
mountaineers and modern urban mountaineers. Colonial relationship also vividly
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expressed in Japanese “conquering” Taiwan’s Central Mountain Ridge when the 
resource surveys were conducted, and in the erection of a statue of one high-ranking 
KMT official in the top o f Yu—Shan, the highest peak in Taiwan.
This struggle to recover the original cultural meanings o f landscapes is another 
manifestation that resistance to cultural hegemony has occurred through some very 
common daily routines, at every possible geographical location, and in every potential 
arena.
This dissertation takes considerable space to deal with the development and 
retrospections of the many indigenous movements in Taiwan. However, my goal is not 
to provide a self-righteous, theoretically sound and practically feasible strategy or 
approach for the indigenous movements. Actually, it is probably beyond the capability 
and responsibility o f any academic to point out a “correct” direction for the 
development of indigenous movements. However, I do not wish to imply that the 
academics should remain politically neutral and innocent. Rather, as the proponents of 
hermeneutics will argue, no researchers can eschew personal involvements, 
emotionally or academically, in their field studies of the research objects (see the 
argument of Duncan and Ley 1993). The representation and description of both 
individual persons and indigenous movements in which they participate are eventually 
based on the author’s own ideology and reflect the selective absorption of “field data” 
gathered and the outcomes o f participant observation.
Another concern that is worth noting in the concluding chapter is the question 
regarding whether or not it is appropriate to apply theory and methodology developed 
in/from the Western World to the study o f social phenomena in a society that has
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completely different historical, geographical, social, cultural, and political contexts. In 
his insightful paper, Liao Ping-hui (1995) has already provided a critical examination 
on this concern, but I would like to pursue these thoughts further.
Despite the fact that many theories were developed in the West (academic 
colonialism?), what makes post-colonial theories special is that many of important 
figures in post-colonial literatures are from the Third World. These intellectuals had 
established their academic reputations in the West and through their internationally 
renowned celebrity, they have started to build up significant influences and help in 
struggles against the imposition of stereotypes on “the others” by the gaze o f Euro- 
American “imperial eye” (Chen Kuan-hsing 1996). Liao Ping-hui in fact, not only 
problematizes the direct, uncritical application of the Western theories to Taiwan’s, or 
more broadly, East Asian societies. He actually opposes the direct import of post­
colonial theories. However, post-colonial theory is hardly a homogenous 
theory/phenomenon, as no colonialism created the same impacts at different time and 
upon different cultures and peoples. Thus, colonial legacies always interact with local 
histories and geographies to produce each individual, unique post-colonial society. 
Moreover, to debate the suitability to “qualify” Taiwan’s society as post-colonial, one 
might mislead and misuse the conceptualization of post-colonialism. As I argued at 
Section 2.1, post-colonialism studies in both the colonial “mother countries” and 
mostly, the Third World societies, which have not yet completely de-colonized in that 
their colonial past still works on the formation of new identities, cultures, and 
societies, should be a dynamic process rather than a fixed theoretical framework that 
confines our geographical imagination.
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Finally, I will provide some other possible interesting directions for further 
research in related topics. However, before more detailed research in Li-Shan can be 
conducted, a long overdue extensive land use survey should be undertaken by the 
KMT government. This survey should clarify the ownership and leasing rights of the 
reservation lands. Only after the basic land data are publicly available can a realistic 
picture o f contested autonomous zones be roughly sketched. Geographers and 
anthropologists who are really concerned about the future development of indigenous 
autonomous zones (and actually, benefit from studying the topic and the people) in 
Taiwan should take this social responsibility to push the KMT to enforce this 
comprehensive survey. They also need to prepare for the confusion which will follow 
if all voices are heard.
The aftereffects of the founding of Council o f Aboriginal Affairs can be 
observed from the perspective that under what social and political conditions can the 
State apparatus co-opts radical movements into the establishment and eliminates the 
progressiveness of these movements. Another possible interaction between the State 
apparatus and indigenous movements is that the State absorbs the proposals and 
opinions from indigenous movements to further consolidate its rule over aborigines. 
However, the Council is too new to make any conclusion from its brief history of 
interaction with indigenous activists as
of fall 1998. What is sure is that the Council has absorbed some indigenous elites into 
the establishment in the past two years.
Gender issues are basically absent from my analysis in all aboriginal affairs. In 
the patriarchal Han state and society, indigenous women often suffer “double
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marginalization” from the outside world (the State, stereotypes constructed by mass 
media and education) and inside world (men’s chauvinism embodied in father, 
husband, and son). In identity politics, a frequently asked question by feminists is 
“What identity and in whose country?” because traditionally, politics is a men’s 
domain and the identity question is often treated, incorrectly, as gender blinded. 
Maternal social organizations did exist among some of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, 
but the assimilating process significantly reduces the feasibility in practicing the 
traditional way of organizing a society. Indigenous women have to fight not only the 
paternal/military authority of the KMT regime, but also patriarchy deeply embedded 
in some traditional aboriginal cultures. This may cast a dilemma for some female 
activists as they try to recover the “authentic traditional culture” that includes the 
unbearable patriarchal system. Nevertheless, this dilemma could also provide an 
opportunity to forge a new indigenous female identity, which not only challenges 
mainstream discourse of national identity (i.e. the Chinese identity), but also defies the 
designated role of females by patriarchal authority. Furthermore, this dilemma also 
offers a dynamic view towards the formation of a new (perhaps, the real post-colonial) 
culture that is capable of changing itself and absorbing new elements in a dynamic 
world.
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